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African Philosophy, African Jurisprudence and Cultural Realism: Propounding a Hundred Propositional Postulations

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Abstract

Controversies and debates over the possibility of African philosophy and African Jurisprudence are rife and rampant in the literature. However, discussions and discourses concerning the connection between these two disciplines and the concept of cultural realism is missing, non-existent and simply ignored or neglected. The objective of this paper consisted in underscoring the utility that these two disciplines bring to the intellectual and ideological tables when and where matters about Africa are discussed. The paper discovered that Africa philosophy and Africa jurisprudence do not only have a serious and significant connection between themselves, but, in equal terms, do show that they are veritable items, issues and ideas concerning the concept of cultural realism. The paper further discovered that imbued in and exuded by these two disciplines is the power and the performing prowess of what may be called cultural rationality. Cultural rationality is evidently reflected in both African philosophy and African jurisprudence. The paper concluded that this principle of cultural rationality evidenced in both disciplines makes it possible for some propositional postulations about Africa Philosophy and Africa jurisprudence to be propounded in the light of the ideological background and historical context that Africa had experienced all along.

Keywords: *African philosophy, African jurisprudence, Cultural realism, History, Ideology*

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1. Introduction

Ideally, although realistically, the substance and subject matter of African Renaissance is strictly, seriously and significantly tied to the growing awareness towards and the conscious concern about the concept and agenda of development. If renaissance is to be provoked into thoughtful actuality and possibility, it could mean that development is the pathway to actualizing that major concern and goal of Africa. Undoubtedly, the major, most monumental, momentous and meaningful challenge to Africa in the 21st century is that of the several but seasoned debates, disputes, discourses, contentions and consistent controversial conversations wrapped around and wired about the nature, character, contour and consequence of development. Indeed, the face and phase of development in any Continent, for any Continent, around any continent is a multi-faceted one. Being multi-faceted, it could correctly mean that what constitute development in its actual or thorough sense, it is not limited to just one area of concern, just one approach in adventure or just one dimension of determined deeds to be achieved. Concerning Africa, the context and conditions for development seems to have been restricted to some areas of popular and performing interest such as the economic, material, scientific, technological, the

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military, the social, the political and so on and so forth. One or two areas of interest concerning development in Africa and which seems to have been neglected and overlooked in the seasoned addresses and several debates consist in the philosophical and jurisprudential approaches. The argument of the paper, without any sense of agonizing adventure, preposterous imagination and patronising nonsense, is that if the pathway to African development is to be holistic, robust, rich, rewarding and result oriented, then, it means that analysis concerning the philosophical and jurisprudential angles towards African development ought to be given that pride of place it ought to and could have, necessarily, naturally and by nurtured means. To this end, this paper attempt and adopt a kind of introductory interest in what African philosophy and African jurisprudence have to say and contribute in understanding the peculiar challenge to African development. In the actual sense, this paper attempt to address some basic issues around the contest and controversies over African philosophy and African jurisprudence and, by this articulated analysis, seek, strive and struggle to show that what is often popularly paraded about Africa, in these two areas of cogitative and cerebral possibilities, and mere fabrication and, that, African philosophy and African jurisprudence constitute a reality in Africa 's cultural renaissance that cannot be waved aside nor considered inconsequential if the pathway to African development is to be understood properly, prominently and pre-eminently. To this end, this paper actually throws a challenge against certain misgiving, mis-service, structured but screwed denials that has been made against African Philosophy and African Jurisprudence and, by this, contend that both disciplines have their root in Africa and, that, what is needed in this contemporary context is to showcase the cultural realities about Africa in the area of Philosophy and Jurisprudence. In precise terms, the concern of the paper is the formulation of strongly worded proposition and seriously weighty postulation in defence of cultural realism and renaissance as far as Africa is concerned. Indeed, the paper contends and attempts at pursuing the thesis that if African renaissance and development are to be attained, then, issues, ideas and ideals about Philosophy and Jurisprudence of Africa ought to be recognized, respected, decently reckoned with and its pride of place away from the negative and notorious remarks that have been made against Africa along the line of these disciplines.

Although, the word 'development' sounds like a terminology with serious, solid and special economic undertone, yet, it has a wider spread and sphere whose significance is beyond mere economics. It is possible for a set of people to be planted in the palace, parlour and place of economic and material prosperity. Yet, if the same set of people do not have the legacy of a rich regime and resourceful reign of reasoning, reason and rational capacity and a system of rules that is listed in the language of competent legitimacy and the capacity for legality, such a set of people cannot be said to be enjoying or seen to be embracing full, flowing, free development because the concept of development is holistic, never partially minded nor constructed, all encompassing, an engagement, experience, expression, and exposure that is encyclopaedic. Indeed, true tested and thorough temperament of development could be entailed, encapsulated, and ensconced in the reality of culture and what is culturally real, which means that culture, cultural realism and development are conceptually connected and it may be difficult to divorce them from each other. In this sense, cultural realism is not and never to be conceived and conceded to as odious, opposed nor a challenge to the nitty-gritty, nurtured nuances, substance, subject matter, soul and spirit of development. Importantly, therefore, both Philosophy and Jurisprudence could be conceived and conceded to as agents, instruments and institutions through which cultural realism can be comprehended, in concrete and convincing terms, furthered, harnessed, improved, attained, actualised, accomplished, specially sensitized, strongly supported, seriously and significantly stabilized and socially and serially sustained.

Within the context of an African traditional setting stage and sphere, sophistication, Philosophy and Jurisprudence may be denied, could be denied and deemed unrefined, raw, crude and in tandem with nature but the singularity, spectacularity, speciality and salience of actuality cannot be denied because no human cultural setting as sphere is lacking in those realities; they are properties and realities of culture that are represented in every cultural setting. In what follows, a solid and serious prosecution of the objective of the paper shall be attempted by paying attention to the connection between what is deemed philosophical and that which is conceived to be jurisprudential. In addition, the paper shall itemize the background to the reality of law and philosophy in the African sense and context. And, what is more,

2. Philosophy and Jurisprudence: The Connection

The disciplines of philosophy and jurisprudence both have etymologies, courtesy of their checkered, interesting, inspiring and impressive histories. It could be through that these etymologies are expressible, embedded, enshrined and ensconced in an expertism that derives from specific and particular experiences over time. These etymologies and the experiences on which they are embedded makes both disciplines exciting, enterprising and eloquently engaging in terms of their substance, subject matter, the scope they cover, the seriousness they capture, the significance they convey and

the salience they show and share within the context of the sessions and seasons of special engagement, eloquent expressions and the encounters they exemplify.

Etymologically, philosophy is from two Greek words *Phileo* and *Sophia* which reads as “love of wisdom”. In equal manner, etymologically, jurisprudence come from two Latin words *Juris* and *Prudentia* which means “science, theory or philosophy of law”. Is there any connection between both disciplines? Of course, in certain terms, the answer is the affirmative, because it means that philosophy and jurisprudence are connected as much and as long as it is true that the wisdom, the passion that love resonate or that is resonated through law is the basis of the connection between both disciplines. It means that the rationality, ratiocinativity and contemplativity that law enjoys, expresses and experiences comes from philosophy. Philosophy is the supplier of the architectural reason, foundational content and the fundamental character that jurisprudence manifest, makes use of and mould into its action and activity.

Clearly, convincingly and concretely, one can then say that the reason and wisdom embedded in law is what show, expresses and establishes the connection between philosophy and jurisprudence. Jurisprudence has elements of philosophy. That philosophical element signifies and indicates that there is a quantum of reason and wisdom that law resonate which is the preoccupation of jurisprudence. Jurisprudence, necessarily, naturally and normally, reflect philosophy from the perspective and wisdom which law and its philosophical study, theoretical analysis and scientific articulation reflects.

If the nature of philosophy represents a strong, serious and significant supplier of the statement that signifies the character of jurisprudence, it could follow that our conception of what philosophy is will determine and decide and go a long way in showcasing the true connection between philosophy and jurisprudence in actual fact and nothing more pretentious. What, then, is that conception of philosophy that is found embracive of what jurisprudence equally is? In this light, the conceptual understanding of philosophy with unquestioned utility, to be adopted, as a working basis, is showing the connection between philosophy and jurisprudence, is that offered by Makinde (2007), philosophy is reasoned answers to fundamental questions of life, existence and reality. This definition throws up certain issues that are fundamental to the nature and character of philosophy and which, also, can be utilized in extrapolating concerning the connection between philosophy and jurisprudence.

The first issue in this definition is that philosophy is a response, the response to something, there is always something that philosophy responds to but this response assist in understanding the essential character of philosophy beyond mere response. The nature of response that defines philosophy is in the form of an answer. Philosophy is an answer to some fundamental issues. The answer, which is the response, that depicts the nature and character of philosophy is the reasoned one not just any answer not just any response but a reasoned answer and response. Reason defines philosophy essentially without any sense of compromise or negotiated notation and nurture in negativity. The answers that philosophy exhibits and expresses are: reasoned answers and responses, to fundamental questions of life. It means those questions are not ordinary, empty questions ensconced in nothingness. They are fundamental questions which means philosophy does not address itself, does not provide reasoned response and answers to non-fundamental questions. In short, it is not all questions of life that philosophy addresses. Again, the questions that philosophy provide reasoned answer to are fundamental, so, philosophy is interested in questions because it is convinced that it has answers. Nevertheless, from the perspective of philosophy, the answers that philosophy provides to fundamental questions are not just answers, but, reasoned answers. It follows evidently, that reason is the rule, reason is the reigning rule in the regime and region where philosophy reigns. Reason is the only law and the order. The temperament of philosophy is that which is tailored towards and patterned after reason and reasonability.

And, what is more, the nature of philosophy, from this conceptual understanding, covers fundamental questions relating to life, existence and reality in the significant, natural, material and physical senses. The reasoned answers that philosophy provides to fundamental questions are answers and questions that are legitimately related to life, existence and reality. Evidently, philosophy and jurisprudence have something in common as much as it is true that jurisprudence exhibits and expresses the temperament of philosophy. Reason is the rule in jurisprudence, this is where jurisprudence derives its philosophical temperament, traits and tendencies.

One problematic dimension to this connection between philosophy and jurisprudence is that if jurisprudence is endorsed in philosophy, to reflect the philosophical, the question is, which conception of philosophy does jurisprudence accommodate, admits, acknowledges, harbors, conveys, expresses, exhibits because there are different conceptions of philosophy that are not in tandem with one another, nor are they tailored towards the emphatic temperament enjoined and entailed in the dictums, deeds, and details of one another. In Western Philosophy, for example, conceptions of philosophy such as the Socratic, Cartesian, Hegelian, Marxist, Russellian, Wittgensteinian, all exist with due sense and

diligent essence of paramount performance, popular potency and paradigms paraded in prowess. Beyond all these, the paradigm of what philosophy is to African notably craves for attention and peculiarly strives, struggles and sweats with avid strength and adventurous stamina or recognition and respectable reckoning. So, given this list and litany of conceptions of philosophy, which does Jurisprudence endorse, embrace and entertain? One possible clue is to make the submission that Jurisprudence could decide to follow the common traits that all these conceptions express without any sense of doubt.

Although, Makinde's definition is a good one to follow, in actual fact, a working definition to follow, yet, some critical issues can be raised from this conception of philosophy: one, It makes philosophy too simplistic; two, this definition reduces philosophy to an exercise with the atmosphere a formal examination and experience, it is as if the philosopher is engaged in the writing of an examination where there are questions and answers to be provided; three, given this perception, it makes understanding of philosophy too ordinary, yet, what philosophers do in actual fact and nothing more pretentious, can be tagged as extraordinary. In another sense, this definition could mean that if there are no question, there is no philosophy. Although what Philosophers do is in the forms of questions for which there are reasoned answers, yet, it doesn't seem to be like this all through, since there are philosophical attempt that are carried out, engagingly, which do not resonate nor resemble reasoned answers being provided to fundamental questions at all.

Furthermore, this conception of philosophy is not total. Why? It is because the definition is not representative of that cultural dimension of philosophy that doesn't see, regard and hold reason as the ultimate and the only method for philosophical engagement. Method of reason could be the choice of the Analytic Tradition. But, what about the Continental Tradition that looks away from the method of reason and adopt and adores other methodic approach in executing, expressing, espousing and expanding the substance and subject matter of their philosophical interest, ideologies and issues of invigorating, illuminating and inspiring intellectuality? Surely, Makindes's romanticization, affection and sympathy for the Analytic Tradition is audaciously clear, the authenticity is authoritative. However, the adventure may not be considered assuringly convincing and its acceptance may not be compelling on account of the fact that reason may not be the ultimate as far as the philosophical exercise, enterprise and engagement is concerned.

The reliance of Philosophy on reason has been criticized, castigated, condemned. Foucault (1982) argued that reason is the anti-party of, inimical and anti-theoretical to the freedom of man as a subjective being. In the same vein, Kierkegaard (1978), the father and founder of modern Existentialism, argue that, If philosophy depends absolutely on reason, such a dependence is cagey, a drive towards philosophical captivity and a descent to a distemper of true intellectuality. In addition, this conception of philosophy re-iterates and repeats the obvious, on one hand, and, on the other hand, reject and repudiates the obvious. This is because questions about life, existence, reality and the universe, simply and straightforwardly, appears to be the obvious and so fundamental such that there is need emphasising that they are fundamental. There are no questions about life that are not fundamental. Indeed, all questions about life are fundamental, although, it could be admitted and agreed to that there could be degrees of fundamentality to various and several issues of life.

From another dimension, this conception of philosophy is problematic in the sense that a good philosophical exercise may not and need not, necessarily, come from the dimension of reasoned answers. A good philosophical engagement may actually come from the angle of reason question alone. Such exercise of philosophical acumen, accuity, adroitness, dexterity and distinguished and differentiated distinction may actually come from reason questions alone. Reasoned answer alone may not be the entire essence of philosophy. It does not mean that the confidence of Makinde in the method of reason is misleading; never the less, it could be tagged as not too informing. What is more, this definition leaves much to be desired, although it could not mean that this definition does not deserve attention. It does. However, the difficulty with this definition is that questions, fundamental questions, may actually turn to be what is philosophical, not necessarily reasoned answers. There could be reasoned questions and who says reasoned questions are not philosophical? Philosophy does not necessarily have to be reasoned answer, but also, reasoned questions.

Makinde's conception of philosophy makes a ridicule of those components of intellectuality that are associated with the tools and methods of philosophy which is reasoned. It gives prominence, primacy and pre-eminence, to reason and the qualification it provides concerning answers and questions are deemed secondary but if there are no answers and no questions, what can reason do? Reason alone cannot stand if it is not conjoined to and connected with specific answers and questions that brightens and showcases the quality, status and strength of reason. Reason is empty when it stands alone. This observation is what Makinde ought to have taken note of.

In addition, Makinde's conception of Philosophy appears too pretentious in the sense that its attempt at conceiving the nature of philosophy hides and conceals the subjective face that all philosophical exercises, experiences and engagement express, eloquently portray, specially epitomize and seriously parade. Philosophy may seek and set out to

be objective but it often ends up being subjective and what it does and what is done in the name of philosophy is outright subjective submissions. The reasoned answers that Makinde alluded to do not inhere in what monolithic. Reasoned answers are always endorsed, embedded and ensconced multiplied forms and are framed in a baffling multitudinous array of ideas on a single subject matter which necessarily reveals the subjective and seriousness of philosophical ideas in content, character and consequence.

Similarly, feminist interpretation can be adopted in the reading of Makinde's conception of philosophy because that conception portrays another subjective element in the nature and character of philosophy. Makinde's definition extols, exalt and emphasizes a phallogocentric understanding of philosophy because reason is touted to be the acme and kpm of what is philosophical. It is popular to say that the male gender exhibit reason, logic and justice while the female gender is conceived as an expression of care, nurture and emotion. It means that Makinde's conception is a free expression of Masculinism. Makinde only offered a phallogocentric definition of philosophy nothing more nothing less. What is wrong if philosophy is defined from the feminist perspective as emotive answers to fundamental questions of life, existence and reality? It is, therefore, possible to charge Makinde for being too patriarchal, gender biased, and anti-woman, anti-feminist in his conception of philosophy. Philosophy could be what it is, depending on who is doing the definition. If feminist conceive philosophy from the emotive point of view, what, exactly, would be the aberration and abomination in such an approach? The point is, if it is agreed that reason is necessary for philosophy to commence and, indeed, proceed, it could not follow that it is the most sufficient of conditions to observe, adopt, and adhere to in establishing the paradigm to follow. In another light, if the phallogocentric and masculinist interpretations can be gleaned and distilled from Makinde's conception of philosophy, one could then say that Makinde's preference constitute an interrogation of Meta-physics by Epistemology since man, the knower, is here perceived, from the phallogocentric and masculinist point of view, is found interrogating fundamental questions of life, existence and reality.

In veracious terms, no philosophical theory is beyond limits, immune from defects, that cannot be set within the context and condition of possible shortcomings, setbacks and loopholes. Every philosophical theory is endorsed, embedded, and embroiled in lingering limits. This reality is the authentic foundation and the assuring, audacious, authoritative basis on which the Theory of Limitabilism is erected upon. Even if the reality of the Theory of Limitabilism finds authentic and articulated applicability concerning Makinde's conception of philosophy. Nevertheless, it is no patronizing nonsense if a sense of gain and utility can be garnered, gathered and gotten from Makinde's concerning the nature and character of Philosophy especially when this conception is emphasized in connection to the existing and ongoing debates, disputes and controversial conversations on what the nature, content, character and consequence of jurisprudence is. If philosophy, according to Makinde, is reasoned answers to fundamental questions of life, existence and reality, how, then, can one define and capture the nature of jurisprudence? For me, within the context of creative constructionism, jurisprudence can be tagged and termed as reasoned answers to fundamental questions concerning the nature, character, consequence, functions, purpose and limits of law within settings and context of culture and spheres and conditions that are global in implications, interest and insights.

This conception of jurisprudence is aching to and shares a sense of similarity, an essence of sameness with that of Dworkin (1979: 1) where and when he defined jurisprudence or, more appropriately, Philosophy of Law, as the discipline that raises philosophical problems associated with the existence and practice of law. Whether it is jurisprudence or Philosophy of law, what takes place in both disciplines are endorsed, embedded and entangled in sameness. Actually, there are no two disciplines; both are the same. What makes them different consist in terminology usage and the fact that the former is undertaken within Law Faculties while the latter takes place within Faculties or departments named "Philosophy". In Jurisprudence or Philosophy of Law, what is done, to the point of satisfaction, is ready, steady, rigorous and robust application of Philosophy and its methodology to the reading, interpretation, investigation and interrogation of law. It means that jurisprudence consist in understanding law in a very wide range of senses that are informed from the perspective of reason. It means that there could be and there are perspectives to the understanding of Law which could be via reason and other means that are not in tandem with reason. However, the choice of jurisprudence is the application, articulation and analysis of Law by utilizing the methodology of Philosophy which is, essentially and necessarily, reason in this context. It is no wonder that Aquinas (1966), Theologian and Natural, Law, Theorist, made the famous submission that Law is 'The ordinance of reason'. It means Law has a place in reason; Law results from the process, position and practice of reflection. Law remains inseparable from reason. Law resides in and revolves around reason. Law is empty and blind when it jettisons the power, prowess, the parading paradigm and potency of reason. This submission defers from the legal traditions that see Law as a social fact, social prophesies or a tool or instrument in class arrangement, antagonisms, animosity, acrimony and conflict. Basically, it is somewhat difficult to divorce or separate Law from the rational mindset paraded and prevalent within existing structures and the constructive epistemology that pervade and permit human societies. So, if law is intricately a rational entity, actions and reactions, when particular laws

go bad, in formation, formulation and implementation, attests to the natural inclination that law is embedded, enshrined and essentially entangled in the web, womb and way of rationality and reasonability. When law regulates in society, it is nothing but rationality and reasonability that are in motion and in activated form. Essentially, therefore, Law, to my mind, is embedded in a modicum of elements that are poised and postured in the pedigree and profile that epitomizes rationality, reasonability and ratiocinativity.

An immediate objection can be raised against this conception concerning the nature, character and content of what law is. One of such objections is the view that this understanding of law underscores a straight forward preference for the Natural Law Tradition, Ideology and Idiosyncrasy. To this end, one could equally object to this conception of law in that, if followed, accepted, affirmed and adhered to, it will imply that law and morality are necessarily connected or have an inseparable relationship. Again, to claim that law is a rational entity is to submit that there is metaphysical mindset exuded by and imbued in nature of law. Other objections could still be raised, but, it is important to state and submit that no particular, peculiar or specific preference is made other than the preference that is a natural concomitance, outflow and emanation from the received and perceived connection between Philosophy and Jurisprudence which is nothing but reason. It does not mean that trending towards reason does not have its own particular limits. Reason has its own limits; Makinde's preference and sympathy for reason have been critiqued earlier. The emphatic points at this stage is the choice or decision to follow the natural consequence of the argument and submission followed all along. If this definition or conception of law adopted all along involves a commitment to devalue that law and morality are inseparable, what, exactly, is criminal about that position? I am aware that Legal Positivism and Legal Realism astutely, passionately and obsessively see every sense of criminality in endorsing, expressing and eloquently defending the thesis of Inseparability between law and morality. I do realize that the conversations around that controversy are legion, legendary and represent a lingering, living, lively and lasting landmarks in Philosophical disquisitions and Jurisprudential debates. However, since the concern in this paper is about the nexus between philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa, therefore, it is important to affirm the most popular and prevalent position adopted in contemporary African Jurisprudence concerning that thesis which is what Idowu and Oke (2008); Idowu (2024) tagged and termed as "The Conceptual Complementarism Thesis". The thesis, in a nutshell, states that, "it is worth reiterating that if a concept is complementary to another concept, though both are different, it does not necessarily follow that they are separable" (Idowu and Oke, 2008:166). Interestingly, within the context of contemporary African jurisprudence, some other pertinent positions concerning law and morality have been argued, advanced, advocated and adumbrated. Examples are "The Epiphenomenalism Thesis" by Adewoye (1987) and Idowu (2006); "The Derivative Thesis" endorsed by Max (1963), Ahiauzu (2006), Wiredu (2004), and Menkiti (1971); "The Culturalist Thesis" by Gyekye (1997) and Murungi (2004); "The Assimilationist Thesis" by Okafor (1984).

Note worthily, the field of philosophy represents a vast domain of knowledge, a bank with proven ideas and a mass of intellectual resources and riches with far reaching proportions, postulations, propositions and pontifications that are seriously and significantly second to none. Jurisprudence happens and appears to be one of the several fields that resonates, reminisces and reflects the expressive, essential and the eloquently engaging temperament, trait and tendency imbued, involved and interred in the exercise, enterprise and engagement named philosophy. If it is true that philosophy is the *sciential matrix*, that is, the mother of the sciences, it could follow that jurisprudence does not seem to have any sense of complains or the stance of rejection against the exercise of ownership over jurisprudence by the dutiful, diligent and doghead discipline tagged philosophy. In this sense, jurisprudence shares in the essential intestine that makes the activity of philosophical thinking worthwhile, wealthy, weighty and winsome overtime. To be quite sure, the etymologies and epistemologies of Philosophy and Jurisprudence are endorsed, foregrounded and enthused in paradigms of popular, persistent and parading perspicacity that has refused to be diminished and that continues to constantly and consistently create character, content and consequential controversies in historically happy, healthy, hygienic and habitual conversations. The marriage between Philosophy and Jurisprudence, historically, was tied, still is and will continue to be tied at the altar of reason, the temple of rationality and the territory of ratiocinative impressions and imperatives. Reason is the color and language that makes Philosophy and Jurisprudence the envy of critical and engaging concerns even within the contexts of the 21st century. The question of interest, at this point, however, is how does this analysis apply in the understanding of the Philosophy and Jurisprudence of Africa? Again, In extant terms, what constitutes the character of African philosophy and African jurisprudence? Is there any connection between philosophy and jurisprudence in the African sense? What are the challenges to what can be usefully, specifically, concretely, convincingly and peculiarly tagged as African philosophy and African jurisprudence? But, then, what is the ideological background to the certainty and character of African philosophy and African jurisprudence?

3. The Ideological Background to the Philosophy and Jurisprudence of Africa

Ideally, given the nature, character and contour of sessions in history and time, it remains an undoubtable proposition, unmistakable contention, unquestionable conclusion and unrivaled submission that there is an ideological background to the era and idea of the philosophy and jurisprudence that reflectively reiterates what is truly and thoroughly African. In definite terms, therefore, the background to African philosophy and jurisprudence is basically ideological. It is the ideology of resistance, rejection, refusal, refutation and repudiation of what is recognizably false and obvious fabrications concerning the reality of what is historically true, culturally sound and anthropologically assuring, audacious, authoritative and authentically accurate about Africa. Basically, it is ideology versus ideology, ideology against ideology and the intrigues of ideology and counter-ideology. In actual fact, the coverage of the ideological resistance and report is threefold. The pre-colonial, colonial and the post-colonial are facet of representation in this ideological fight for what is freely true and truly free about Africa. Those philosophical ideas and jurisprudential notions that Africans celebrate as worthy, weighty and wealthy instantiation of African identity, may not be perceived nor conceived in superlative terms and tenses that are embedded, enshrined and embroiled in senses of superiority, yet, what is true of those philosophical ideals and jurisprudential ideas that resonates and reminisce Africa are, in actual fact and nothing more pretentious, lessons and sessions that are concomitant with cultural validity, contextual viability and contemplative vivacity with a vibe and vigor that are ensconced in historical utility. The contestations against African Philosophy and African jurisprudence are legion but not legendary; those contestations have their root, source and origin in perceptions that are permeated in the parlance, popularity and paradigms of ideology which means that an attempt at addressing the nuances, nurture as trending narratives ought to be answered and addressed from the perspectives of ideology as well. Ideology, then, becomes the budding basis, the burden bearer and the boastful background to what actuates and animates a season of reflection of what is truly representative of the African conception of life, reality and society from the point of view of jurisprudence and philosophy.

If the actuality of African philosophy and jurisprudence is premised on the peculiarity and particularity that is foundationally ideological, it could mean that this ideological foundation is a necessity that is cultural, historical, contextual, content-prone and characterized necessities. Again, if the background to African philosophy and jurisprudence is possibly ideological, it could mean that, an ideology, in this context, is pregnant, promising, pertinently potent and is a parade of performing prowess for African jurisprudence and philosophy that can be argued, has been argued and could still be argued in ways that ensures, enforces, expresses and envelops a paradigm in perspicacity. If ideology is the background to African philosophy and jurisprudence, it becomes a compelling truism, fascinating factuality and a fundament in foundational formulation that, ideology in question, in this context, does not exist in a vacuum nor does it in here in emptiness. This background sustains the submission that ideology and ideologies are the expressive engagement required in projecting the modern and contemporary utility inherent in the content and character of African philosophy and jurisprudence.

In a picturesque manner, the ideological background to African philosophy and jurisprudence indicates a contest of ideologies; one is the ideology that shatters, that screams at, that turns into shreds every possibility emanating from Africa and, two, the ideology that strives, struggles and sweat to secure, to sustain, support and stabilize what is distinctly, distinguishably, differentiated, uniquely and peculiarly African. Nevertheless, that the latter conception of ideology is an engagement in seasons and sessions of strivings, struggles and sweats does not indicate and imply that this ideological weapon, armoury and facility is a negative and inferior one. The truth is that this ideological weapon utilized for the sake of Africa is birthed, brewed and bred in a historical and strategic necessities that she (Africa) cannot overlook, underestimate, wave and consider as inconsequential. Again, that the former conception of ideology shatters doesn't indicate correctness in its submission about the cogitative content, mental manners, cognitive character, cerebral capacity, competence and the height of history that Africa possesses naturally and which constitute the healthy happiness that she(Africa) harbours historically.

Given the above, that is, the character of African philosophy and jurisprudence, it means that the nature and character of the ideology that shatters ought to be understood. This understanding assists in unraveling the background that formed the frame of African philosophy and jurisprudence. The ideology that shatters possibilities about Africa is no pretentious, has not always been pretentious nor does it intend at shying away from what it holds as its perception of that which emanates from Africa. Indeed, its perception about Africa is not a concealed enterprise and engagement; it is severe, strong and a consistent attempt at utilizing history to project what is negative about Africa in the endemic, expressive and essential sense. The eloquence in this sense of ideological construction of history about Africa is daunting and damaging. Perhaps, this is one of the logical, hermeneutical, pragmatic and therapeutic reasons why Smith (2021) suggested strongly that the methodology consulted in constructing history ought to be decolonized.

The ideological weapon that shatters possibilities emanating from Africa is an ongoing one; it has never ceased nor can it cease for sometimes to come on account of what is engaging inly and ideologically useful concerning the peculiar purpose, adventurous agenda and the open objectives it has canvassed, created and constructed for itself. In actual fact, the ideology that shatters can be conceived, conceptualized, characterized, and conceded to as resonating, reminiscing and reflecting an epitome, embodiment and expression of “Nights After Colonialism”. The actual face and phase of these “Nights” can be defined, depicted and described in ways that reminisces and tells of what is ongoing against Africa. The ideology behind and beneath Imperialism or Neo-colonialism, Globalization, Eurocentrism and the Xenophobic temperaments that Racism occasions are still endorsed in reverberations that are regrettable. Indeed, these global tendencies are simply and straightforwardly ideological. The Nights represent a plethora of seasons and sessions that are seriously and significantly shattering against possibilities emanating from Africa.

There are three sides to the ongoing shatter against Africa especially in the areas of philosophy and jurisprudence. One is that which denies, in the outright sense, the possibilities and actualities of what is deemed to be philosophical and jurisprudential. Two is when a sense of optimism is confessed, expressed and professed about an African who is seen as showcasing philosophical and jurisprudential dexterity, acumen and adventurous sagacity that emanates and derives its roots from the Western world or that resonates Western jurisprudential and philosophical ideas. The optimism is celebrated and cheerful congratulations are extended to an African who does that which is exceptional, excellent and extraordinary. The third possibility is that if an African at a global philosophical forum claims to be extolling, exalting and emphasizing ideas of jurisprudence and philosophy that are strictly African, a bewildering sense of pessimism and a naughty sense of negativism is immediately expressed, confessed and professed whether such actuality and possibility exist in and about Africa. These are attitudes and attributes that permeates every attempt at showcasing and projecting what is essentially African. A friend attended the 2024 edition of World Congress Of Philosophy that held in Rome, Italy. Some of the reactions and attitude he experienced was the case of some of the participants asking him whether Africans do, practice and write about philosophy at all. According to Taiwo (1998) “I submit that one source for the birth certificate of this false universal is to be found in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s *The philosophy of history...* the ghost of Hegel dominates the hallways, institutions, syllabi, instructional practices, and journals of Euro-American philosophy. The chilling presence of this ghost can be observed in the eloquent absences as well as the subtle and not-so-subtle exclusions of Hegel’s descendants. The absences and exclusions are to be seen in the repeated association of Africa with the pervasiveness of immediacy, a very Hegelian idea if there be any”. This is a reflection, evidence and authenticating corroboration of the pessimism, the ideological negativism cast around the possibility of an African philosophy and jurisprudence. It is believed that if Africans, especially professionals and practitioners, have time to do philosophy at all, the philosophy that ought to be wealthily, worthily and weightily practiced is that which is Western and Westernized in outlook not that which is claimed to be African and deemed to be Non-Western.

In this sense, it is not preposterous imagination nor any sense of patronizing nonsense if an attempt is made to explore and explain the ideological background to the philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa not necessarily philosophy and jurisprudence in Africa. Both expressions are two different things. An ideological mindset but that is embedded and encapsulated in distinctive, distinguished, differentiated, delicate and deliberate difference certainly permeates both expressions. The expression, “the jurisprudence and philosophy of Africa” is an authoritative affirmation, audacious authentication and an assuring ascertainment of the existing possibility and actuality of that which is owned exclusively by Africa. The expression, “philosophy and jurisprudence in Africa” is a denial of the possibility and actuality of what is unique, distinct, peculiar, certain and observable about Africa. In this latter expression, African exclusivity does not exist nor can any claim be founded on the second expression. What is worrisome is that some African legal philosophers, for example, write about jurisprudence in Africa not necessarily African jurisprudence or jurisprudence of Africa. Komolafe (2022) is a defender of this orientation and temperament when it comes to the analysis, articulation and the account of legal history and theory in Africa.

It is at this point that it is useful to explore and explicate the ideological background to both philosophy and jurisprudence in the African sense. But what is ideology? What constitutes the ideological foundation of and background to African philosophy and jurisprudence?

At this point it is important to have a good grasp and gorgeous, gainful grip concerning the nature, meaning and character of ideology. When and where this is done, healthy and helpful assistance is immediately rendered so as to greatly enhance and elevate my attempt at providing a convincing and concrete understanding of the nature of the negative, notorious, nefarious ideology that formed the background that led to the emergence of African philosophy and jurisprudence in the eventual sense. Simply stated, decently defined and semantically depicted, an ideology “is a set of opinions or beliefs of a group or an individual. Very often, ideology refers to a set of political beliefs or a set of ideas

that characterize a particular culture. Capitalism, communism, socialism, and Marxism are ideologies” in addition, ideology refers to a system of beliefs, values, ideas, and ideals that shapes how individuals or groups perceive and interpret the world. Ideologies provide frameworks for understanding social, political, economic, and cultural phenomena, often guiding behavior, shaping policy, and influencing decision-making. They can be explicit, as in political ideologies like liberalism or conservatism, or implicit, underlying everyday assumptions about life and society.

A good deal of perfunctory analysis, statement and explanations are needed, useful and important in unearthing the essential character of an ideology and why ideologies have a dovetailing nature in explicating why the background to African philosophy and jurisprudence deemed to be deeply ideological. If ideologies are mere opinions about how the world ought to be, in presuppose terms, it means that ideology lack the character of science; they are not scientific. Opinions are informed by perceptions that are largely subjective. Being subjective, it means that they are defined in terms of relativity, contextuality, situationality and circumstantiality. Basically, opinions are denied deeds and dramatic decency and space in the region and realm of inter-subjective verification appurtenance. Again, ideologies, being strongly worded opinions, could be considered to have the backing and the power of cultural stereotypes and images of superiority and the comparative advantage of early, elevated and expressive history. In most cases, it is these expressive elements in certain cultures that provide an overriding perception of optimism for some cultures with which they create perceptions of pessimism with respect to and concerning others. More importantly, ideologies are never couched, created, crafted nor constructed to be neutral in nature, nurture, notes and notations about the world, about others and about the human self. Rather, ideologies, being serious and significant opinion about the way the world ought to be, are deliberately formed, framed and formulated to express, engender, elicit and espouse certain feelings that are termed as fascinating fundamentals to be followed, adopted and adhered to by self and others. In this sense, ideologies are packaged proposals, monumental and momentous models, serious signs and symbols that requires being acted upon if the world is to experience expected and desires change. The basic stimuli behind ideologies is change. More often than not, ideologies are instrument and agency in the actualization of purposes that may be declared as pejorative and derogatory especially when such ideologies emanate from certain parts of the human world. When such occurs, the kind of perception developed and cultivated about ideologies can be safely submitted as negative content and colouration of people, culture and societies in symbolic and signified specificities. A Plethora of such ideological perceptions about Africa especially are attempts at scientific innovativity, philosophical ingenuity and jurisprudential inventiveness exist and can be found in extant literatures within the Western world. These are writings and canonical works ensconced, embedded and emphatically established with colorings and connotations that are negative in manners, mien and methodic monuments with momentous mindset that have memorable magnificence in meaningfulness about Africa. Hegel (1956), Hume (1854), Marx and a Plethora of others can be cited in this sense. Such extant works are obviously and openly different and distinguished from catalogues of attitudes that are exhibited when occasions tend to reflect and reiterate them. Notable refutation and repudiation of Africa can be distilled from the submissions and conclusions from David Hume, The Scottish philosopher of expressive eminence and popular prominence in Africa.

What clearly and specifically are the major themes in Humean rejection and neglect of the realities of Africa in general? In the significant sense, Hume’s racial theory became the point of justification for claims of superiority of white over blacks. In fact, four themes emerged in popular coinage in legitimating the issue of slavery all over Europe. These four themes are as follows:

1. That mental and moral capacity of non-whites differs markedly from whites (Linnaeus, 1806);
2. That being non-whites was an essential defect on its own; the normal, natural condition of man was whiteness but due to some unfortunate environmental factors, some humans have lost their whiteness and with it, part of their normal human nature (Buffon, 1817: 207; Blumenbach, 1969).
3. Some beings that look human are not really so but are lower on the chain of being and thus represent a link between humans and apes (Long, 1970). On page 356, Long advocated the view that Negroes are lower on the chain of being than the rest of mankind. They are closer to orangutangs than to other men. In Long’s view, a white moron is closer to the philosophical definition of man than a black genius, or as he put it, the “wisest black, red, swarthy, or sooty individual.”
4. That there are several theses that separate human lines of creation and/ or evolution with Caucasians being the best (Brackman, 1977: 2); Bracken (1973) Brackman cites the Talmud as the source for the Afro-phobic “Ham” curse. “Ham is told by his outraged father that, because you have abused me in the darkness of the night, your children shall be born black and ugly; because you have twisted your head to cause me embarrassment, they shall have kinky hair and red eyes; because your lips jested at my expense, theirs shall swell; and because you neglected my nakedness, they shall go naked.”

Based on these theoretical postulations, David Hume translated his philosophical prowess, astute cogitative performance and cerebral pontifications in the castigation, condemnation and criticisms of Africa and her possibilities as lacking in anything seminally serious, sublime in significance and special in semantic, sentential and a statement with special setting. Africa became an instrument of complete derision, characterised denigration and consistent deluge of debilitating remarks. Racism became a popular subject matter for philosophical speculations; racism turned to a significant substantial theme and topic for ideological constructions; racism became a significant but unfounded agenda within the context content and contour of historical writings and canonical works. Indeed, racism was the outcome of slave trade and, in another sense, slave trade became a historical practice of phenomenal proportions in Europe. Africa became the target, the object of ridicule and the cynosure of consistent castigation. In all honesty, I do not understand what exactly is the basis of racism. Is it colour or cogitative content, cerebral character or the calculus inherent in cognitivity? If the basis of racism is fundamentally ensconced in truism and the threshold of truth, there ought not to have been any form of conjugality between those who are white skinned and those who are not. But, is there no free, flowing and fascinating conjugality between these sets of people that history has succeeded in harbouring? This is left for the world to judge and the history of ideas to contemplate about. What is of interest and curious to us is that Hume's philosophical racism and the very basis on which they stand are at variance to his avowed principles of empiricism which are experience and observation. In fact, as argued by Eric Morton, Hume's views about Africans and Asians had no empirical foundation. In his words: "Hume's notions about Africa and Africans, Indians and Asians were not based on factual, empirical information which he had gained by "experience and observation." No, his empirical methodology did not fail him nor did he fail it. The issue is that he never had an empirical methodology to explain racial and cultural differences in human nature. He only pretended that he had. I argue that the purpose of his racial law was not one of knowledge, but one of justification for power and domination by some over others" (Morton, 2002). But, then, Hume is not alone in this procession of racism utilizing the instrument of philosophy. Which is which? Is the utility of philosophy in the defence of racism coincidental with what was in the mind of the philosopher in question or is it philosophy itself that is capable and complicit in this affair? Is philosophy neutral when it comes to question of racism? How did these philosophers find philosophy as a proper and notable instrument to utilize in the project of denigrating and dehumanising Africa. More than the Humean Scepticism raised against Africa, the same can be said of the German philosopher, G. W. F. Hegel. Hegel's racism is notable as well notorious. The pertinent question is why is there so little, if any, respect for and, as a consequence, interest in African phenomena and their philosophical resonances? The answer to the question must not be found to consist in the fact that Africa holds no promising philosophical itinerary nor should it consist in the view that philosophy itself is not interested in what Africans think, say or do. These explanations do not portray the heart of the matter. Imbued in the peculiar absence of African phenomena in the field of philosophy, and impliedly, in the area of jurisprudence, is the politics of social history. In the language of Taiwo (1998) "All too often, when African Scholars answer philosophy's questions, they are called upon to justify their claim to philosophical status. And when this status is grudgingly conferred, their theories are consigned to serving as appendices to the main discussions dominated by the perorations of the 'western Tradition'". The peculiar absence of Africa in the tradition of Western philosophy and jurisprudence lies in

Delicately but deliberately, the ideology and history that shatters, dehumanizes, denigrates, the basis and the means Africa, her identity, her history, including, the jurisprudence of philosophy that flows from that identity, is the ideology and history of the unusual, post and pretentiously paraded and presented as the usual, the incorrect historicity, presented and paraded as historical correctness or correctness in historicity. The unusual paraded in this ideology and history is regrettable because it remains verily and validly at the level of the unusual, the fabricated and the force. If nothing eventful, episodically, is expressible by and assignable, accordable and ascribable to Africa, why the invasion of Africa in 1884 by Bismack and his compatriot all over the Western world? This is food for thought concerning the content and character of the ideology that shatters, demeans and debases Africa.

If nothing historically holy, happy, healthy, hygienic and wholesome is associated with Africa, the question is why the relapse, resort and recourse to the practice of Slave Trade by the Western powers in respect to the history of the world? If nothing culturally baffling, beautiful, better, best, blissful, bountiful, bright, blossoming, bold, big is and was characteristic of Africa, why the collateral and colossal commitment to cultural dislocation of Africa by Western ideologist with its constructive caricature and the cornering cosmetic capture of Africa in terms that are ensconced, expressed and embedded in negativity, notoriety and night marish notations and nefarious nurtures? The story of Africa and the West can be captured metaphorically expatiated and figuratively exemplified in that of a lady and a man with the latter having the strong desire for the former but on account of the intimidating resources possessed by the lady, the latter decided to conjure and concocts tales, temperament and tools of inferiority to portray pictures and parade details and data concerning the lady so that when the feelings, forms and frames of inferiority are internalized by the lady, she can

succumb to the domineering deeds of superiority conjured by the man, may eventually heed to the request of the man when in actual fact no images and ideas of superiority or inferiority exist at all.

The ambience of potency, prowess and persuasions that permeate, attenuate and percolate the ideology within and by which the African philosophy and African jurisprudence projects are shown, shared, secured, sort for, stabilized, sustained and supported can be described and depicted as inherent in a monumental tide without which those projects would have utterly failed. The tide in question can be conceived as historical. It is captured in the sense and essence of correction and correctness of history about Africa which all along has been distorted in disturbing way without any decency but a deliberate domestication of damaging and daunting data and details. The tide in question is a solid attempt at correcting what was not true and has never been true about Africa. The idea that Africa represent nothingness, emptiness and a tail of vain vibes concerning history is represented in various views, perceptions and opinions emanating from the western world about Africa. This monumental tide on the part of Africa is against the ideology that denigrates, that dehumanizes, that devastates possible capacity and competence in the cognitive and cerebral sense against Africa. It is in the light of this that the ideological background to African philosophy and jurisprudence is not only conceived but constructed to have meaningful impact in addressing the possibility of sustenance and stability for the two projects mentioned all along.

The question then is how has Africa and her possibilities been depicted and described in the literature? What is the ideology of repression and suppression of cognitive possibilities concerning and about Africa? It is important to reflect this because it shows the tide against which Africa is confronted with, battling against and is seeking to exceed and supersede. It has actually survived but it is good to be put in written form. This monumental tide against the ideology that denigrates and dehumanize Africa can be described and depicted as represented in a flame, fire, feeling and fan of correction, historical corrections. The utility of ideology and history in dehumanization, denigration, suppression and repression can only be combated and confronted by recourse to both ideology and history but in a refreshing form that takes the process of construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of both ideology and history. To reiterate this monumental tide concerning Africa ideological come back is to wax lyrical about African possibilities. Yet it is true to reason that the sustaining power that African philosophy and jurisprudence commands in contemporary context is something lofty and laudable and that represent the energy, strength and stamina of African renaissance. If the controversy concerning African philosophy is demised according to Makinde (2007), it could follow that the controversy over African jurisprudence is equally won, it is demised on account on the fact that the African jurisprudence project is supervenient on the African philosophy project. Both are concrete possibilities with comprehensive and convincing convictions.

4. The Law and Philosophy of Africa

A careful, cautious and conscious reflection concerning ideology, history, colonialism, Eurocentrism could influence in the conclusion that Africa had nothing seminar, serious and sublime to instantiate and exemplify in the areas of Philosophy and Jurisprudence. If this kind of submission is made about Africa, such is not to be taken as strange, shocking and surprising. Such a submission necessarily, normally and naturally, could be considered as an easy inference and dutiful deduction from every shade of opinion, position and perception emanating from some disturbing aspect, damaging dimension and demeaning deductions contained, written and reported in Western literature that covers and captures the substance and subject matter of Philosophy and Jurisprudence. As a matter of fact, it is only in recent times, that passages and portions that reflected African contributions to the fields of Philosophy and Jurisprudence were, in the first instance, acknowledged; in the second instance, accommodated and admitted; and, in the third instance, accorded, ascribed and assigned a modicum of merit, meaningful momentum and a monument of manners and manifestation maintained in means, modes, measures and methods beyond mere myopism.

Is it any wonder that Holleman (1974) contended that nothing called Jurisprudence could be conceived to exist in Africa. However, if Holleman's submission about Africa is founded on the deliberate deduction and dramatic deeds, details and data derived from the wheels and ways of Colonialism, then, Holleman could be faulted as and found to be wrong and incorrect. Surely, nothing can be truer than the observation, open and obvious and audacious authoritative and assuring authenticating assertion that when colonialism came onboard, it sought to impose a new moral as well as political and economic order, founded on loyalty to metropolitan and colonial states and on discipline, order and regularity in work, leisure and bodily habits (Mann and Roberts, 1991). The word "imposed" utilized by these Western scholars is instructive and an eye opener and relevantly reveals the kind of mindset that colonialism and the colonial order that was in charge of the African territory operated with, through and by a mindset. If colonialism sought to impose a new legal hegemony, hierarchy and habit, it could not mean that nothing was in existence; it could not indicate that

emptiness was the prevailing order; it could not mean that the local population, communal enclave and social life of the people lacked or was lacking in the regime of laws, reason and legitimate expression that were spelt in the nature and character of control, rule, regulation and domination. What was sought for was something new and different from the old that could aid and assist the new regime in town. Actually, nothing new in terms of ideas concerning governance, administration and politics is conveyed in as much as it is true that what colonialism practiced by imposing its own laws represents the cultural attitude consistent with global practice. The point being made is that: one, it was not colonialism that brought law, reason, rule and regulation to Africa; two, it was not colonialism that brought ideas, issues and images of power, command, legality and conceptions of legitimacy to Africa; three, power and politics had always existed in Africa before the emergence of any colonial order; four, details, data, deeds and deliberations about and concerning obligations and the nature of duties derived from laws of reasons, rules and regulations that tended to control had always existed before legal and legitimate inventions proudly and potently paraded by colonialism; five, indeed, laws existed before colonialism; colonialism met laws, reason and order when it arrived; six, well-orchestrated and organized social hierarchy, administration and arrangement were in place before colonialism arrived.

Importantly, although hordes of criticisms, castigations, chastisement and condemnations could be hauled and hurled at colonialism concerning what it did wrong and incorrectly by the pursuit and promotion of policies, practices and performances that paraded the paradigm of cultural dislocation, identity damage and the ideological revolt against, disrespect, rejection and repudiation of local intelligence, communal history, social expressions and experiences, including the extant rationality of the colonized people, yet, colonialism could not be faulted for imposing a new moral order, a new lease of law and a new pattern of political and social engineering. While this imposition could be rebuffed, on one hand, it could be hailed as emitting a positive sense of significance in marshaling a modicum of defense of what can be truly considered to be original in the African perspectives. By this statement alone, it is somewhat impossible and a serious difficulty for colonialism to claim that ideas and ideals of law, ideas and ideals of reason, never existed in precolonial Africa. Indeed, in actual fact and nothing more pretentious, the laws and reasons, the intelligence and regulation that colonialism brought unto the frontiers and face of colonial territories and colonized terrains, were always at logger heads with settled legal frames. Settled rational ethos, expressions and dictums that pre-colonial Africa had entertained, embraced and expounded all along. Colonialism brought change in the local people's perception about themselves through the kinds of laws and the patterns of rationality it sought to enforce and impose. In serious terms, it had difficulty in controlling the kind of change it enforced and imposed. This change became the initiator of and the inspiration towards conflicts of momentous proportions. The submissions of Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts can provide guide but do not necessarily ensure, engendered nor encourage a compelling sense of correctness about happenings in local territories and the habitation of happiness hopefully and healthily sustained in freedom from the spirit of communal settings and social cohesion enjoyed before colonialism. In their wealth "European understanding of precolonial African systems of law and authority and African collaboration with colonial system of law and government led to the invention of tradition in Africa and its foundation in customary law and local institutions such as chieftaincy and courts. Although Europeans did not see it, their efforts to build colonialism on indigenous authority and tradition confronted processes of change and conflict" (1991: 1-2).

At this stage, it is important to have a determined decisive and descriptive understanding of the content and character of African Philosophy as well as that of African jurisprudence with a view towards showing the connection between both with respect to the demand of rationality. What then, are the statement of signification concerning these dimensions of cultural actuality and possibility of Africa, for Africa, in Africa? The actual meaning, the attaining moments, the accomplishing measure and the achievable meaning of Africa Philosophy consist in the outline of specific, peculiar and unique orientations and trends within which the essential idea, eloquent items and expressive intentions of African Philosophy can be located, cited and pointed at. When followed, these trends or orientations can be classified and categorised, conceptually as expressing a sense and essence of philosophical intentions, idea, temperament and trajectory that is episodic in nature and character. Conceptually, these trends constitute a good representation of the gradating and graduating history of the temperament, terrain and territory of thought as far as Africa is concerned. Again, in a sense that is aesthetically adorable and admirable, African philosophy can be defined, described and depicted, when conceived and conceded to as exhibiting, encapsulating and expressive paradigms of meanings that are worthily paraded in relation to African history. These trends do not only have episodic meaning with paradigmatic contour, but, in the substantial sense, enjoyed and exude a sense of historicity for Africa, of Africa, in Africa. These several attempts and plethora of ways by which African Philosophy has been defined can be conceived as an attempt at showcasing the style of rationality, statement of rationality and the senses of rationality that African philosophy has created, crafted, concocted and cemented for itself.

In each trend or orientation, it is important to submit that there are elements that attest to the presence and the evidence of what may be classified as rational justification in the content and character of Philosophy that Africa parades, present and professes, persistently, peculiarly and popularly. Both African Philosophy and its Jurisprudential counterpart, can be categorised as epitome and embodiment of what Smith (2021) tagged and termed as “The Colonizing Methodologies”. They are methodologies that challenge the submission and conclusion of Eurocentric ideological perception about Africa.

Necessarily, the content and character of African Philosophy and Jurisprudence are designated, depicted and designed in neutrality. However, this is not the same for the Philosophy and Jurisprudence of Africa. Neutrality is often through out of the windows, in the sense that Philosophy and Jurisprudence of Africa are complete, holistic and absolute product of responses and reactions for ideological conjectures about Africa that are never neutral but which are essentially notorious and expressly negative. So, Philosophy and Jurisprudence in Africa can never be neutral; characteristically, they are item of interest and in the ideology of defense.

In exemplified and instantiated terms, no one would readily, steadily and preparedly contend that there never existed Western Philosophy or British Philosophy and Jurisprudence. But, then, it is part of the literature in Philosophy and Jurisprudence that African Philosophy and African Jurisprudence do not exist at all. What is taught, preached and paraded as African Philosophy is nothing but Post-Colonial responses and reactions to that denial and the ideology behind and beneath the denial and scepticism directed against Africa in the most indecent manner. This is the premise and foundation on which the ideological background to African Philosophy and Jurisprudence is based, phrased, framed, formed and formulated within the womb and web of history. The ideological background to both discipline is informed by the negative ideological construction against Philosophical and Jurisprudential possibilities maintained, mentioned, manifested, mentored, moulded, and managed by Africans, for Africans, in Africa.

Strategically, fundamentally, holistically and collectively, African Philosophy and African Jurisprudence represents, reflects and are inherent in the followings ideas and ideals: One, both are episodic cultural reality; Two, both are cultural campaigns concerning cultural realities; Three, both are crusades with colossal and collateral consequence concerning realities around culture; Four, both are platforms for the parades of cultural paradigms; Five, both are ideological representation; Six, both are projections of cultural justification; Seven, both are system of cultural rationalities; Eight, both are voices of victory and vindication against ideological victimization and historical intimidation.

Conceptually, the expansive set and sense of meanings that are accommodated and acknowledged within the context of African Jurisprudence is decent, deliberate, dramatic, decisively dexterous and a demonstrative display of the nature, character and content of African thought in the area of Jurisprudence. Indeed, the conception of African Jurisprudence as witnessed and is experiencing elastic and eloquent expansions, expressing, as it were, and engaging epistemological expertism that is second to none. The aesthetics that this expansion expresses and unfolds engenders a sense, essence and modicum of cultural logic and rationalities, contemplativity and ratiocinatively, lending credence to the fact that the African Jurisprudence project, showcasing the substance, strength, status and subject matter of African renaissance is not a misnomer nor a cultural mistake, is not a cultural voodoo nor voice in vehement, vociferous and vituperative villainy against the world and the west but an assertive adventure concerning what Africa proudly parades as far as seasoned thought and sessional thinking is concerned with respect to law. Indeed, the expansive conceptions concerning ideas, ideals and images about law for Africans, by Africans, of Africans, in Africa does not represent a routine, regime nor reward in meaninglessness. When thoroughly understood, when comparatively comprehended, when convincingly concretize, these conceptions of African Jurisprudence expressly convey the view that this systems of law, ideas about law and functionally thinking interest in legal matters, permeate conception of society. What is interesting about these expansive conceptions concerning law in Africa, of Africa for Africa is that those conceptions seem to cover almost all areas of human life in the society in showing how deeply concerned about law Africans were before encounter with westernism, colonialism and modernistic views and perceptions concerning law and how they still are in an expansive, enhancing, elevating and elaborate perspective.

Just like episodic capture of professional Philosophy, philosophers and philosophical orientations in African Philosophy, in like manner, jurists and philosophers, within the African enclave, have succeeded in penning down what their thoughts concerning law is. The submission could be sound and the conclusion could be correct in the contention that what these legal Philosophers from the African enclave have conceived law to be, in the African sense, consist in a kind of ideological defense of what Africans holds to be true with respect to law. The ideological defense is obvious, observable, open and never to be and taken as intentional incorrectness without any sense of pretention nor preclusion, a convincing clarity that is rationally correct and correctly rational. What are these conceptions?

In the first instance, Watson (1984), M'baye (1975) and Smith (1965) all submitted that the Jurisprudence that is tenably followed, thoroughly formed and truly framed by Africans, for Africans, in Africa, resides in and rest squarely on the logic and the language of customs. For these scholars, African jurisprudence is customary Jurisprudence. In a different light, Nyankoh (2017) argue that the Jurisprudence of Africa is a borrowed one gotten from the residues of colonialism. Somewhat different but distinctive picture and portrait of African Jurisprudence was what Max Gluckman (1963) tagged as naturalistic jurisprudence. On his part, John Murungi (2004) opined that humanistic jurisprudence epitomizes the bodies, soul and spirit of a Jurisprudence that is strictly and seriously African. And, what is more, Reconciliationism defines the anatomy of Africa Jurisprudence according to William (2006). In another extant theoretical submission, William (2006) maintained, by way of mentioned, that Therapeutic Jurisprudence dictates, depicts and describes the tone, tune and temperament of African Jurisprudence. Komolafe's (2022) seminar piece of sublime worth and weight cannot, but, be mentioned, where he argued that no unique Jurisprudence of Africa exist, only Jurisprudence in Africa which is a medley and hybridization of legal theories. Oladosu (2001) complicated the consequential character, colour and contour of African Jurisprudence by confessing a caring and concerned commitment to Possivistic Jurisprudence as the most culturally compliant Jurisprudential world view suitable for Africa on account of cultural complexities, conflicts and complications.

Three basic questions stand germane, critical, crucial and central to the different but distinguish and distinctive conception of philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa. They are:

1. What is the rational content and contour of African philosophy judging by articulated analysis above?
2. What is the rational character and colour of African jurisprudence when considered in the light of divergent conceptions prevalent in the literature and paraded in canons and canonizations concerning African jurisprudence?
3. Importantly, if the connection between Philosophy and Jurisprudence, in the larger sense is reason, then, the question is: what is the rational connection between African Philosophy and Jurisprudence, when considered together?

Indeed, the trends that defines African Philosophy and the expanding and expansive conceptions that depict and describes African jurisprudence in the literature only, readily and steadily domesticates and indicates Philosophy, the regime of reason, the reign of reflection, the rule of nationality and the culture in Africa that cannot be waved aside and that represents a phenomenal way of doing Philosophy that is weighty and a jurisprudence that is worthy, wealthy, workable and worthwhile. Thus, it does mean that the engaging enterprise and exercise of the habit of philosophy and jurisprudence do not represent nor reflect a paradigm in misnomer. Philosophy and jurisprudence are not mistaken exercises as far as Africa is concerned. Indeed, there is no reason, under the sun, that could be raised in defence of the declaration and in support of the submission that philosophy and jurisprudence do have a rejecting voice against the African blood, brain and body.

5. African Philosophy and Jurisprudence as African Cultural Realities: A Defense

Philosophy and Jurisprudence constitute some of the rich resources that form the content and character of cultural realities in as much as both are cultural realities in themselves and that defines the cultural heritage, heights and habit that a set of people by trait, tendency and temperament, tend to peddle, project and parade to the outside as representing and as a representative of their identity and way of life.

The concept of cultural realism states that the realities around culture cannot be truly and thoroughly harnessed, affirmed, applied and administered where the content, character, colour, contour, and consequence are altogether denied, debased, demeaned, denigrated and deemed destined to the decadence and deeds of the doldrums of history and negative, notorious, nefarious and nightmarish constructions of ideological frameworks farther from the fortress of the fascinating fundament of truth about realities that African cultural groups identify with, accommodate, acknowledge and admit as special, salient and serious for their perception of life, existence and the universe altogether. Philosophy and Jurisprudence are realities within the womb and web of culture and are products of cultural expression. Both are vehicles for expressing the nature, nuances, and nitty-gritty of culture. These two are ways by which the concept of cultural realism can be height fully analysed, happily advanced and habitually articulated. Being products, vehicles and agents for the proper parade of the concept of cultural realism, the philosophy and Jurisprudence of Africa ought to be deliberately and decently defended against desperate, devastating, and destructive denials that are done outside the deeds and depths of decorous dexterity.

Culture is a substantive phenomenon; it is quite fundamental in form, frame and formulation. Indeed, culture is a formula that exposes and expresses what and who a set of people are, what they believe. It is an arena, an avenue for

understanding what conception and perception of life is to such people. Philosophy and Jurisprudence constitutes some of the rich resources that form the content and character of cultural realism in as much as both are cultural artifacts in themselves, and that defines the cultural heritage, heights and habits that a set of people actually peddle and project to the outside world. It is expressly true and evidentially incontestable that as far as the concepts, concerns, contents and character of cultural realism are concerned, philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa have been largely underestimated, undermined and undervalued with respect to the process of development. Cultural realism is epitomized and embodied in cultural rationality and intelligence on account of the facts that the former breeds and gives birth to the latter. The latter makes the former worthwhile, weighty and wealthy. Cultural realism is an accommodation of and admittance of the contemplative system, setting and style sanctioned, allowed, enshrined, endorsed and expressed by each culture. Cultural realism is a system having a holistic frame and form. Cultural intelligence and rationality are some of imprint, implications and investment emanating from cultural realism. They are expression and experiences of culture that authenticate the plausibility of cultural realism which means cultural realism does not exist in a vacuum, emptiness and nuttiness; there are some realities that serve as evidence of cultural realism. Philosophy and Jurisprudence are some of these realities of culture. Without these realities, every culture is a Nil, zero, ensconced in nuttiness, in abeyance and, altogether, moribund. These realities make culture a force to reckon with in understanding human society. The concept of cultural realism makes lot of senses when its constituents are studied. This attempt focuses on African Philosophy and Jurisprudence and vehicles for defending what is culturally real to African society.

Significantly, no cultural paradigm in the world is emptied of realities such as Philosophy and Jurisprudence. Indeed, it is absurd to talk about culture in the absence of it constituting realities. Seriously, but significantly, no culture exists in a vacuum outside vivacious voice of uniqueness, specificity, particularity and peculiarity. The Philosophy and Jurisprudence of Africa are realities by which the cultural presence, prowess, potency, performance, purpose, power and paradigms of Africa can be paraded and, ultimately and altogether defended. If, when and where these realities of cultures are open to physical substantiation, obvious, observable, conscious inspection, mental corroboration and confirmation, then, the concept of cultural realism can be conceived and conceded to as making an important height of happy, healthy, hygienic and habitual sense. The sense it makes consist in its realities being understood through painstaking studies such as these.

The point that is being stressed along this line of thought is that culture is what creates philosophy and jurisprudence that a set of people who own that culture exercise and enterprise themselves in. So, culture creates philosophy and jurisprudence and not the other way round; culture is a creator of realities not the created through realities. It is through philosophy and jurisprudence that what is real about a cultural group is expressed, exposed and expounded. It is exemplifying and instantiating to stress that Ancient Greece was not popularly paraded in economic fortune, faith, form and favour like all other countries in Europe as at that time. However, it is a fact of history, having the height of healthy recognition that the same Ancient Greece was very rich in terms of its philosophical engagement and the jurisprudential enterprise it embraced and entertained as part of its cultural realities and properties.

Culture is an entrenched phenomena having its own sway, swagger, staggering and serious sagacious significance. Philosophy and jurisprudence are two prime examples of the staggering, serious and sagacious significance that culture proudly possesses as powerful properties to parade with performing prowess, potency and a paradigm of persistent peculiarity. Philosophy and jurisprudence are properties of culture. No wonder at all that they constitute the content, character and constituent of cultural realism. As a matter of fact, no culture is real in the absence of these two properties. The reality of every culture is made thick, interesting, invigorating, impressive and an imperative that is second to none when these two disciplines or properties are present and are paraded for thoughtful perusal and painstaking study, analysis and articulation. For this present attempt, African Philosophy and jurisprudence are both conceived and conceded to as ventilating vehicles through which the concept of cultural realism can be convincingly comprehended as far as Africa is concerned. Again, these two disciplines act and stand as validating voices for ventilating and venerating what a set of people, say Africans, vivaciously view as constituting virtues that reflect their cultural stand point. It is in this sense that propositional perspectives and paradigms are deployed, in this paper, in the defence of what is realistically true and never negative about African Philosophy and Jurisprudence as portrayed and pictured in Western Ideological circles and the humiliating habit of Western historical conjectures. Who, then, is a cultural realist?

Simply stated, sincerely sanctioned and seriously sentenced, a Cultural Realist is someone who practices and puts into performance the possibilities presented, provided and paraded by the culture in question. A Cultural Realist is a defender of the recognized realities, respectful realities and reflective realities for which the culture in question is advanced in articulated form, fashioned for fascinating performance, known, registered and reckoned with for epistemological etymological, existential, ethical and exegetical purposes, expectations and ends. Every culture has

realities, and, so, the concept of cultural realism has a universal application, appeal and affirmation even if it is true that some relative and subjective considerations characterized its articulated analysis, acceptance and what is advanced as constituting its womb of worth and web of weighty wealth.

Philosophy and jurisprudence are some of the intellectual realities, cogitative constituents, cognitive contents, components of and the cerebral facility and faculty inherent, interred and ingrained in every culture. They form what is often advanced and adopted as a sound, logical and credible validation of the concept of Cultural Realism.

Culture is real just because it has properties, resources, features and elements that are ensconced and embedded in realism. The properties of culture can be both material and nonmaterial. Cultural Realism evokes facts and feelings that could be conceived and conceded to as fundamentally and foundationally metaphysical but that could, significantly, be conceived within the context of ontology appropriating, approximating and appertaining to that which is anthropological. This explains the thickness and the substantive significance of culture when it is conceded to as an agenda within realism. Indeed, if the concept of realism explicates the nature of culture and if the concept of culture expatiates and emphasizes the nitty gritty and necessities about certain realities that culture accommodates, it could follow that cultural realism reasonably and rationally raises themes and topics that are ontologically serious and significant. Conceptually, therefore, Cultural Realism transcends ideas and ideals that are merely physical and extend to ideas and ideals that could be conceived as beyond the physical that is, the metaphysical, showing that Cultural Realism is itself a philosophical terminology.

The realism within which culture is explained, expressed and exemplified, only points to the fact of existence which means that the philosophical weight and worth of the concept of Cultural Reality stretches beyond the surface to the depth of thinking concerning what is natural to the nonnatural. Conceptually, Cultural Realism strikes at the value, valuation and validity of possibilities which means that an Anti-Realist position, perspective, posture, attributes, perception and temperament towards culture can be adopted and asserted which eventually makes the whole idea of culture embedded in ambivalence, not necessarily contradictory in the sense that almost every form of attitude can be adopted and asserted with respect to culture, a feature about culture that makes it prone to being considered and classified as a neutral concept with respect to possibilities for which any position can be adopted and assumed.

Disregarding imagined controversies around culture in relation to realism, it could be submitted that the neutrality of culture would still have to be proven. This does not remove the fact that some realities are actually defined concomitantly with culture, it is now left to be proven by dint of logical argument, seasoned rationality how and why an Anti-Realist posture has to be adopted towards and in relation to culture. Culture is not empty, if it is so it has to be proven and the argument has to be sound, logical, plausible and convincing. Nevertheless, Cultural Realism tends to have issues and ideas for open debate and discussion which are considered exceedingly and extremely important.

Cultural Realism significantly strikes at the ideal of ontology and existence in relation to culture but that this dimension of culture equally invokes ideals of the emphatical concerning culture, the empathetic about culture and the emotional around culture. These are contending issues that makes discussions and debates around Cultural Realism a habitually healthy exercise. Culture seems real in relations to these expressions too. This is why, as a way of life, it portends significant features that require attention, articulation and analysis.

All said and done, if the concept of cultural realism makes sense, it is believed that the sense it conveys is two-fold: Culture is real, in the global sense, on one hand, and, on the other hand, culture seems real because it has what is real, realities, that expresses and exposes the realism on which it is embedded and eloquently enshrined. Again, there are two-fold dimensions of understanding that the concept of Cultural Realism expresses which are, that, while culture has a Global appearance: there is nowhere in the world where the concept of culture is rendered in existential, geographical and ecological idiocy. However, in the second sense, Cultural Realism makes it an appealing, appropriate, affirmable and acceptable claim that the contents, properties and realities that Cultural Realism celebrates are conceivable in subjective, relative and contextual ways. Given these insights, the remainder of the paper wishes to ventilate, advance and articulate one hundred propositional postulations and perspectives within which African Philosophy and African Jurisprudence can and are to be defended in the light of the concept of Cultural Realism. Those propositions that clearly and convincingly establishes African Philosophy and African Jurisprudence as vehicles of cultural realism are listed below:

1. African law and philosophy derive their substance, subject matter, soul and spirit, from African people's conception and perception of what the society is. In the African sense and perception, law and philosophy are reflections of and functionally tied to the issues of the identity of the people within the settings of society.
2. The philosophical outlook of Africans constitutes the principle through which African law is practiced, professed and put into action.

3. The substance and subject matter of African law and philosophy seems to be derived from the strength, stamina, status and supplies emanating from the sense and essence of the soul and the spirit that are internally integral and intestinal to the voice of recognition for Africa through which it vibrates, is validated and made to be viable.
4. Myopic parameters, paradigms and patterns created, couched, crafted and conceived concerning and against African law and philosophy, stems from frustrating frameworks formed, framed, fashioned and founded on familial feelings that emanate from pessimistic, perception, position, perspective and portrait concerning African, that are against Africa especially from external experiences, expression and encounters.
5. In the African sense, situation and settings Constant, consistent, continuous and characterized communal and cultural feelings of freedom, fulfilment, fruitfulness and flight of fame and fascinating fortunes are determined, decided and developed by specific but serious encounters with Law and singular but significant expressions of philosophy.
6. The eloquence embedded, enshrined, expressed and expounded in African law and philosophy doesn't represent empty eloquence, empty engagement, empty expression, empty experiences. The eloquence is founded on encounters, Africa's encounters overtime and historically through and down the ages.
7. African Philosophy and Law represent attempt at defending what the African conception of a human person consist in, both as a global picture and paradigm as well as from a cultural position, perception and point of view.
8. Truly, both African Law and Philosophy could be conceived and confessed as having metaphysical flavor, fundament, foundation, form, frame, fashion and ferment that are second to none which cannot be jettisoned, abandoned nor forsaken when critical studies are conducted about such. Accommodating such flavors, in pertinent studies, concerning such themes and topics, makes a complete study in themselves.
9. African Proverbs have both legal and philosophical senses which predates and antedates encounter with the Western world through colonialism. Colonialism met sets, sessions, statement and several seasoned seasons, stock and supply or proverbs that resonates African conception of law and philosophy without any attachment, affinity or association with Western proverbs that are legally and philosophically signified.
10. If law and philosophy never existed in Africa before encounter with the Western world through colonialism, how could Africa have survived all the dastard, disturbing, devastating, debilitating and demeaning experiences, conditions and circumstantially victimizing situations that she has had to go through? Law and Philosophy resonates ways through which African Possibilities have survived and still surviving till today. The surviving strategies, stratagems, sentiments, systems and statements were, have been and are still internal to Africa and the African.
11. Law and philosophy of Africa and Africans represent, resonate and reminiscences Africans' view about life which, in actual fact, could be different and indeed are found to be different from perceptions coming elsewhere.
12. The commencing point for the profession, postulation, pontification and propositional defense of African law and philosophy is African beliefs system, African value system, African cultural system or way of life, African metaphysical world view and the realities that have permeated and percolated the African cast, context and circumstances overtime.
13. The same intellectual strength, stamina and status that African philosophy seem to be enjoying, entertaining and expressing appears to be the same that the African Jurisprudence idea derives and draws from without any sense of shame nor silencing stupor, shocking sensation nor strange submission.
14. Just as continental philosophy does not have to follow analytic philosophy, in like manners, African philosophy and African jurisprudence need not to follow any of these. A sense of distinction can still be pointed at in significantly and serious terms without much intellectual befuddling nor confusion.
15. If African law and philosophy all along are founded on and expressed in a Lin, zero, entire emptiness, expressed in emptiness, founded in emptiness, surely, there would not have been any significant nor serious thing for professional philosophical practice to engage in, to express and exhibit to the whole world, distanced from the conventional order that houses both law and philosophy.
16. The ideological drive in Africa concerning Africa about Africa is actually supplied from the contents and character of law and philosophy that is African in nature, substance, scope and significance.
17. The Nationalistic flavor, farvour, ferment, form, frame, foundation and fundament, is a representation of the defense of the content and character of law and philosophy as Africans see both.

18. What Law is to Africa represent a sense of serious and significant sameness with what philosophy is to Africa.
19. The bridge, the base, the building block that seems to hold both law and philosophy in utter meaningfulness is culture.
20. In Africa, there seems to be no gulf nor any gap between that which is legal and that which is philosophical. Indeed, in terms of expressive, existential and experiential evidences, a smooth sense of continuum, with sagacious seriousness, exist between African law and African system of reason and reasoning.
21. The foundation on which both law and philosophy is erected is sagacity; this foundation is sound, simple, serious and straightforward sagacity, captured, characterized and conceived as communal, collective and societal package and pool of wisdom.
22. Law and Philosophy represent a continuum in Africa.
23. The etymological eloquence, engagement, expression and experience on which Law and Philosophy are founded consist in nothing but traditional expertism which is second to none and continues to accord, assign and ascribe a sense of specificity, particularity and peculiarity to the image and identity that is African.
24. African law and philosophy are instrumentally, ideologically and intellectually coterminous with each other. Philosophy represents the law of reason while law represents the philosophy of obligations and reward within the context of African society.
25. As far as the African world is concerned, the separability ideology between law and philosophy does not seem to exist in Africa. Law is not separable from philosophy nor is philosophy separable from that which is legally meaningful. They inhere in each other.
26. Colossally and collaterally, law and philosophy in African societies do not express themselves as alter-nativized paradigms. They complement each other, however. They are structures of seriousness and settings of significance in understanding African societies.
27. Realistically, humanistic concerns, frameworks and paradigms including ideals seem to be discernible and decipherable in the content and character of African law and African philosophy.
28. Both law and philosophy in the African context represent the strategic fulcrum around which societies in Africa are organized and by which societies in Africa are prettily, steadily and readily organized. Philosophy and law are, thus, properties and possessions in the character of organization and management of African societies
29. Conceptually, contextually and compositionally, African law and philosophy could be conceived as a contractual, communal and cultural blend of African rationality, ratiocination and the routine, regime, reign and rule of reason within the sphere, situation and setting that strongly signify the African condition.
30. African philosophical orientation is a representation and evidence of the reality of African law among Africans. In like manner, African law represents the evidence concerning the existence of a philosophical order or orientation among Africans. Both play this evidential rule.
31. Historically, realities about African law and philosophy have been racially abused, rejected, repudiated, refused, renounced as lacking respect, reference, nor any sense of eloquent eulogy and expressions.
32. Both African law and philosophy are tools and temperament boundaried and territorized in epistemological and metaphysical agency about Africa, representing Africa, in the field of knowledge and metaphysical production.
33. Both law and philosophy about and concerning Africa are revealers and reflections of the normative character, routine and regime that Africa has entertained, embraced, enshrined, expressed and experienced all along in their history.
34. Both law and philosophy about and concerning Africa are items, ideas and issues of historical interests about, impressions concerning and introduction to Africa. Readily, this could translate to mean that the law and philosophy of Africa presents and parade paradigms about Africa that can be investigated, interpreted, interrogated and inquired into for serious studies which is one of the aims for venturing into and ventilating these ideas and ideals about Africa.
35. Both law and philosophy are items and issues of culture and cultural realism which can be investigated in relation to and concerning Africa. When law and philosophy are studied about Africa, it is the case that Africa's cultural heritage is what is being studied and investigated.

36. Controversial issues, images and ideas concerning what African identity is can be curtailed, controlled, managed, deciphered, discerned when conscious attempts are made to know what African law and philosophy are.
37. The face and the soul or the spirit of Africa's existence is and are perceivable, conceivable and realizable through the institutions of law and the idea of philosophy that are entertained, embraced, allowed, expressed and experienced in African social reality. Both law and philosophy play this eminent role.
38. Both law and philosophy of Africa represent the cultural bond and the contractual basis for cementing and building African society (Idowu, 2024).
39. The tenets, thesis, thought provoking theories and thoroughness in temperament on which African philosophy and jurisprudence rest, are drawn, derived from and delicately domesticated in dramatic decency through the principles of natural justice, good conscience and equality of fair hearing in disputes, debates, discourses and controversial conversations that revolves around the live and times of people within communities and societies in African milieu and enclaves (Oke, 2011).
40. The ideals of resolute resilience, narrative of non-intimidation and the facticity of faith constitute the enduring principles, expressive pursuit and engaging perceptions on which the foundation of African jurisprudence and philosophy are resting, around the character, consequence and contour of her history over time.
41. The basis, major and boastful milestone on which African jurisprudence and philosophy thrives towards is nothing but social coercion, the coercion of the society, and communities that form African societies. The principles derived, created, crafted and constructed within African jurisprudential ideas and those of philosophy are targeted at ensuring social coercion. That is the milestone they seek to secure and sustain (Adewoye, 1987).
42. African philosophy and jurisprudence operates under the influence and impact inspired imperative of cogitative aesthetics, cognitive beauty and the fascinating cerebral facility and faculty that may be tagged, depicted and termed as traditional in temperament, traits and tendency, ancient in adventures and communal in character, capacity and competence and which is readily built and formidable to engage any sense of cognitive wisdom coming from anywhere especially the circle, context and the concentrated commitment of Eurocentrism (Mann and Roberts, 1991).
43. The framework, monument and milieu under, which African philosophy and jurisprudence operates and is operated, is sincerely ethical, strictly moral and sensitively religious (William and Moses Oke, 2008).
44. The philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa are not established in the sense and essence of primariness of one and secondariness of another, rather, a sense of enterprising, exciting, expressive and eloquent equanimity is the emphasis. Law is philosophy in action, philosophy is law in thoughts and as reason. Both action and thoughts or reason represent the push and pull of jurisprudence and philosophy as far as the African milieu or worldview is concerned.
45. African philosophy and jurisprudence are founded on the determined, decisive and decent connection between law and reason. Law regulates reason in its temperament and the exercise of law is equally regulated by the audacity of reason; both walk hand in hand. A sense of equanimity with respect to society is emphasised between both law and reason in the African sense.
46. African philosophy and jurisprudence preaches, emphasises and exercises the esteemed principles of checks and balances in societal organised governance systems. The result and recourse to the assisting ambience of monuments in metaphysics is never rolled out, exempted, eliminated nor eradicated in the African context.
47. The philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa resonates the democratic temperament, the democratic culture, the ethos and emphasis of democracy rather than an adventure into authoritarianism. Where the former is jettisoned and there is a relapse to the latter, the latter is culturally dealt with (William, 2005).
48. The central push and pull of African philosophy and jurisprudence is not attuned to the tunes of adversarial attitudes, attributes and arguments. Rather, it is the attempt to undermine the adversarial elements in the bid to promote the overall wellbeing and welfare of the society which means that the punishment paradigms that the jurisprudence and philosophy of African parades is silent on the adversarial element, expression and experience in engagement.
49. The philosophy and jurisprudence of African reminisces, resonates and reflects communality than individualism although it could not follow that individuality has no relevant and significant fulfilment within community and society (Anyanwu, 1984).

50. The most central, crucial and critical of the sense and essence of African philosophy and jurisprudence consist in the enhancement of societal equilibrium, the restoration of societal balance through reconciliation and the condition of communal conciliation through consensus.
51. African philosophy and jurisprudence constitute an expression of the traits, tendency and temperaments towards the reality of Limit and Limitabilism in extant theories in philosophy and jurisprudence, on one hand, and on the other hand, an expression of Limit and Limitabilism encoded in extant theories about Africa and her jurisprudence and philosophy. Both are expressions of the reality of Limit and Limitabilism. In this sense, African philosophy and jurisprudence represents and reflects a dutiful display, diligent disclosure and decent domestication of theoretical finesse and a realm, reign and regime of a theoretical framework that is fascinating fundamentally and foundationally.
52. African philosophy and jurisprudence represent and stand for attitudes and attributes captured and covered in disagreement and dissatisfaction that Africa expresses against standing theories, thesis and thoughts in the areas of jurisprudence and philosophy, in the general sense, and extant perceptions and conceptions against jurisprudence and philosophy as far as Africa is concerned.
53. In today's world, costumes, dressing patterns, cultural elements and artefact that belongs to Africa are being cherished in the Western world. Some of the elements that constitute her cultural identity and heritage are being studied. Those are properties of Africa, the fact that they are being studied and appreciated actually shows that their philosophies and jurisprudence are always being intact all along.
54. Missing artefact in Africa, on account of colonialism and that are commonly displayed in museums all over the Western world, attests to the fact that something of philosophy, and its counterpart, a jurisprudential worldview, existed. If those things were not precious and the product of Africa, why were they stolen and taken away from the same Africa that was declared to be empty, written in nothingness? Such a submission could not have been correct in the factual sense and in the first instance. Those artefacts are testimonies to how Africans have actuated themselves. It is one of the ways by which they have demonstrated their capacity to live in the society.
55. The absence of written record constitute a major reason why ideology of the west makes the submission that philosophy and jurisprudence could not have existed in Africa but, this is incorrect because written record is one thing, the actuality of a thing in anthropological, the intellectual, and the natural senses is another. If I have not written down a thought in my mind about something, while it is good to write it down, however, it does not presuppose the fact that those fine, refined and fundamental ideas do not exist in my mind nor the cogitative apparatus that I carry.
56. Anthropologists, jurists and philosophers from the western world did claim that African philosophy and jurisprudence do not exist and never existed. It could not be faulted on account of the fact that what they displayed in their varied, various and several submissions about Africa were informed by appeal to ignorant the *argumentum ad ignorantiam* fallacy and when ignorance is the case, free submissions are easy to form.
57. Hollesman's (1974) in his view and submission that an African jurisprudence including philosophy never existed was completely wrong on account of a fact that even colonialism could not have denied. Holleman's submission represents one of the incredible instantiation of the fallacy of poisoning the well.
58. That there existed and still exist African philosophy and jurisprudence even their vestiges, colonial jurisprudence and philosophy could not have denied and it never denied their existence. What colonialism did that could be counted as deliberate injustice and intentional unfairness on Africa is to have declared that philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa that it found was lacking in import, substance, theoreticity, and the temperament of true philosophy and jurisprudence. Colonialism could not deny their existence.
59. The ambassadorial role of African philosophy and African jurisprudence is attested to in terms of being vehicles of cultural refinement, cultural reformation and cultural formation as far as the African dimension are concerned.
60. The livingness, the pulsating elements, and the actuated and animated nuggets and nutrients of African philosophy and Jurisprudence are attested to on account of the complete divergent but expanding conceptions entertained within her jurisprudence and the distinguished but differentiated orientations and trends that her philosophy accommodates, acknowledges, admits and harbours as a revelation she carries in essential, expressive and eloquent terms.
61. African philosophy and jurisprudence represent the calculated calculus of the workings, the ways, the words, the wisdom, the will, the wishes, the weight and the worth of the mindset that exists in Africa and that she

possesses exclusively, expressively and the eloquence of the experiences Africa has encountered, engaged in overtime.

62. African philosophy and jurisprudence represent that paradigm concerning the culture of thinking, the territory of the temperament of thought, the terrain of the temple of thoughts and the travesty and harvest of the throne of thoughts that Africa possesses. Indeed, both cultural realities represent the intense intellectuality in thinking and thought process found among Africans. They display the seriousness of thought among Africans.
63. African philosophy and jurisprudence represent the Impeccable intellectuality, impressive ideological and imperative intentional reaction, response, report, remarks and record of the African Self, African Person in a world that is impatient with respect to the possibilities that Africa necessarily possesses, processes as properties that are self - performing, pontificating and postulating.
64. African philosophy and jurisprudence represent African demonstrative deeds of derring-do, the confidence, courage and boldness she possesses in the face of obvious, open and observable pessimism, pejuration, derogatory and negative perceptions, remarks, submissions and conclusions against her possibility.
65. African philosophy and jurisprudence stand as Africa's symbol of distinctive but distinguished deeds, decency and drama of dignity extended, expressed and expounded to the world. They represent a sense and essence of dignity that Africa parades as a paradigm with purpose.
66. African philosophy and jurisprudence draws and derives heavily from the significant strength inbuilt in and exuded by the fundamentals and frameworks in native languages, the capacity, competence and dexterity, they epitomize and embody such that if note annotations in refinement is ascribable, assignable and accorded to African philosophy and jurisprudence, it is because of the dexterity and the deeds, of strong and serious strength that such linguistic legacies and landmarks parade, portray, present and provides. Undoubtedly, language is philosophy; language is law; philosophy and jurisprudence are language determined. So, it is for the perspective that African philosophy and jurisprudence reflect.
67. The law and philosophy of Africa foregrounds the form, frame and fundament of the African periscope. Both represent the periscope that announces Africa in ways arranged, organized and orchestrated by Africans themselves. This feeling of the periscopic perspective is an avenue for arranging and announcing an awareness about Africans but by Africans themselves since it comes, emanates and emerges from Africans themselves.
68. African philosophy and African jurisprudence represent two letters of proof about social education, cultural enlightenment, creative expressions, communal education, skillful and eloquent expertism that African parades and that constitutes social orientations within the enclave of Africa and the milieu it maintains and manifest over time.
69. African philosophy and jurisprudence can be conceived as standing, shooting, special, serious and significant gallery of African ideas concerning society, community, culture, rights, organizations, freedom and existence.
70. African philosophy and jurisprudence, conceptually, constitute two core cardinal chronicle concerning Africa and about Africa. The chronicles that philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa portrays about Africa creates a special feeling of responsibility, respectability and recognition in the perception of those who see her in the most correct and right perspectives.
71. African philosophy and jurisprudence can be classified, considered, conceptualized and categorized as representing two test of reality, two theories of reality, two temperaments of philosophy, two traits of reality and two tendencies of reality as far as Africa is concerned and that Africa naturally entertains, embraces and expresses without any sense of shame, in decency but as significant paradigms that tells the realities that holds for Africa. Both realities further go ahead to tell of the symbiotic relationship between law which stands as regulations, and, philosophy, which stands as the reality of reason. Philosophy stands for reality of reason or rationality and law stands for reality of rule and regulations.
72. African philosophy and jurisprudence can be classified, considered and conceived as two aspects of African windows of ideas to the rest of the world, and, in equal terms, the door of receptivity to what is considered interesting, inspiring and impressive that is coming from the outside world when juxtaposed with each other. In other words, both cultural realities constitute how Africa assesses herself and how it examines her own ideas in relation to the rest of the world.
73. African philosophy and African jurisprudence cannot, ought not and should not be seen and conceived within the context and character of the utility of uncertainties. Uncertainties were not part and parcel of those two

aspects of African history, those two aspects of African history were substantive in nature and the utility it nurtured was not in uncertainties because African history and people then and now are not to be conceived in the content of uncertainties. Uncertainty was never part of what Africans celebrated because uncertainty was not effectual nor anything to write home about.

74. African philosophy and African jurisprudence, in the present sense, can be tagged and termed as a good instance of is called peopled-jurisprudence, peopled-philosophy because in the past and even now removed from the precinct, properties, possession and principles of colonialism, they remain people friendly. The people-friendly trait of both cultural realities was true was true in the past and it is still equally true in the present. The consciousness about people remains the characteristics of the law, the jurisprudence and the philosophical pattern practiced always in her history.
75. African philosophy and African jurisprudence, in the present sense, represent a carry-over from the paradigm of the past in terms of reason and law celebrated, entertained in African societies and communities, which, in equal terms, reflect the view that the past in Africa was not and never an image in darkness, in emptiness, in nothingness. What constitutes African philosophy and African jurisprudence, in this contemporary context, could not have been gotten from colonialism because colonialism meant standard, unique and peculiar systems of law and philosophy when it came with its own.
76. African philosophy and African jurisprudence reflect and relate to African conception of society as a theatre with philosophy, as reason, constituting one dimension of the theatre of society and Law, as rule and regulation, constituting another dimension of the theatrical conception of society. Society, as a theatre, in the African sense, does not suggest nor symbolise neither of tragedy nor comedy; it is suggestive of seriousness that rules and permeates life within society with the contributions of both reason and law recognized to be so, indeed.
77. African philosophy and her jurisprudence entertained, embraced and expounded within that geography, constitute an excellent and exceptional workings of the womb, the web and the well of her possibilities. The womb signifies the reproductive possibilities, the web suggests networking possibility while the well stands for the depth and dimensions of possibility, open, available and affordable to African societies through the pragmatic contribution, significance and relevance of both Law and Reason.
78. African Philosophy and African jurisprudence, in their own right, constitute, suggest and symbolise the expression of the intestines of survival, stability and sustenance that Law and Philosophy contribute to the attainment of these three ideas. These two paradigms are the integral capacity and competence that Africa society have enjoyed and experienced in the march towards stability, survival and sustenance.
79. African Philosophy and Jurisprudence stands for the garment, the gown and the regalia of glory that dresses, reveals, showcases and shares what Africans think about in the areas of philosophy. Law and Reason depict how glorious the thought of a people can be in their attempt to live together in the society they have found themselves and formed for themselves.
80. African Philosophy and African jurisprudence reminisces, in a reflective form, the goodness, goodwill and goodliness that Africa entertains, embraces and expresses within the community of the harvest of ideas. Law and Reason represent the good in the will of Africans that they parade for the world to see, regardless of ideological, historical and racial pessimism.
81. African Philosophy and African jurisprudence reflect the marketing trademarks, brands, packages and copyright coming from Africa and extended to the global sphere in the areas of philosophical and jurisprudential debate, discourses and disquisitions.
82. African Philosophy and African Jurisprudence reminisces, resonate and reflect the content, character and colour of the soul, spirit and mind that is characteristically, constitutionally and componentially typical of Africa. They endorsed and underscore the kind of soul and mind pattern that Africa possesses when it comes to philosophy and jurisprudence. Both reveals the mind and soul conception that is exhibitivite of Africans within Africa.
83. African Philosophy and African Jurisprudence can be conceived as a new cart in philosophical and jurisprudential temperament, order and thinking. African conceptions of Law and reason are not to be excluded nor shown and shared using statement and language of negativism. This constitute a new way of thinking and conceiving both philosophy and jurisprudence, perhaps, in ways which have not been entertained before now in global philosophical and jurisprudential matters, monuments and meanings.

84. African Philosophy and African Jurisprudence constitute the contextual innovativity or innovative contextuality that resides, remains and is retained within the African milieu. It is that sense of innovativity that set it apart from other philosophical narratives and jurisprudential heritage and orientations. This innovativity, necessarily, accords, assigns and ascribes value, validity, esteemed eloquence, assessed acceptability and advancing articulation.
85. African philosophy and African jurisprudence stand as a serious and significant statement of the fascinating fashion of the content and character of tradition prevalent, practiced, performed and paraded in the African context. Both Law and Reason serves as the impressive fashion that Africans conceive as the form and frame, the fundament and foundation of African heritage. The heritage that a people cherish, celebrate and can canvass as important in their survival, stability and sustenance is popularly, potentially, practically and powerfully known, instantiated and exemplified through their tradition. Tradition represents the soul, spirit, strength and stamina of a people. Reflectively, it is no mistake nor is it incorrect to submit that, Law, as rule and regulation, and Philosophy, as reason, reflectivity and contemplativity, both stands as sufficient components of the outflow from tradition. Indeed, tradition is reflected in both; also, both are revealers of tradition. It means that the tradition of a people is always steadily and readily philosophically and jurisprudentially rich, robust and resourceful.
86. African philosophy and African jurisprudence are both suggestive and symbolic seriousness of the patterns, processes and procedures of existence in Africa. Philosophy symbolizes and suggests rational existence while jurisprudence suggests and symbolizes legal existence both within the context of the African enclave. Existence is not dry, dark, deadly nor is it a dead reality in Africa; Law and Reason are some of the constituents that make existence interesting, impressive, invigorating and imperative to follow in the African sense.
87. African philosophy and African jurisprudence are suggestions concerning the mastery, mastermind and masterpiece in method deployed, employed and utilized by Africa in transcending the myopism that mar the ideology and history of a people, in this case, African people. The philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa do not translate to myopic methods in themselves but are methods adopted by Africans in transcending the myopic and malodorous mention and momentum in the manners of societies that deploys meaningless monuments in dehumanizing Africa's history.
88. African philosophy and African jurisprudence suggest the kinds of intellectual and ideological movement, manners, mien, moments and monuments that Africa has managed, over time, and that has successfully managed Africa into what she sees and that she sees as meaningful in the memorable sense.
89. African philosophy and African jurisprudence are expressive sentences and eloquent statements in cultural hermeneutics. The philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa are indicators of the kind of paradigms of interpretation of the kind of societies adopted by Africa. Societies are open to opportunities available in being interpreted, investigated and interrogated. The philosophy and jurisprudence of a people are indices or variables through which such interpretations are actualized, accomplished, achieved and attained.
90. African philosophy and African jurisprudence constitute Africa's contextual and cultural capture and coverage of the captivating character of her epistemological rationality and epistemological regulation and legality. Both philosophy and jurisprudence are subject to the capacity conveyed through the appurtenance of epistemology which implies that both can be known and are knowable in society. Indeed, they are paradigms of epistemology; they suggest, reveal and reflect how African societies think.
91. African philosophy and African jurisprudence constitute the contextual capture and the captivating coverage of the reality of Expressivism and Communicativism as far as Africa is concerned. They are reiteration of the glorious point that there are heavy, happy and healthy opinions and views to express and communicate about Africa but that there are contents, color, contour and consequence do not, necessarily, have to be painted, pictured, paraded and portrayed in negativism, nothingness, notoriety, superfluity of naughtiness and a reduction to redundancy and irrelevance. Simply stated, something significant exist to say, write and report about Africa through her philosophy and jurisprudence.
92. African philosophy and African jurisprudence constitute the contextual capture and the captivating characterization of the reality of what exist and the rejection of the ontology of nothingness and emptiness often ascribed, steadily assigned, always associated and readily attributed about Africa in western canonization. The ontology of emptiness about Africa represents a myth.
93. African philosophy and African jurisprudence, even in the contemporary times, constitute a contextual capture and captivating character of the power and utility of memory, African memory about the past, present and the future through what law and reason reveals, relates and reflects about Africa in the holistic sense.

94. African philosophy and African jurisprudence constitute a context, constant and continuous, in Africa's attempt at staging that sense and essence of cultural revolution, rejection and revolt. Professional attempt at penning down, in plain staking terms and terminologies, the salient elements of African philosophy and jurisprudence can be captured in this captivating process, patterns, procedures and possibilities.
95. African philosophy and jurisprudence are and have always been Africa's agency and agenda in reiterating, remonstrating and reflecting Africa's hope concerning and about the future.
96. African philosophy and jurisprudence are Africa's means, measures and methods at reaching and engaging the world of ideas politely, pragmatically and purposefully.
97. African jurisprudence and Africa's character of philosophy are African agency in the promotion and pursuit of cultural difference, dissonance, defense and decency.
98. The jurisprudence and philosophy of Africa stands for, signifies essentially and seriously convey Africa's agency and agenda for the pursuit and promotion of cultural rebirth, renaissance revival, regeneration, responsibility, respect, empowerment, emancipation and liberation.
99. The jurisprudence and philosophy of Africa are representations in cultural objectivity, not universal nor global objectivity. The subjective content is unmistakable, unquestionable, unbroken, unrivaled and deserves mentioning in the momentum of cultural objectivity that she manages and manifests, within myriads of meaningful monuments.
100. The jurisprudence and philosophy of Africa registers the subjective consciousness, content and character of Africans concerning what philosophy is. In equal terms, African jurisprudence suggests the subjective consciousness, content and character concerning law within the African cast. Both law and reason are products, properties and possessions, emanating and originating from the subjective consciousness and culture that Africans parade about those two disciplines, facets, phases and faces of African societies.

6. Conclusion

Civilization, as an ancient, antiquated and adventurous phenomena in world history, emerged, emanated and existed first, in ancient Egypt. Indeed, the first set of philosophers from ancient Greek civilization, such as Thales, Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle, had, in their differentiated but distinguished and distinctive ways, seasoned but seriously significant sessions of experiences and encounters with the philosophical and jurisprudential manners, moments, monuments and magnificent magnitude of mental exercises, engagements, expressions and expositions in Ancient Egypt. In this sense, it does and could follow that African philosophy and African jurisprudence actually had a commencing date that predated and antedated Western philosophical and jurisprudential experiences. Consequently, Africa had philosophy and jurisprudence before the Western world got enrolled, empowered and entangled in those two disciplines of cultural realism.

It is compelling and convincing too, but, not incorrect, to submit that, in the light of this historical facts, features, and forms, Western philosophy and jurisprudence had, at its commencing date, paraded before the world, even up till the present moment, although with a special sense and taste, were cultural realities that it borrowed, stole, took and got from Africa. In instantiated sense, substantive form and exemplified form, one could correctly submit that what western philosophy and jurisprudence paraded all along was a loan from Africa which it is yet to pay back. Philosophy and jurisprudence that are Western in nature, content, color, contour, course, and consequence, both emanated from and represented a loan from Africa which means that both Western philosophy and jurisprudence are indebted to the philosophy and jurisprudence of Africa, courtesy of ancient Egyptian civilization.

If philosophy and jurisprudence reminisces, resonates and reflects an unusual, uncommon and unconventional way of thinking amongst mortals, it could be contended, proposed and postulated that this non-orthodox and non-traditional kind of thinking and reflection about the universe existence and reality, represents a cornerstone in man's approach to the world and the environment that nature constantly presents to man in unfolding dimensions and the untellable depth of decent displays, disclosures and dramatic deeds beyond the deliberate decisions of man on earth, but, then, this reflective attitude and temperament started with and commenced in ancient Egyptian civilization. What is worthy of close attention, keen awareness, convincing consciousness and clarity or focus is that, according to globally acknowledged historical facts, Ancient Egypt was a Black community, colony and collective conglomerate (Johnson, 1991; Obenga, 2004; Ashimolowo, 2007).

Nevertheless, the fact that philosophy and jurisprudence were initiated, primarily and, in the first instance, in Ancient Egypt, from and within Africa, could not mean that Africa paraded, then, and still parades a sense of Universality, Totality and Essentiality, in relations to both cultural realities. Actually not! Africa had it from the beginning, no doubt,

but, her philosophy and jurisprudence do not and cannot pass for universal philosophy and jurisprudence. What one could contend and postulate, without any sense of contradiction, is that each culture do have their stay, say, sway and stake with respect to the realities, such as philosophy and jurisprudence, that culture controls, expresses, carries and commands.

Above all the best submission and correct conclusion to make over these matters is that “The Miracle of Greece”, that of philosophy and its counterparts, jurisprudence, could not have been anything worthwhile, weighty, wealthy, winsome and miraculous, if the initial miracle had not been transferred, transported and imported from Africa to the Western world. In conclusive terms, if what connect both Philosophy and Jurisprudence resonate and revolves around reason, what this proudly portend, present and parade, is that the journey of reason into the heart of man, into the thought of man, into the reflective capacity, rational and contemplative competence of man, in his mortality, into what is called Philosophical exercises and Jurisprudential exegesis, actually commenced from the African mind, not necessarily in Western world. The origin of reason had its primal, primitive, primordial and distinctive root from the mindset of an average African. Africa started the parade of reason, which is now considered to be the trade mark, means of exchange, of both Philosophy and Jurisprudence. Indeed, Africa got the right, routine, reign, rule and regime of reason correctly from the beginning, even if it is true that her history has been plagued by circumstantial conditions and human creation that cast context of victimism around her and concerning her future.

That Western Philosophy has done a fascinating sense and essence of aesthetic justice, paradigm of interesting invigorating impressive beauty and a parade of powerful performance, prowess and potency in philosophical exercises and jurisprudential expressions, remains undoubtable, unbeatable, unmistakable, unquestionable and, altogether, unrivalled. Yet, what is incontestable and non-controversial is that what Western Philosophy presently parades, in popular esteem, pertinent acceptance and persistent acclaim, was a seed of greatness, glory and grandeur she got was given to her from Africa. The origin of Western greatness with respect to philosophy and jurisprudence came from the original greatness, glamour and grandeur that Africa bequeathed to her without much ado. Undoubtedly, therefore, Africa remains rested and bested in the reign, rule and regulation of reason which can be defined, depicted and designated as expressive sagacity nurtured in pragmatic outflow and paradigmatic outpour eloquently second to none even if the entire world does not seem to have a comprehensive conviction about these convincing cognitivity, cogitativity and cerebral perceivity and faculty that she possesses powerfully, performingly in prowess as a property that explains her poise and posture, pedigree and profile.

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