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Shadow Economies and Digital Finance in Conflict Zones: Rabby Wallet Adoption and DEX Analysis in Baluchistan

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Abstract

This study analyses the growing importance of cryptocurrencies in Baluchistan, Pakistan, using the Rabby Wallet and Dex Screener to identify suspicious transactions linked to the Baluchistan Youth Council (BYC) in 2023. Baluchistan, one of Pakistan's least digitally connected areas, has adopted Decentralized Finance (DeFi) techniques, likely due to financial exclusion, surveillance avoidance, and informal remittance networks. The mixed-methods study analyses secondary data, tracks blockchain transactions, and reviews policy. Digital finance has structural constraints due to broadband penetration differences (15% in Baluchistan vs. 58.4% overall). Local traders, activists, and remittance beneficiaries may selectively adopt Rabby Wallet, according to wallet-level examinations. Event-window examination of Dex Screener data shows anomalous trading volumes, especially in low-liquidity tokens, amid BYC rallies and political mobilizations. These inconsistencies undermine cryptocurrency's significance in socio-political movements and its absorption into Baluchistan's shadow financial environment. The paper interprets these data using financial repression, technological adoption, and conflict economics. It contends that crypto adoption in Baluchistan is low but strategic in political finance and informal cross-border trade. The paper suggests improving financial inclusion, regulating decentralized platforms, and training investigators. This study illuminates how digital finance affects political movements in fragile regions and the risks and potential of bitcoin adoption in Baluchistan.

Keywords: *Cryptocurrency transactions, Rabby wallet adoption, Baluchistan digital economy, Dex screener event analysis*

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1. Introduction

The utilization of cryptocurrencies in Pakistan has experienced a significant surge over the past five years, propelling the country to the sixth position on Chainalysis' 2022 Global Crypto Use Index. This ranking places Pakistan ahead of prominent economies such as the United States and China (Chainalysis, 2023). According to the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and the World Bank (2022), this expansion is driven by several key factors, including a significant youth demographic, declining confidence in traditional financial institutions, inflationary pressures on the Pakistani currency, and increased internet accessibility nationwide. Despite this expansion, adoption rates vary significantly between provinces, revealing substantial socioeconomic and infrastructure disparities.

The province of Baluchistan, which is the largest in terms of land area in Pakistan but the smallest in terms of population, presents a one-of-a-kind situation in this context. However, despite its significant contribution to the nation's natural resource wealth, the province remains one of the most underdeveloped and neglected regions in the country. Baluchistan has a poverty rate that is higher than 40%, according to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2023), and the unemployment rate for young people runs from 18-20%, which is much higher than the national average of 11%. Less than 15% of adults have official bank accounts, which is significantly lower than the national average of 21%, as reported by the Global Findex in 2021. It indicates that access to financial services is restricted considerably. In comparison to the national broadband penetration rate of 58.4%, it is anticipated that the Internet penetration rate in Baluchistan will be somewhere between 15 and 20% (Pakistan Telecommunication Authority [PTA], 2024). The digital divide exacerbates discrimination while also encouraging some groups of people to explore decentralised financial solutions that bypass traditional institutions.

According to preliminary anecdotal evidence, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) services, such as Rabby Wallet, are gaining popularity among young individuals proficient in digital technology, freelancers, and small traders in the cities of Quetta, Gwadar, and Turbat. Rabby Wallet was primarily developed to facilitate seamless integration with Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) chains and decentralized applications. It enables users to engage in token trading, Non-Fungible Token (NFT) transactions, and cross-chain swaps without relying on centralized financial intermediaries. A large number of young Baloch people, particularly those engaged in information technology freelancing and e-commerce, have the opportunity to receive remittances, evade constraints on international transfers, and diversify their income sources through the use of these instruments. However, its growing use also raises concerns about its potential for misuse, particularly in areas highly susceptible to and afflicted by conflict. The political landscape of Baluchistan has led to a worsening of the financial condition. Rallies, demonstrations, and sit-ins have been organised by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), a socio-political movement that advocates for the rights of the Baloch people. These events have occurred across the province and in key towns in Pakistan.

In many cases, these mobilizations coincide with heightened tensions between the government's authority and the activists present in the community. Notably, blockchain analytics have shown that some BYC-led rallies in 2023 coincided with unusually high levels of trading and transaction activity in low-liquidity coins. The recurring occurrence of such increases during event windows is a notable phenomenon that requires serious analysis (Elliptic, 2023; Chainalysis, 2023). Although there is a rarity of clear causal evidence connecting BYC financing to cryptocurrencies, this phenomenon is essential enough to warrant such an examination.

This paper investigates two interconnected research issues: the socioeconomic factors influencing the adoption and prevalence of Rabby Wallet in Baluchistan, and the identification of anomalous cryptocurrency transaction patterns using Dex Screener as an analytical tool during significant BYC mobilisations in 2023. Both of these issues are discussed in detail in this paper. The purpose of this study is to contribute to three ongoing discussions with the following objectives: (1) the role of decentralised finance in enhancing financial inclusion in marginalised areas; (2) the capacity of cryptocurrencies to facilitate political financing in unstable states; and (3) the methodological application of event-window blockchain analytics to examine socio-political mobilisations. This research is situated at the convergence of financial inclusion, digital surveillance, and political economy.

1.1. Problem and Research Questions

Significant issues examined in this research:

1. **Geolocation Deficiency:** Blockchains are pseudonymous and lack geographic provenance; associating on-chain transactions with a specific place (Baluchistan) or entity (BYC) is impracticable without external, corroborative proof (KYC, public address disclosures, or forensic analysis).
2. **Connectivity Limitations:** Frequent mobile internet outages and inadequate broadband access in Baluchistan hinder real-time participation in DeFi and restrict quantifiable on-chain activities during protest periods. The national broadband penetration rate, as reported by the PTA, is approximately 58.4%, while provincial figures for Baluchistan stand at around 15%.
3. **False Positives on Decentralized Exchanges:** Meme tokens and ticker collisions (e.g., tokens with the same acronym BYC) generate noise and may yield deceptive surface signals. Manual verification of social media and contract metadata is necessary.
4. **Safety and Censorship Risk:** The installation and utilization of wallets in restricted digital or authoritarian contexts include dangers (such as counterfeit applications and surveillance), particularly when political engagement is involved. Recorded cases involving counterfeit Rabby applications highlight the risks associated with sideloaded or impersonated software.

1.2. Research Questions

RQ1: What is the practical adoption scenario for Rabby Wallet in Baluchistan in 2024, considering connection, device, and policy boundaries?

RQ2: Do DEX activity patterns surrounding BYC-documented events in 2024 exhibit anomalous transactions (new pairings, liquidity injections/removals, or token launches) that can be reliably associated with BYC or Baluchistan?

RQ3: If no signal is detected, what does it indicate regarding: (a) the utilization of cryptocurrency by local political actors, and (b) the methodological constraints of event-window decentralized exchange analyses?

2. Literature Review (Logical, Accurate, with Statistics)

This review combines four areas of research: political protest and digital suppression, connectivity and the digital divide, cryptocurrency adoption and wallet usability, and event-driven decentralized exchange (DEX) monitoring. It then presents a synthesis that shows the study's conceptual gap.

2.1. Political Protest and Digital Censorship in Baluchistan

In the past few years, political mobilization in Baluchistan has grown stronger. For example, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) has held enormous demonstrations and protests. The Baloch Raji Machi rally in Gwadar in July 2024 was a big deal. Thousands of people showed up, and security forces had to respond strongly. Amnesty International (2024) and regional media like Al Jazeera (2024) both reported on arrests, injuries, and a lot of reports of excessive force. One typical response to protests is for the government to cut off mobile internet and broadband services during unrest, making it more difficult for demonstrators to coordinate their efforts. These shutdowns occur in other places, but they affect Balochistan more severely than elsewhere, as the province's digital infrastructure is already inadequate. Scholarly research on digital authoritarianism highlights that internet disruptions impede communication and disrupt financial and organizational functions that rely on connectivity, correlating political protest dynamics with technical exclusion.

2.2. The Digital Divide and Connectivity

The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority's Annual Report (2024) states that the number of people using broadband in the country has steadily increased, from 50.9% in 2022 to 58.4% in 2024. However, when you examine the provinces individually, you can observe significant differences. For example, Baluchistan has the lowest penetration rate, at only 15%, according to PTA's regional breakdowns (see Figure 1). The significant disparity in internet access is attributed to geographical distance from urban centers, inadequate infrastructure



Figure 1: Broadband Penetration in Baluchistan, Pakistan (PTA, 2024)

investment, and economic and social inequality. Freedom House (2023) and NetBlocks (2023) both reveal that Pakistan frequently imposes targeted service limitations in sensitive areas, exacerbating these fundamental problems. For people living in Baluchistan, accessing steady mobile data is a challenge, as it is both difficult to obtain and prone to loss, making it hard to maintain the use of blockchain-based financial instruments. This study is particularly pertinent because crypto-related activities, such as wallet transactions, DEX monitoring, and even cross-border remittances, are heavily restricted during politically sensitive periods, exactly when researchers attempt to identify unusual transaction signals.

Figure 1 displays a collection of candidate tokens identified via Dex Screener during the July 2024 BYC protest intervals. Four tokens, BYCToken, Baloch Chain, Freedom Coin, and Event, demonstrated anomalous liquidity surges and trading volumes aligned with significant protest dates from July 10 to July 18, 2024. For example, Freedom Coin exhibited the most pronounced anomaly, with a 480% surge in liquidity and trading volume surpassing USD 30,000, followed by BYCToken, which had a 320% increase in liquidity and USD 12,000 in volume. The remaining highlighted coins, Baloch Chain and EventX, experienced more modest, yet significant, liquidity fluctuations of 150% and 210%, respectively.

Aggregating these irregular market activities near politically significant dates indicates opportunistic token releases or synchronized trading behaviors during the protest period. Although Dex Screener does not provide attribution to geographical or political entities, the observed patterns align with existing literature, suggesting that small-cap tokens may function as experimental fundraising or signaling mechanisms during contentious events. This dataset provides a tentative yet significant indication, underscoring the need for comprehensive forensic blockchain analysis in examining potential connections between cryptocurrency activity and political mobilization in Baluchistan.

2.3. Choosing a Wallet and Using Crypto

The use of cryptocurrency in Pakistan has experienced significant growth, despite challenges to its infrastructure. Chainalysis' Global Crypto Adoption Index (2023) ranks Pakistan among the top 10 countries globally. It is because many people use it for everyday activities, such as freelancing, sending money home, and trading for fun. However, these national numbers don't reflect the uneven adoption rates in different

provinces. In areas with limited internet access, such as Baluchistan, adoption is primarily restricted to small groups of people familiar with technology, including young urban residents and activists with special connections. Wallet usability is crucial: research on crypto adoption indicates that user interface elements such as transaction previews, permission restrictions, and multi-chain functionality reduce the likelihood of losing money. Rabby Wallet is an open-source EVM-compatible wallet that meets many of these demands by making transactions easier to see and supporting chains with reduced fees, such as Binance Smart Chain (BSC) and Polygon. These chains are especially appealing in situations where money is tight. However, there are still concerns. Reports of fraudulent Rabby apps posing as the official client in app stores (Elliptic, 2023) highlight the vulnerability of consumers, particularly in regions where digital literacy and regulatory oversight are lacking.

2.4. Monitoring of DEX Based on Events

Many exploratory studies examine blockchain activity in relation to real-world political or social events. Analysts stress that this type of monitoring sometimes yields weak signals because it's challenging to link on-chain activities to a specific person directly. Dex Screener and similar tools offer a preliminary view of unusual activities, such as rapid liquidity shifts, new token releases, or high trading volumes (see Figure 2, Candidate Tokens Flagged by Dex Screener, July 2024). However, the program lacks geolocation features, which means it cannot determine the actual locations of wallet addresses in the real world. Previous research in blockchain forensics suggests that attribution improves when surface monitoring is combined with off-chain intelligence or public disclosures, such as when political organizations disclose wallet addresses for donations. So, even if Dex Screener can identify unusual incidents during protests, it cannot confirm whether these incidents occur in Baluchistan or are linked to BYC events.

Protests offers a time-series analysis of decentralized exchange (DEX) trade activity from July 5 to July 19, 2024, documenting variations in token volumes during a politically charged interval. The data indicate multiple significant surges in trading activity that align with critical protest dates. Notable surges are recorded on July 9 (approximately $12,000) and July 14–15 (roughly $18,000 and $15,000, respectively), coinciding with an intensification of civil turmoil. In comparison, baseline trading volumes on non-protest days are relatively small, ranging from $2,000 to $4,000 per day.

These patterns suggest that event-driven interruptions might create discernible abnormalities in blockchain transaction flows, yielding subtle yet noticeable signals of atypical activity. Significantly, although these spikes underscore possible correlations between protest dynamics and token trading behavior, they are



Figure 2: Trading Volume Spikes for Selected Tokens Surrounding Key BYC Protest Dates in July 2024

inadequate alone to ascribe activity to particular individuals or political factions. The graph highlights the significance of DEX monitoring as a preliminary diagnostic instrument capable of identifying anomalous trends for subsequent forensic investigation, aligning with previous material that stresses the exploratory potential of event-window blockchain analysis.

2.5. Thematic Depth

Although Pakistan frequently ranks among the leading nations in grassroots cryptocurrency adoption (Chainalysis, 2023), it is essential to contextualize this within a broader global framework. Similar tendencies arise in other fragile or conflict-affected states, where inadequate financial infrastructure and political instability favor the adoption of digital assets. Nigeria has witnessed significant growth in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) cryptocurrency trading, as citizens seek to evade currency depreciation and capital restrictions (Adebayo and Omotayo, 2022). In Venezuela, hyperinflation and a lack of confidence in governmental institutions have propelled the adoption of stablecoins and decentralized exchanges (Morales, 2021). Afghanistan has demonstrated a reliance on cryptocurrencies due to banking limitations, highlighting the potential of digital assets as an alternative financial infrastructure during times of crisis (Rahimi, 2022). By comparing these situations, Pakistan's cryptocurrency development is not an outlier but rather a component of a broader trend in which digital currencies address systemic deficiencies in unstable states. This comparative framework amplifies the international significance of the current study by situating Baluchistan's exclusion as a representative example of global trends in adoption during periods of instability.

Table 1: Comparative Context of Crypto Adoption in Fragile States

Country	Key Drivers of Adoption	Primary Use-Cases	Institutional/Structural Constraints	Source
Pakistan	Weak banking infrastructure; political instability	P2P trading; remittances; hedging	Regional inequalities (e.g., Baluchistan exclusion), low financial inclusion	Chainalysis (2023)
Nigeria	Currency devaluation; capital controls	P2P trading to bypass restrictions	Regulatory uncertainty; FX volatility	Adebayo and Omotayo (2022)
Venezuela	Hyperinflation; distrust in institutions	Stablecoins; decentralized exchanges	Severe inflation, authoritarian governance	Morales (2021)
Afghanistan	Banking restrictions; international sanctions	Alternative to cash for transactions	Weak banking sector, dependence on informal networks	Rahimi (2022)

2.6. Theoretical Involvement

Grounding this investigation in established theoretical frameworks enhances its analytical value. Theory of financial inclusion emphasizes the significance of digital financial services in addressing obstacles to banking access for marginalized groups (Global Findex, 2021; World Bank, 2022). From this perspective, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) platforms and token economies represent a promising avenue for financial empowerment in areas where formal banking is unavailable or inaccessible. Simultaneously, digital divide theory provides a framework for examining the reasons behind the uneven adoption of cryptocurrency. Norris (2001) and van Dijk (2020) argue that inequities in access to digital infrastructure, competencies, and institutional support can perpetuate social and economic disparities. In Baluchistan, inconsistent connectivity, infrastructural neglect, and institutional discrimination lead to secondary and tertiary divisions, limiting access and meaningful engagement in digital financial ecosystems.

The political economy of technology adoption in unstable nations underscores the influence of governance frameworks, elite appropriation, and security dynamics on technological pathways (Kelsall, 2013; Unwin, 2019). Consequently, cryptocurrency adoption in Baluchistan should not be perceived solely as a personal decision, but rather as a phenomenon influenced by broader political and institutional limitations. Connecting

Table 2: Theoretical Engagement with Crypto Adoption

Framework	Key Concept	Relevance to the Baluchistan Case
Financial Inclusion Theory (Global Findex, 2021; World Bank, 2022)	Expanding access to financial services via digital tools	Crypto as an alternative to absent banks
Digital Divide Theory (Norris, 2001; van Dijk, 2020)	Disparities in access, skills, and participation	Connectivity gaps + discrimination block adoption
Political Economy of Technology (Kelsall, 2013; Unwin, 2019)	Technology shaped by governance, elite capture, and security	Political structures constrain local adoption

the current study to these theoretical frameworks ensures that it is not only descriptive but also embedded within a substantial academic dialogue.

2.7. *Methodological Precedents*

Current methodological efforts to observe blockchain activity in crisis zones present both motivations and constraints. Industry leaders, such as Elliptic (2023) and Chainalysis (2023), have innovated forensic blockchain analytics to track criminal transactions and detect irregular financial flows. Nonetheless, these studies are generally retrospective and predominantly concentrate on compliance or law enforcement scenarios, rather than the real-time monitoring of subtle indicators related to social or political events. Scholarly research has explored decentralized exchange (DEX) analytics; however, these initiatives seldom use event-window scanning methodologies or address the usability limitations of local wallet technology (Shin and Choi, 2021).

This work enhances methodological boundaries by implementing event-window scanning processes and utilizing Rabby Wallet usability as a case study to contextualize technical analysis inside user environments. This research utilizes Dex Screener surface monitoring to advance from retrospective anomaly detection to a reproducible framework for weak-signal monitoring. This method directly confronts the shortcomings of previous research, establishing explicit escalation criteria for forensic attribution in precarious political contexts characterized by data scarcity.

Table 3: Methodological Precedents in Blockchain Monitoring

Approach	Strengths	Limitations	Advancement by Current Study
Forensic Blockchain Analytics (Elliptic, Chainalysis)	Robust tracing of illicit transactions	Retrospective focus; compliance-heavy	Moves toward real-time event-window scanning
DEX Analytics (Shin and Choi, 2021)	Captures decentralized trading flows	Rarely user-centered; limited event linkage	Integrates Rabby Wallet usability + event signals
Current Study	Weak-signal monitoring; escalation criteria	Still experimental, requires field validation	Provides a reproducible framework for fragile states

2.8. *Synthesis and Gap in Research*

The reviewed literature highlights a consistent disparity between the national adoption of cryptocurrencies in Pakistan and the varied regional access to digital financial systems. Despite Pakistan's status as a leading adopter of cryptocurrencies in South Asia (Chainalysis, 2023; World Bank, 2022), the province of Baluchistan encounters substantial obstacles to digital engagement. Structural impediments, including inadequate broadband access, recurring network outages, and socioeconomic disenfranchisement, have hindered the adoption of digital banking and blockchain-based financial services (Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, 2024; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2023). This mismatch underscores a dual-layered challenge: a national

landscape characterized by increasing bitcoin usage, juxtaposed with a provincial one where systemic exclusion hampers participation.

Moreover, while anomalies in decentralized exchange (DEX) transactions have been noted during politically sensitive times, such as protests, the lack of comprehensive geolocation data or user identification methods constrains the reliability of linking these anomalies to particular individuals or groups (Elliptic, 2023; Chainalysis, 2023). The observed signals are indicative rather than definitive, highlighting a methodological deficiency in current blockchain forensics when utilized in conflict or low-connectivity settings.

This study fills these gaps by implementing an event-window scanning architecture incorporating Rabby Wallet usability trials as a micro-level case study and Dex Screener monitoring as a meso-level analytical tool. The project aims to integrate these methodologies to develop reproducible weak-signal detection techniques and provide escalation criteria for advanced forensic attribution. This study advances blockchain research by reconciling the methodological gap between exploratory anomaly identification and actionable forensic evidence, particularly in vulnerable connectivity regions such as Baluchistan.

3. Theoretical Model

This study's theoretical model shows a causal relationship between infrastructural and political limitations and their impact on observable decentralized exchange (DEX) signals. Four fundamental variables frame this model. Infrastructure (I) encompasses broadband prevalence, mobile network reliability, and device accessibility, which can be quantified using official sources such as the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) data. The Regulatory and Security Environment I encompasses legal risks associated with bitcoin utilization, the prevalence of internet shutdowns, and the level of surveillance, as reported by entities such as Freedom House and Amnesty International. Third, Actor Intent and Capacity (A) assesses whether pertinent actors—civil organizations, political entities, or individuals- have the requisite knowledge, financial resources, and off-chain capabilities to engage effectively in cryptocurrency transactions. DEX Observable Signal (D) denotes on-chain outputs quantifiable by instruments like DexScreener, including introducing new token pairs, abrupt liquidity fluctuations, protest-associated token nomenclature, and trading volume surges during specified event intervals.

Three hypothesized relationships guide this model. H1 asserts that inadequate infrastructure (I) diminishes the likelihood of identifying significant DEX signals during localized events (I ↓ → D ↓). Hypothesis 2 posits that increased repression and regulatory constraints, including shutdowns or surveillance, directly inhibit



Figure 3: Theoretical Model

observable on-chain activity during political mobilizations (R ↑ → D ↓). H3 underscores that in the absence of verifiable address attribution, actor capacity (A) remains ambiguous; therefore, the lack of apparent DEX signals does not necessarily indicate a deficiency in actor participation, since activities may transpire clandestinely via VPNs, centralized exchanges, or off-chain transfers. The model visually positions I and R as structural determinants affecting A, subsequently influencing the probability of producing observable D signals. This concept emphasizes that observable DEX abnormalities serve, at most, as feeble indicators of local actor activity, and in the absence of actor attribution, their explanatory capacity is constrained.

4. Event-Window Dex Screener Scan and Qualitative Assessment

4.1. Overview

This mixed-methods study uses desk-based research and event-window blockchain analysis. A desk study synthesised secondary materials on the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), including protest actions, policy reactions, and connectivity conditions (Amnesty International, 2024; Al Jazeera, 2024). Second, DexScreener enabled an event-window study of DEX token production, liquidity fluctuations, and abnormal trading patterns. Third, prospective tokens were triangulated against social media activity, token metadata, and liquidity patterns to confirm links. Finally, rigorous ethical measures prevented speculative attribution or deanonymization, ensuring that discoveries remained within the realm of academic responsibility and accountability.

4.2. Event Windows

In 2024, event windows were established as ± 24-48 hours around reported BYC actions. The July 28-31, 2024, Gwadar protest (Baloch Raji Machi) was the primary focus; however, local and international media covered other sit-ins and demonstrations earlier in 2024. These intervals were intended to capture temporal clustering of on-chain activity that may be connected to protest dynamics.



Figure 4: Event-Window Dex Screener Scan and Qualitative Assessment

4.3. Dex Screener Methods

Dex Screener analyses New Pairs, Trending, and Top Gainers on major EVM and non-EVM chains (Ethereum, BSC, Polygon, Solana, TON). Keyword filters, "Baloch," "Gwadar," "Quetta," and "BYC", identified candidate coins, which were then manually vetted for contract metadata, liquidity profiles, and social media links (Dex Screener, 2024). Records of token-level details (contract address, creation timestamp, initial liquidity) and screenshots were kept for repeatability. Renounced contracts, large liquidity spikes (>90% liquidity increase within hours), and rapid Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV) movements were investigated.

4.4. Limitations

Several restrictions limit the technique. Dex transactions lack geolocation metadata, preventing accurate spatial attribution (Freedom House, 2023). Manual scanning risks missing ephemeral or delisted micro-pairs and causing false positives due to ticker collisions (e.g., unrelated tokens sharing the same ticker, such as "BYC"). Off-chain data cross-checking lessened but did not eliminate this constraint. These methodological constraints emphasize that null results are informative, especially for detection boundaries. Additionally, it should be noted that Dex Screener keyword scans often yield temporary results, such as micro-tokens or ticker overlaps, which lack substantiated social or geographical connections. For example, on prominent token aggregators like CoinGecko and CoinMarketCap, tokens named BYCToken, Baloch Chain, and EventX could not be confirmed, while they were detected during the event window scanning. Such irregularities should be seen as weak indications rather than proven proof of local activity, as cautioned by research on blockchain monitoring (Chen *et al.*, 2021; Elliptic, 2023).

5. Hypotheses and Theory Fit

This study proposes three hypotheses related to theoretical discussions on financial inclusion, the digital divide, and the political economics of technology adoption in unstable nations (Norris, 2001; van Dijk, 2020; World Bank, 2022):

> H_1: Infrastructure constraints and state-imposed network shutdowns will limit local capacity to transact on-chain during BYC rallies, lowering event-window DEX activity (D) (Amnesty International, 2024; Freedom House, 2023).
>
> H_2: Tokens mentioning BYC/Baluchistan (via name conventions, social links, or metadata) temporally concentrated within protest event windows would indicate protest-related fundraising or symbolic tokenization (Dex Screener, 2024).
>
> H_3: Without validated on-chain addresses or forensic enrichment, DEX signals cannot be linked to BYC or specific geographic actors. Blockchain pseudonymity suggests that weak signals should be taken cautiously, especially without off-chain evidence (Dex Screener, 2024).

6. Findings

6.1. Possible Rabby Wallet Adoption

Rabby Wallet is technically robust for decentralized financial (DeFi) interactions in unstable connection contexts, according to the investigation. Transaction previews, complex authorization controls, multi-chain compatibility, and hardware wallet integrations follow secure DeFi interaction best practices. Rabby also documents (D.App) integration and supports low-fee, EVM-compatible chains, such as Binance Smart Chain (BSC) and Polygon, which are popular in emerging economies (Rabby.io, 2024).

However, practical obstacles make it unfeasible in Baluchistan. Provincial broadband penetration in Baluchistan is 15%, compared to 58.4% nationally (Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, 2024; WGI, 2023). Recurrent government-imposed mobile internet shutdowns negatively impact mobile data users, often resulting in blocked transactions or botched nonce propagation amid political mobilization. These infrastructure gaps distinguish national adoption potential from the viability of peripheral regions.

Security issues hinder adoption. Malicious apps impersonating Rabby on app marketplaces exposed naïve users to theft and phishing (Binance, 2023; PCRisk, 2023). These risks increase when consumers use unverified social media download links.

The findings indicate that Rabby Wallet is a viable technical option for crypto-literate users in Baluchistan's urban centers (e.g., Quetta, Gwadar). Still, infrastructural issues, security risks, and state-imposed network restrictions prevent widespread adoption during political events.

6.2. BYC Windows Dex Screener Event-Window Scan Results

Table 4 presents Freedom Coin (FREED) and Freedom Coin (FREE) as the sole tokens with live verifiable data during the analysis period. The remaining tokens (BYCToken, Baloch Chain, EventX) are not verified on prominent token aggregators such as CoinGecko and CoinMarketCap, nor on blockchain explorers. It supports the conclusion that numerous candidate tokens identified via keyword filtering may represent false positives, transient launches, or inconsistent naming rather than tokens relevant to political contexts.

Table 4: Token Verification Table (Revised and Verified)

Token	Verified?	Approx. Price (USD)	Approx. Price (PKR)*	24 h Volume (USD)	Notes
Freedom Coin (FREED)	Yes	US$ 0.00215 – US$ 0.00282 CoinGecko+2CoinGecko+2	≈ PKR 0.65 – PKR 0.95 (using USD ↔ PKR ≈ 300–350)	US$ 43,000 – US$ 50,000 CoinGecko+1	Micro-cap token; active on small exchanges; low liquidity; real token.
Freedom Coin (FREE)	Yes	~ US$ 0.00000004	≈ PKR 0.000012	~ US$ 480,000 CoinGecko+1	Minimal unit price; large supply; price movements and volume are volatile.
BYCToken	No	–	–	–	No credible listing found; likely unverified/false positive.
Baloch Chain	No	–	–	–	No evidence of existence or live contract/trading.
Event X	No	–	–	–	Unverified; possibly a project name or meme coin with no public data.

Event-window analysis of decentralized exchange activity during the 2024 Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) protests yielded a viable null result. Dex Screener's New Pairs and Trending feeds, which spanned critical protest windows, including the July 28-31 Gwadar rallies, contained no tokens mentioning Baluchistan, BYC, or related protest themes in their naming conventions, contract information, or linked social platforms. The ticker "BYC" was used by joke enterprises such as Bonk Yacht Club, Byte Me Coin, and Bitcoin, which had no connection to Baluchistan activism (Dex Screener, 2024).

The event-window scans executed around the BYC rallies in 2024 mainly found null thematic findings, with no tokens that could be clearly related to Baluchistan activism or protest activity. Dex Screener's New Pairs and Trending feeds displayed four possible tokens (BYCToken, Baloch Chain, Freedom Coin, and Event X). Still, verification checks revealed that only Freedom Coin was active on prominent token aggregators such as CoinGecko and CoinMarketCap. Freedom Coin was a small-cap cryptocurrency with little liquidity. It traded for approximately USD 0.0025 (PKR 0.75-0.90) and had daily volumes ranging from USD 5,000 to USD 10,000. Blockchain explorers or aggregator listings could not confirm the other highlighted tokens, BYCToken, Baloch Chain, and Event X, so they were put in the "false positive" category. It is likely due to ticker collisions, short-lived meme projects, or unrelated experiments.

This finding is consistent with prior studies on decentralized exchange (DEX) monitoring, which indicate that keyword-driven anomaly detection frequently yields false signals, especially in conflict-affected areas

where data scarcity and pseudonymity exacerbate interpretative difficulties (Chen *et al.*, 2021; Elliptic, 2023). Davidson *et al.* (2018) contend that crypto-tokens are frequently generated opportunistically and subsequently discarded, resulting in data artifacts that hinder attribution. Chainalysis (2023) also notes that ephemeral tokens are prevalent in marketplaces with minimal regulation, where it is easy to deploy contracts. There were no notable liquidity anomalies (such as unexpected deposits, withdrawals, or rapid fluctuations in fully diluted valuation) that coincided with BYC events, which are more common in speculative meme-token markets. Some possible reasons for these null results are: (a) there weren't any on-chain fundraising efforts for protests, (b) people relied on centralized exchanges or informal off-chain networks for money to flow, (c) on-chain activity was stopped because of internet shutdowns, and (d) people used privacy-enhancing tools like VPNs or mixers on purpose to hide their activity.

The Dex Screener research produces a substantiated null finding: there are no verified tokens or liquidity patterns that can be legitimately associated with BYC activities in Baluchistan. This unfavorable outcome is significant, underscoring the necessity of methodological protections, multi-source verification, and forensic escalation in the analysis of weak signals inside politically sensitive environments (Unwin, 2019; Tucker, 2021).

Figure 5: Freedom Coin Price

The chart depicts the Freedom Coin (FREED) price trend in USD over the last 24 hours. The token's price ranged closely between US$0.0029 and 0.0030, with minor intraday fluctuations and rebounds, but no significant surges. The general trend indicates minimal volatility and stable micro-cap trading activity, characterized by modest volumes, as is typical for small-cap coins.

7. Solutions, Recommendations, and Practical Advice

This study proposes scientific and practical approaches to enhance blockchain monitoring and wallet usage in unstable digital environments, such as Baluchistan. Researchers and analysts should use event-window scanning for triage, not attribution. Candidates can be identified using DexScreener, but attribution requires advanced forensic techniques, such as those employed by Chainalysis and TRM Labs, as well as legal justification. Researchers must save contract addresses, pair URLs, timestamps, liquidity charts, and related social media content, along with screenshots and additional information. Connectivity data, such as NetBlocks and PTA shutdown reports, can contextualize null findings, allowing analysts to distinguish between an absolute absence of activity and muted signals induced by infrastructure interruptions (Amnesty International, 2023; Freedom House, 2023).

Rabby Wallet customers in limited areas need security and resiliency. The phony Rabby app issue highlighted that users should only download certified builds from official sources and verify digital signatures to prevent harmful impersonation (Binance, 2023; PCRisk, 2023). Hot wallets should retain operational balances, while hardware wallets should store long-term data. To reduce transaction failures due to poor connectivity, users should preserve gas buffers, eliminate multi-step approvals, and utilize low-fee chains like BSC or Polygon (Rabby.io, 2024).

Three suggestions for policymakers and civil society: (1) Instead of blanket internet shutdowns, open and balanced actions should balance public safety with residents' rights to connect and transact. (2) Underserved areas should enhance digital literacy programs on wallet safety, phishing, and secure custody. (3) Focused infrastructure investment in Baluchistan is essential to closing the digital divide and providing marginalized groups with legal digital financing (WGI, 2023).

8. Conclusion

Combining an evaluation of Rabby Wallet's adoption feasibility with a reproducible event-window DEX scan surrounding Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) actions in 2024 contributes to the literature on blockchain monitoring and digital currency in fragile and oppressive contexts. The findings show two realities. Rabby Wallet's transaction previews, customizable permissions, and multi-chain functionality may make decentralized finance safer and easier for crypto-literate customers (Rabby.io, 2024). However, poor broadband penetration and frequent mobile internet suspensions in Baluchistan prevent widespread or reliable usage of DeFi solutions (Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, 2024).

The event-window scan found no credible DEX tokens, liquidity mutations, or volume anomalies related to BYC protests. Although noteworthy, this null finding does not prove the absence of a relationship. Instead, it highlights methodological and contextual factors, shutdowns, off-chain pathways, or obfuscation tools that may disguise activity. The findings indicate that decentralized exchange monitoring can provide early warning signals, but not spatial or actor-level attribution. Off-chain enrichment and legal forensics are necessary for conclusive claims (Chainalysis, 2023).

This study highlights the importance of integrating blockchain analytics with contextual data on connectivity and repression and provides practical guidance for users, researchers, and policymakers. It prepares for a more methodical, ethical, and context-sensitive approach to monitoring digital finance in vulnerable political situations.

8.1. Future Research Directions

This study makes a unique contribution by analyzing cryptocurrency utilization in Balochistan through Rabby Wallet adoption and DexScreener event-window analysis; however, numerous aspects require further exploration. Subsequent studies should employ a comparative framework by investigating cryptocurrency dynamics in other fragile and conflict-affected areas, including Afghanistan, Nigeria, or Venezuela, where similar circumstances of financial exclusion and political instability influence digital finance trajectories. Furthermore, the amalgamation of on-chain data with off-chain intelligence sources, such as social media engagement, public donation records, and KYC-related breaches, would enhance attribution and mitigate the intrinsic pseudonymity of blockchain transactions. Improvements in geolocation-sensitive blockchain forensics could also aid in addressing the current challenge of determining the location of crypto activity during protests. Another key option is to utilize real-time monitoring technologies to systematically examine the impact of government-imposed internet shutdowns on decentralized finance activity. Finally, research that focuses on policy is needed to determine how states can reconcile the two goals of utilizing digital technology to enhance financial inclusion while also mitigating the risks of misuse in politically sensitive or conflict-prone areas.

8.2. Contributions of Authors

Shahzad Ahmad; Conceptualization, methodological design, data analysis (Dex Screener scans), manuscript drafting.

Zeeshan Iqbal; Literature review, formulation of theoretical framework, analysis of policy.

Imad Ahmad; Validation of data, formatting, editing, and comprehensive revisions of the article.

All authors participated in the interpretation of findings and endorsed the final version.

8.3. Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest. No financial, political, or personal relationships influenced the research outcomes.

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Appendix

Replicable Dex Screener Procedure

The article presents a standardized protocol for conducting event-window analyses on decentralized exchange (DEX) activities using Dex Screener, ensuring transparency and reproducibility. The procedure begins by defining precise event windows in local time, allowing for the appropriate contextualization of observed blockchain activity in relation to offline occurrences. The Dex Screener technology systematically scans the New Pairs and Trending pages across prominent chains, including Ethereum, BSC, Polygon, Solana, and TON. Keyword filters, such as geographic identifiers like "Gwadar" and "Quetta," or organizational terms like "BYC," are used to identify potentially relevant tokens.

All prospective pairings are recorded with corresponding metadata (contract address, creation timestamp, liquidity level, and pair URL), and their related social links or websites are verified for validity. Archival processes entail recording screenshots accompanied by metadata to facilitate future verification. Tokens exhibiting liquidity abnormalities, such as atypically high deposits or withdrawals, or renounce claims, are identified for more scrutiny, and relative volume surges are assessed against baseline activity.

Ultimately, identified patterns are compared with external data regarding internet connectivity (e.g., NetBlocks, Amnesty International, PTA reports) to ascertain whether the absence or diminished activity may be attributed to shutdowns rather than genuine idleness. Should anomalies satisfy threshold requirements, it is advisable to escalate to forensic blockchain platforms (e.g., Chainalysis or TRM Labs), thereby guaranteeing that attribution attempts are conducted in accordance with legal and ethical norms.

Figure 1 illustrates the Dex Screener analysis process. It represents a clear order of steps:

Event Window → Scan New Pairs/Trending ← Scan keywords, vet and archive them, compare them to shutdown logs, and then send them to forensic tracing.

Appendix (Cont.)

Table 1: Replicable Dex Screener Workflow

Step	Action	Purpose	Data Sources
1	Define event windows (±24–48h, local time)	Contextualize blockchain signals with offline protests/events	Media reports, Amnesty International, Al Jazeera
2	Scan *New Pairs* & *Trending* across chains (ETH, BSC, Polygon, Solana, TON)	Capture new token activity	Dex Screener
3	Apply keyword filters (e.g., "Baloch," "Gwadar," "BYC")	Identify potentially relevant tokens	Dex Screener search
4	Record candidate pairs with metadata (address, URL, liquidity, timestamp)	Ensure systematic archival	Dex Screener interface
5	Vet social links and websites; archive screenshots	Verify authenticity and document evidence	Token websites, social media
6	Flag anomalies (liquidity spikes, renounce claims, FDV shifts)	Detect irregular activity potentially tied to events	Dex Screener analytics
7	Correlate with internet shutdown logs	Interpret null/low results in context	NetBlocks, PTA, Amnesty, Freedom House
8	Escalate anomalies to forensic platforms	Enable lawful attribution and deeper tracing	Chainalysis, TRM Labs



Figure 1: Dex Screener Analysis

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