



Strategic Autonomy In The Global AI Landscape: India's Foreign Policy In The Age Of Artificial Intelligence

Arjun Sidharth¹

¹Research Scholar, Department of Political Science, Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India, Email: arjunphd202103@gnlu.ac.in , Orcid ID: 0009-0001-3103-5586

ABSTRACT

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one of the technologies that have been identified as an important strategic resource that affects the economic competitiveness, military capability, governance and international power. The escalation of U.S.-China technological competition has led to a more fractured global AI landscape, posing complicated decisions for middle powers aiming to gain access to technology while avoiding too much reliance on either side. This study analyses if AI is a new strategic space for India's autonomy and how India fares in the technological competition between the United States and China. A qualitative analysis is used with academic literature, policy documents and institutional sources, and a realism, techno-nationalism and complex interdependence lens. The results suggest a hybrid approach by India of technological multi-engagement through selective cooperation with advanced technology partners, cautious control of sensitive Chinese technological influence, technological capability building and ongoing membership in global innovation networks. The strategic independence of India relies on semiconductors, computing, cloud services, data, human talent, research ecosystems, and technological norms more and more. The study also suggests the concept of digital non-alignment and networked autonomy as useful concepts to explain India's attempt to maintain policy flexibility while being technologically interdependent. Although the use of state-of-the-art semiconductors, cloud platforms, and cutting-edge AI research still restricts full technological sovereignty. The study contributes to the debates on AI governance, technological sovereignty and middle power strategy in the new AI order by emphasising the dynamics of domestic capabilities, diversified partnerships and global interdependence.

Keywords: AI Governance; Technological Sovereignty; India AI Strategy; Strategic Autonomy; Technological Interdependence

INTRODUCTION

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a technology of the future that has a lot of potential to shape the future of military strength, economic competitiveness, governance, and international influence. It is a two-sided technology, unlike the other technological innovations. AI can be applied to civilian sectors like finance, logistics, healthcare, education, and public administration, as well as to military operations like autonomous systems, surveillance, intelligence analysis, cyber operations, and decision support. As a result, the capability of AI is increasingly emerging as a key element of national power and national strategic planning. But creating national AI capability is not just about algorithms, it's also about access to cutting-edge semiconductors, computing infrastructure, cloud services, high-quality data, human talent, digital platforms, research ecosystems, and technological standards.

AI's quick securitization has paralleled increased tech rivalry between the U.S. and China. As AI has rapidly been securitized, there has been a rise in tech competition between the U.S. and China. But it's not only about the weapons; it's also about semiconductors, computing power, digital infrastructure, data management, research environments, and AI standards. The competition is also called the "AI Cold War," in which the main objective is technological dominance (Heeks & He, 2024; Bryson & Malikova, 2021). Technological bipolarity can be observed in chip exports, limitations on technology transfers, and alternative approaches to digital governance. The trends are a serious threat to countries that rely on external technology ecosystems yet need policy sovereignty.

The issue is especially relevant for India. India is an emerging power that seeks economic growth, military

modernization, technological development, and greater influence in the world, but at the same time, wants to preserve its strategic sovereignty. Since Independence, Indian foreign policy has undergone a change from the Cold War non-alignment to the current multi-engagement with multiple power centres. However, the dependence on AI is more complex than traditional diplomatic or military ties. AI ecosystems today are a complex mix of semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, software, data, digital platforms, research networks and specialized talent. Such reliance on external actors at these layers can limit policy options and thus have an impact on strategic autonomy. On the other hand, dependence on technology networks around the world may limit access to innovation, investment, knowledge and advanced infrastructure.

While strategic autonomy, AI geopolitics, and U.S.-China technological competition have been explored by existing scholarship, few studies have focused on how a middle power like India navigates strategic autonomy in the complex multi-layered nature of the AI ecosystem. Hence, it is important to examine the independence of foreign policy, technological capability within the country and dependence outside the country. This study aims to fill this gap by examining the Indian AI strategy using the theoretical frameworks of realism, techno-nationalism, and complex interdependence. It adopts a qualitative analytical approach, which is based on the academic literature, policy documents and institutional resources related to the development of AI in India, technological partnerships with the rest of the world, and strategic positioning.

The study tackles two interwoven questions. First, can the search for AI be a new domain of strategic autonomy in India's foreign policy? Second, how does India cope with technological competition, cooperation and dependence with the United States and China in the field of AI? It explores the possibility of the new strategy as technological multi-engagement, where India can engage selectively with the USA and other countries, and at the same time limit the sensitive Chinese technological influence and focus on developing indigenous capabilities. The study does not view "digital non-alignment" as an outcome, rather as an interpretative lens through which to view India's evolving AI strategy. The paper feeds into the discussion on AI governance and technological sovereignty by demonstrating how strategic autonomy is more and more relying on the interplay between national AI capacity, fragmented technological cooperation and ongoing engagement in globally interdependent innovation ecosystems in the face of growing technological competition and global asymmetry.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Strategic Autonomy in Indian Foreign Policy

India has always given great importance to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy since independence. In the Cold War era, India's policy of non-alignment allowed it to remain independent from the United States and the Soviet Union, enabling it to protect the national interest without forming any alliances. Non-alignment, in its form and practice, has changed but its goal of autonomy remains to influence Indian diplomacy (Mohan, 2017). After the Cold War, India adopted a policy of multi-alignment, which meant that it was pursuing relations with the big powers, including the USA, China, Russia, and the European Union. This is a way of thinking that is relevant to India in an increasingly interdependent world and at the same time allows policy flexibility.

The notion of strategic autonomy has lost its meaning in modern parlance, as it is no longer interpreted as isolation or strict neutrality. Rather, it entails hedging strategies, issue-based collaboration, and diversified partnerships (Hoffmann, 2020). But the majority of the literature available is still on the traditional aspects like defence, diplomacy, trade and alliances. This is only a partial understanding of autonomy in a world that is becoming more and more digital. In recent years, new technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, data governance and digital platforms, are having a major impact on state capacity and policy autonomy. Thus, technology has emerged as a key element of strategic autonomy. For India's technological sovereignty, not only is there a process of balancing involved, but there is also the aspect of reducing its technological vulnerability and engagement with the global innovation network.

AI and International Power

Artificial intelligence has a significant effect on global power relations through military might, economic development, and governance. AI-based technologies have the potential to disrupt command structure, decision-making, and strategic stability (Horowitz, 2018). They also provide asymmetric benefits in cyber operations, cyber intelligence analysis and automated targeting systems (Allen & Chan, 2017). The advances show that AI is not the weapon of the rich and powerful of the advanced economies, but it's also

accessible to emerging powers and non-state actors.

In the military, AI may be applied to increase the effectiveness of autonomous systems, surveillance, logistics and cyber operations. On the other hand, AI is also destabilizing because of the possibility to escalate events faster and shorten the time of decision making (Payne, 2021; Johnson, 2019). Productivity driven by AI may also be contributing to growing inequalities worldwide between technologically advanced and dependent countries (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2020; Korinek & Stiglitz, 2019). Therefore, leadership in the age of AI is becoming an economic and geopolitical influence. AI is not only about algorithms. In order to function, it requires semiconductors, computing power, clouds, big data, expertise, R&D ecosystems and good regulatory environment (Lee, 2018; Kania & Costello, 2021). Interdependences have brought up such a notion as "AI sovereignty", which means the ability of states to exercise their sovereignty over critical technology and at the same time stay connected with global innovation ecosystems. Hence, the national AI strategy becomes an example of self-reliance versus interdependence. Governance of AI and regulation of data and ethics have become essential pillars of national power and strategic autonomy.

U.S.-China Technological Rivalry and the AI Cold War

The growing competition between the two states has been termed the "AI Cold War." It has been concluded in the technological dominance in semiconductors, advanced computing, digital infrastructure and standards for AI (Bryson & Malikova, 2021). Areas of control are the military, economic and normative influence. Restrictions in semiconductors, export control and securing supply chain are the most evident examples of competition. They contribute to technological blocs formation and competing ecosystems of countries (Farrell & Newman, 2019; Meijer, 2023; Bown, 2020; Miller, 2022). Cloud computing, 5G network, AI research and data governance framework are the other areas where this competition exists. It results in technological interdependence which becomes an opportunity and strategic threat.

The competition is also ideologically motivated because the United States and China push for their vision of digital governance, data control and technological regulation (Aaronson & LeBlond, 2018). Thus, the middle powers are urged to have access to crucial technologies but not to become dependent on one state. However, even though there is a growing body of literature on AI geopolitics, the majority of research focuses on great power competition. There is virtually no analysis on the strategic autonomy of middle powers like India within the context of the global technology ecosystems they rely on: semiconductors, cloud platforms, research networks, etc. Similar lack of literature can be seen in the aspect of the integration of autonomy elements in India in relation to indigenous AI development, strategic partnership and data governance. Thus, the aim of this study is to fill this gap by analyzing the technological dependence, capacity building and international relations of India in a polarized world of AI.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study takes a realistic, techno-nationalist and complex interdependence perspective to explain the evolution of India's AI policy and implications for strategic autonomy. Realism emphasizes the importance of security, survival and maximizing power in an anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2018). In this way, the potential of AI is a strategic asset that can increase the effectiveness of the military, the competitiveness and national power (Gilpin, 1981; Horowitz, 2010). In this respect, India's efforts to develop AI can be seen as a move to minimize technological dependence in the face of growing competition between the U.S. and China. The idea of techno-nationalism is behind the state's efforts to create technological sovereignty through the development of indigenous innovation, industrial power, digital infrastructure and control of critical data and technologies (Samuels, 1994; Weiss, 2014). This is reflected in India's investments in innovation of AI, creation of digital public infrastructure, and construction of data sovereignty (Segal, 2019; Atkinson, 2020; Aaronson, 2019).

However, complex interdependence highlights India's continued reliance on the global semiconductor supply chains, cloud infrastructure, software, capital, talent and research networks (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Farrell & Newman, 2019). Together, these frameworks collectively pave the way for technological sovereignty, the intersection of local AI capabilities and strategic independence. Digital non-alignment is India's overall strategic stance, technological multi-engagement is diversified external engagement, and networked autonomy is policy autonomy achieved through indigenous capability and selective integration with the outside world.

THE AI COLD WAR: USA-China RIVALRY

The U.S.-China competition in AI is not a geopolitical competition, but a battle for control of key AI

technologies. The United States has a strong advantage in foundational research, semiconductor design, cloud computing, and venture capital, while China has been making significant strides in the fields of state-led investment and industrial policy, as well as in developing large-scale digital infrastructure (Allison, 2017; Bryson & Malikova, 2021). The competition is now expanded to chips, compute power, cloud platforms, data governance, and technical standards.

The U.S. holds the advantage with export restrictions on high-end semiconductors and AI machinery, as well as through alliance-driven partnerships and market-driven innovation (Bown, 2020). However, China emphasizes technological self-sufficiency, data sovereignty, and state control over critical infrastructure, as well as the influence it seeks to build through digital infrastructure and standards, particularly in the Global South (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019). This competition is a blessing as well as a bane for India. Reliance on external systems restricts strategic autonomy, while access to U.S.-led technologies facilitates collaboration and innovation. The role played by China in regional value chains makes the question of decoupling problematic. India has to find a balance between access and independence; increase partnerships in a more diverse manner; develop local AI skills and contribute to the global governance of AI. This decision has been taken against the backdrop of India trying to achieve technological independence in the fast-changing AI landscape for strategic independence. The importance of technological sovereignty as a bedrock of India's strategic independence in today's world of fragmented AI order is stressed by this.

INDIA'S AI STRATEGY AND POLICY ARCHITECTURE

During the past decade, Indian AI policy has witnessed various changes, which include recognition of AI as a tool for development and strategic technology. In 2018, NITI Aayog released the National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence which included a focus on inclusive growth, responsible AI, and sectoral applications in the healthcare, education, agriculture, mobility and smart cities sectors (NITI Aayog, 2018). As opposed to a more technology-centric approach to an AI strategy, India's initial approach was more focused on social impact and public service delivery and spreading capacity building. While this developmental emphasis is still relevant, it has been supplemented by a growing emphasis on strategic capability, technological sovereignty, and domestic AI infrastructure.

This shift is reflected in the development of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and IndiaAI Mission (MeitY, 2023; Mohan, 2022). Aadhaar, UPI, DigiLocker and Open Network for Digital Commerce have developed interoperable population-level digital systems. These platforms foster innovation based on data and create an enabling environment for public and private services powered by AI (World Bank, 2024; Heeks & He, 2024). For strategic autonomy, DPI is developing local digital capacity, reducing dependence on public-service platforms developed by others and creating a local base for the use of artificial intelligence.

The IndiaAI Mission further reinforces this architecture by emphasizing on key pillars of the AI ecosystem, such as computing power, data resources, innovation, skills, research, and responsible development of AI. The capabilities are crucial as they will help India not only in participating in the development of advanced AI but also in moving away from being a key user of foreign technological systems. As India increasingly prioritizes responsible AI governance, its ability to shape international discourse on transparency, accountability, inclusion, and data governance is also enhanced.

AI is also becoming increasingly significant in India's security framework. The Defence AI Council and Defence AI Project Agency are examples of initiatives to incorporate AI into military modernization, intelligence analysis, autonomous systems, and decision-support systems (Ministry of Defence, 2022). This illustrates the convergence of India's developmental and strategic AI agendas, which is a gradual process.

However, large-scale structural limitations are still present. India still relies heavily on foreign semiconductor technology, cutting-edge fabrication plants, high-performance computing chips, cutting-edge research hubs, and cloud service providers from around the world (Miller, 2022). Lack of skilled AI experts and home-grown hardware also limit technological independence. Therefore, technological independence is not possible yet and not necessarily desired. India, on the other hand, does so by integrating local capacity development with multiple technological collaborations with the United States, Japan, the European Union, and others. This AI policy is thus a hybrid policy in which developmental goals, techno-nationalism, responsible governance and global technological interdependence coexist. This architecture not only enhances strategic autonomy by building domestic capabilities but also minimizes over-reliance on any one external technology ecosystem.

INDIA'S TECHNOLOGICAL MULTI-ENGAGEMENT

Multi-engagement approach in the tech policy of India is the effort of gaining access to advanced AI technologies without getting too dependent on a particular technological partner. The U.S. and India have seen significant achievements in collaboration across such areas as semiconductor ecosystem, advanced computing, trusted technologies, AI research, standards, talent movement, and responsible AI governance. This new convergence can be observed in the U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), among other efforts, including Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) (Mohan, 2022). These facilities allow India to access research networks, new technologies, resilient supply chains and international standard-setting processes, as well as keeping it flexible in its external technological relations.

India's ties with China are more rational. Strategic mistrust and security issues have now spread to the emerging technologies, such as AI, telecommunications, digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and data governance. A deeper technological cooperation has been hindered by the fear of cyber vulnerabilities, surveillance technologies, and the strategic implications of the reliance on Chinese digital systems. India has thus opted for selective disengagement instead of total disengagement in sensitive areas. This is reflected in actions taken against Chinese technology companies and digital platforms. The banning of Huawei and ZTE from being part of India's 5G ecosystem and the ban on many Chinese mobile apps after the border crisis in 2020 were linked to issues of cybersecurity, data sovereignty, digital infrastructure and strategic vulnerability (Chacko, 2023). This is an example of how realist security concerns and technological goals are coming together, especially when it comes to foreign technological reliance that may pose a threat to critical infrastructure or sensitive data.

But India has not gone for a complete de-Chinaization. Its digital and industrial ecosystems continue to be enmeshed in intricate international supply chains, with Chinese hardware, American software and cloud services, and multinational semiconductor and electronics networks. Full disengagement would have high economic and technological costs, as well as reduce the availability of components, market access, and innovation and knowledge ecosystem access. It is such interdependence that makes India seek not to be technologically isolated but selectively reduce its risks.

From the perspective of this study, this strategy may be referred to as technological multi-engagement. Technological multi-engagement implies deliberate actions from the side of India for the diversification of its technological relationships with different countries and limiting in some sensitive areas. The multi-engagement strategy is not only technological alignment but also a cooperative relationship between India and other actors based on their capacities and interests. Diversification allows minimizing the risks of supply chain disruptions, export restrictions, political pressure, and reliance on one technology ecosystem. Indian strategy implies enhancing the relationships with trusted countries like the United States, reducing dependency on China's technologies, interaction with global innovation ecosystems, and development of its own AI. Such a partnership is aimed at enhancing semiconductor resilience, improving AI research capacity, improving digital infrastructure, building data governance framework, and developing responsible AI. Therefore, multi-engagement may be viewed as a realistic way for reaching strategic autonomy, when India may benefit from the interdependence of technologies in the world and decrease its critical dependency on technologies and increase autonomy in AI technology policy.

IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

The Indian initiatives in the field of AI are a major paradigm shift in the idea of strategic autonomy. The discussion used to be only about military alliance, diplomacy and nuclear policy, but now it's about data governance, digital platforms, computing infrastructure, semiconductors, cloud services, AI models, innovation ecosystems and technological standards. Today, autonomy is not just about territorial or military power – it is also about being able to access, influence and control the critical technological systems that support economic and security power (Farrell & Newman, 2019). India's approach is networked autonomy, which is that autonomy is achieved by building up domestic capabilities and by engaging in several technological collaborations and selectively participating in global innovation networks. There can be no full technological self-sufficiency, because of distributed supply chains, high tech chips, cloud computing, research networks, capital, and talent. Indian autonomy is thus being sought by minimising strategic vulnerabilities while being connected to the flow of global innovations (Mohan, 2022).

There are three aspects to this method. The initial step towards achieving self-reliance is to advance the national AI research, data, digital infrastructure, human resources, computing power, and semiconductor development. Second, diversification involves spreading investments across a variety of countries and technology suppliers, thus minimizing reliance on any one country or technology supplier. The third form of institutional influence is shown by participation in international governance, standards and responsible

technology initiatives.

However, the dependence of India is of a different nature at each of the levels of the AI stack. India has robust domestic capabilities in its digital public infrastructure and data ecosystem; however, it depends on foreign vendors for the latest generation of semiconductors, high performance computing, AI research and cloud services. Such an imbalance creates dependence, which leaves India vulnerable in the event of export restrictions, disruption of the supply chain and geopolitically divided global AI industry because of the rivalry between the US and China. Strategic autonomy in AI, therefore, in the case of middle powers like India, cannot be considered as an individualistic notion, but rather a notion of networked autonomy. It means becoming not fully independent, but somewhat self-reliant, having a few outside contacts and institutional influence and hence a little flexibility in the choice of policy (Allison, 2017).

CHALLENGES, RISKS, AND FUTURE PATHWAYS FOR INDIA'S AI STRATEGY

While a multi-engagement strategy is highly flexible in the case of India, there are certain structural limitations that exist. One is the high level of dependency on foreign infrastructures, namely semiconductors, high performance computing, cloud platforms and advanced AI ecosystems. Despite the attempts of the government to promote the increase of local design and production of chips, the current situation is far from that of world leaders such as Taiwan, South Korea and the United States. It undermines the independence of the country, as during a geopolitical crisis like export restriction or supply chain interruptions it is quite likely that India will not be able to cope with it. Another issue is the lack of proper AI research capabilities. Despite having a large number of talents in the field of technology, the development of frontier AI requires special skills, investments, high-performance computing infrastructures and more collaboration between academia and industries. In case India fails to make more investments, it will remain dependent on technological ecosystems.

Another limitation concerns data governance. Digital Public Infrastructure can facilitate the application of AI, but it has its own problems such as low quality of data, interoperability, lack of privacy and consent, and poor enforcement. Failure to govern the process properly can undermine trust in AI and hinder its responsible application, thus it is vital to have reliable institutions for transparency, accountability, and proper handling of data. In addition, there are some regulatory and ethical limitations. AI-powered governance entails problems of surveillance, bias, exclusion, lack of explainability, and lack of accountability. To solve this problem, India should establish appropriate AI safety protocols, audit systems, and guidelines for transparency and grievance redressal processes.

The strategy becomes more complicated by the presence of geopolitics. The competition between China and the U.S. does not threaten the status quo alone; it threatens the international standards of AI, international trade, and governance. The strategic flexibility of India, especially in regards to the relations with its partners from the Global South region, may be hindered due to excessive dependence on one particular ecosystem. India should develop technical diplomacy and cooperation, and maintain its policy independence.

They will require consistent efforts to be made in developing the infrastructure of local computing, the semiconductor ecosystem, AI research, and skills building. Improvements in data governance, ethical standards in AI, and interoperability are required. The partnerships of India should be broadened, and it should take the lead in setting benchmarks in the sphere of AI on the international scale. Such actions will allow India to mitigate the risks, and to operate independently in the fragmented international AI environment. These actions will allow India to mitigate the critical risks and become independent and interdependent in the fragmented environment of AI.

CONCLUSION

Artificial Intelligence, since its creation, has altered the idea of national power and strategic autonomy. The application of AI in today's world covers various spheres, including military potential, economic competitiveness, technological advancements, governance, and international influence. On the other hand, the rivalry between the U.S. and China has grown sharper in such spheres as semiconductors, computing power, cloud systems, data regulation, research environment, and AI standards. This shift in the technological field has seen middle powers like India depend increasingly on technological power and diplomatic skills for their strategic autonomy. The study directly tackles two key questions. First, the quest for AI is a new facet of India's strategic autonomy, as strategic decisions for foreign policy are increasingly tied to access to and control over important technological capabilities. Beyond the traditional understanding of strategic autonomy in the fields of defense and diplomacy, it also includes strategic autonomy in computing power, semiconductors, digital infrastructure, data sovereignty, AI research and participation in international standards setting. Secondly, India is not a partner to the U.S. in the

technological competition with China, but a technologically multi-engaging partner. It is fostering partnerships with the U.S. and other countries in key strategic fields, selectively bans sensitive Chinese tech, stays in global supply chains and is building local AI capabilities.

The main conclusion is that the concept of digital non-alignment and networked autonomy are complementary concepts that help to understand India's AI strategy. Digital non-alignment is the overall approach that India is following to not join any one tech bloc. The term networked autonomy can be used to better comprehend how this autonomy can be realized through the creation of domestic capacities, various partnerships as well as strategic participation in global innovation networks. This is done, because it is not possible and not desirable to be technologically self-sufficient. Instead, meaningful autonomy means being able to reduce critical vulnerabilities without being isolated from the global technology, knowledge, investment and research networks. But there are a few things to be wary of. India continues to depend on foreign sources for cutting edge semiconductors, high performance computing, cloud services and cutting edge AI research. The country's reliance on these renders it vulnerable to export restrictions, disruption of supply chains, fragmentation of standards and geopolitical pressure. The lack of advanced research capability, responsible AI governance, data protection and regulatory enforcement further restricts the ability to get the strategic vision into long-term technological capability. The future of India's autonomy will, therefore, depend on the continued investments in the local compute infrastructure, semiconductor ecosystems, advanced skills, research capability, data governance and AI frameworks that are responsible.

The study adds to the scholarship on AI governance by showing that technological sovereignty for middle powers is not synonymous with independence. Rather, it is considered as the capacity for flexibility in the policy and the presence of sufficient domestic technological capabilities, diversified external relations, and institutional power in the governance of global AI. India, therefore, provides a useful case study on how middle powers can navigate the international cooperation and strategic autonomy in the context of technological bipolarity. Future research should focus on comparing and contrasting the approaches of other middle powers and emerging economies to the global AI challenge and how networked autonomy can provide a more holistic understanding of national responses to a growing complex global AI challenge.

References

1. Aaronson, S. A. (2019). Data is different, and that's why the world needs a new approach to governing cross-border data flows. *Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance*, 21(5), 441–460. <https://doi.org/10.1108/DPRG-03-2019-0021>
2. Aaronson, S. A., & LeBlond, P. (2018). Another digital divide: The rise of data realms and its implications for the WTO. *Journal of International Economic Law*, 21(2), 245–272. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgy019>
3. Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2020). Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor markets. *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(6), 2188–2244. <https://doi.org/10.1086/705716>
4. Allen, G., & Chan, T. (2017). *Artificial intelligence and national security*. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-and-national-security>
5. Allison, G. (2017). *Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides's trap?* Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
6. Atkinson, R. D. (2020). The case for a national industrial strategy to counter China's technological rise. Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.
7. Bown, C. P. (2020). How the United States marched the semiconductor industry into its trade war with China. *East Asian Economic Review*, 24(4), 349–388.
8. Bryson, J. J., & Malikova, H. (2021). Is there an AI Cold War? *Global Perspectives*, 2(1), 24803. <https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2021.24803>
9. Chacko, P. (2023). Disciplining India: Paternalism, neo-liberalism and Hindutva civilizationalism. *International Affairs*, 99(2), 551–565. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iad029>
10. Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. *International Security*, 44(1), 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351
11. Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and change in world politics*. Cambridge University Press.
12. Heeks, R., & He, J. (2024). From AI divide to AI power: The geopolitics of artificial intelligence. *Third World Quarterly*, 45(1), 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2261555>
13. Hoffmann, S. (2020). *Line on the map: Power, politics, and the India–China boundary*. Harvard University Press.
14. Horowitz, M. C. (2010). *The diffusion of military power: Causes and consequences for*

- international politics. Princeton University Press.
15. Horowitz, M. C. (2018). Artificial intelligence and international competition. *Texas National Security Review*, 1(3), 36–57.
 16. Johnson, J. (2019). The AI-cyber nexus: Implications for military escalation, deterrence and strategic stability. *Journal of Cyber Policy*, 4(3), 442–460.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2019.1701693>
 17. Kania, E. B., & Costello, J. (2021). Seizing the commanding heights: The PLA Strategic Support Force in Chinese military power. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 44(2), 218–264.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1747444>
 18. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S., Jr. (1977). *Power and interdependence: World politics in transition*. Little, Brown and Company.
 19. Korinek, A., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2019). Artificial intelligence and its implications for income distribution and unemployment. In A. Agrawal, J. Gans, & A. Goldfarb (Eds.), *The economics of artificial intelligence: An agenda* (pp. 349–390). University of Chicago Press.
 20. Lee, K.-F. (2018). *AI superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the new world order*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
 21. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2018). *The great delusion: Liberal dreams and international realities*. Yale University Press.
 22. Miller, C. (2022). *Chip war: The fight for the world's most critical technology*. Scribner.
 23. Ministry of Defence. (2022, March 28). *Task Force for Implementation of AI*. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1810442>
 24. Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. (2023). *IndiaAI report: First edition*. Government of India.
 25. Mohan, C. R. (2017). The end of non-alignment? *Orbis*, 61(4), 527–540.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.08.004>
 26. Mohan, C. R. (2022). India and the emerging technology order. *Global Policy*, 13(3), 398–406.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13058>
 27. NITI Aayog. (2018). *National strategy for artificial intelligence: #AIForAll*. Government of India. <https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-03/National-Strategy-for-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf>
 28. Payne, K. (2021). Artificial intelligence and strategic stability. *Survival*, 63(2), 7–32.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1905957>
 29. Polyakova, A., & Meserole, C. (2019, August). *Exporting digital authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese models* [Policy brief]. Brookings Institution.
 30. Samuels, R. J. (1994). *Rich nation, strong army: National security and the technological transformation of Japan*. Cornell University Press.
 31. Segal, A. (2019). The coming techno-nationalism. *Survival*, 61(4), 43–54.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1642814>
 32. Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
 33. Weiss, L. (2014). *America Inc.?: Innovation and enterprise in the national security state*. Cornell University Press.
 34. World Bank. (2024). *Digital progress and trends report 2023: Digital public infrastructure and development*. World Bank.