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Comparative Analysis of Machine Learning Algorithms for DDoS Detection in SDN Topology

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Abstract

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is network control centralized, rendering the controller susceptible to a number of attacks. The Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is one of the most critical risks and it overwhelms the target with false traffic denying any real user the right to use the services. A number of techniques, such as traffic filtering, anomaly-based systems, and machine learning (ML) algorithms are used to identify and prevent such attacks. This paper has gathered a network traffic data to perform training and testing of four machine learning algorithms: Support Vector Machine, Naive Bayes, Decision Tree, and Random Forest. Five constructed features were used: Speed of Flow Entry (SFE), Speed of Source IP (SSIP), Ratio of Flow Pair (RFIP), and the standard deviations of flow packets/bytes (SDFP/SDFB), across five different data split ratios (90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 60:40, and 50:50). The algorithms were evaluated using cross-validation, Accuracy, Precision, Recall/Detection Rate (DR), F1, False Detection Rate (FDR), and AUC metrics. The results demonstrated that all ML algorithms effectively detected DDoS attacks with high accuracy; however, the Random Forest algorithm achieved the best performance, reaching 99.99% accuracy at the 80:20 split ratio.

KEYWORDS: Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Random Forest, Flow-Level Feature Analysis, DDoS Attack Mitigation, Tree Topology.

1. Introduction

The aspect of modern communication networks has led to the paradigm of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) that decouples the control plane from data plane to offer centralized management control and better programmability (Mahar et al., 2024). Since SDN separates the control and data planes, it offers enhanced network scalability and programmability, but this architectural design also introduces vulnerabilities that attackers exploit to disrupt network services (Ashodia & Makadiya, 2022).

On the one hand, SDN creates flexibility in networks, it also brings security weaknesses, specifically, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that may cause the network failure due to the overloading of the SDN controller (Ahmed et al., 2023).

These attacks employ a botnet, which comprises a network of compromised computers controlled remotely by malicious software, unbeknownst to their owners. The purpose of utilizing a botnet in a DDoS attack is to inundate a server or another online target with a barrage of fraudulent requests (Al-Fayoumi & Abu Al-Haija, 2023).

Conventional security systems, such as firewalls and authentication-based intrusion detection systems fail to work properly in detection systems fail to work properly in SDN architectures because network traffic that the infrastructure of the network itself is not simple to scale and manage (Rakissaga et al., 2025). Furthermore, the traditional DDoS detection does not allow adopting new types of attacks or low-rate stealth cyberthreats prevalent in contemporary attacks (Sahosh et al., 2024) (Thwaini, 2022). Also, the traditional techniques for detecting and preventing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are often inadequate due to the unique characteristics of Software-Defined Networking (SDN). Techniques like IP spoofing pose a serious threat to methods that depend on IP address-based filtering because they make it more difficult to distinguish between malicious and legitimate traffic (Aliyu et al., 2020).

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In SDN environments, DDoS attacks targeting many objectives illustrate DDoS attack types as Vulnerability Attacks and Flooding Attacks (Sharafaldin et al., 2019). DDoS attacks are characterized as volumetric or protocol-based floods that exhaust network resources (Ali et al., 2023). The data plane Attacks can cause congestion and service degradation (Islam et al., 2020), whereas attacks targeting the control plane can have even more severe consequences, disrupting the entire network operation by compromising the centralized controller (Leqing, 2020).

Moreover, DDoS attacks can target network interfaces, exploit vulnerabilities in network devices, and disrupt the communication between different components of the network, leading to service outages and compromised network integrity (Facchini et al., 2021).

The evolution of SDN security research has progressed from traditional signature-based detection to advanced machine learning-based approaches, reflecting the need for adaptive and automated defense mechanisms (Fakolujo & Qureshi, 2023) (Kadam, 2024).

Supervised machine learning, in particular, leverages the centralized visibility of SDN controllers to extract flow-level statistics and identify behavioral signatures of malicious traffic. Due to the asymmetry of network data, in which cases of attack are fewer than normal traffic, to make an effective detection, a multidimensional analysis is needed in terms of preciseness, recall, F1 measure, and the Area Under the Curve (AUC).

The proposed study will compare different supervised ML algorithms with the aim of finding the best feature sets that provide a good discriminative performance and, at the same time, have the necessary computational power that is needed to process data in real-time.

This study will offer a basis of lightweight, scalable security architectures that have the potential to secure SDN infrastructures without impacting its fundamental performance advantages through the analysis of these algorithms in a simulated SDN environment.

The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the related work on ML approaches for DDoS detection. Section 3 Methodology for the study. In Section 4, the proposed model Performance Evaluation. The simulation setup and the results obtained are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines potential future research directions.

2. Related work

To deal with these threats, ML approaches have been adopted as powerful methods of performing real-time threats detection in SDN-based networks. ML algorithms can be trained on past traffic trends to recognize patterns and deviations and create a better detector that does not use specific rules (Hemanth Kumar et al., 2023).

When used in SDN, ML can increase capability of the system to distinguish between legitimate and malicious flows based on the flow-level characteristics. machine learning algorithms such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB), Decision Tree (DT), and Random Forest (RF) for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) detection in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) topology has emerged as a critical area of inquiry due to the increasing reliance on SDN for flexible and programmable network management and the growing threat of sophisticated DDoS attacks targeting its centralized control plane (Wabi et al., 2024) (Ali et al., 2023)

The target of DDoS attacks is not only the device in the data plane, but also the control plane in the SDN. Nowadays, it is more difficult to detect DDoS attacks than in a traditional network because of the complexity of traffic flow features. SDN has a decoupled architecture that allows us to build a new model that defines the DDoS attacks flexibly. Nonetheless, to make sure that the definition of attacks is correct, the dynamics of DDoS attacks within the SDN will be considered in the new contexts. Machine learning (ML) as a recently emerged trend in decision-making in most fields can provide a creative solution to SDN.. A real-time SL classifier forecasts the network state based on past training sets and notifies the controller (Wang et al., 2022)

The specific problem addressed is the effective detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks within SDN environments using machine learning classifiers, focusing on the comparative performance of SVM, GNB, DT, and RF algorithms (Alnatsheh et al., 2023) (Ferdiansyah et al., 2024).

Despite numerous studies, a knowledge gap persists regarding the optimal selection and integration of these algorithms in real-world SDN topologies, especially considering feature selection, dataset variability, and computational efficiency (Rizaldi et al., 2024) (Roopesh et al., 2024) (Wabi et al., 2024).

There are controversies as to what algorithm gives the optimal trade-off of accuracy, speed, and resource consumption; RF tends to be more accurate but more expensive, and GNB is cheaper but faster (Singh, 2021) (Isyaku et al., 2023).

The effects of such disconnect are possible delays in the detection of attacks and insufficient mitigation, which

threaten the loss of network availability and service failure (Hamarshe et al., 2023).

SDN The SDN conceptual framework describes network architecture which decouples control and data planes in order to provide a centralized control (Liu et al., 2023).

Machine learning software can be used as a classifier to analyze the characteristics of traffic in a network and differentiate between normal and malicious traffic flows (Roopesh et al., 2024).

The correlation between these concepts supports the purpose of the research: to compare and contrast the effectiveness of SVM, GNB, DT, and RF to detect DDoS attacks in SDN based on the theoretical background of supervised learning (Ashwin et al., 2024) (Al Essa and Bhaya, 2023).

This systematic review is aimed at synthesising existing empirical evidence regarding the relative performance of SVM, GNB, DT, and RF algorithms in SDN topologies in detecting DDoS (Pydala et al., 2024). The value of this review is that it brings together different datasets, feature selection approaches, and evaluation measures to guide the considerations of best practices in implementing machine learning-based security solutions in SDN (Almaiah et al., 2024) (Sumukh & Sandhya, 2024).

The reviewed study uses a thorough methodology as it includes choosing peer-reviewed articles published between 2020 and 2025 that test the mentioned machine learning algorithms on SDN DDoS detection (Sumadi, 2020) (Haeruddin et al., 2025).

Inclusion criteria lay stress on empirical measures of performance like accuracy, precision, recall and computational efficiency. Comparative statistical analysis and thematic synthesis of feature engineering techniques are also categorized as analytical frameworks (Mohsin and Hamad, 2022).

This study describes how four supervised ML models, i.e., Support Vector Machine (SVM), Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB), Decision Tree (DT), and Random Forest (RF), can be used in detection of DDoS attacks in SDNs. It identifies five key traffic characteristics, i.e., Speed of Flow Entry (SFE), Speed of Source IP (SSIP), Ratio of Flow Pair (RFIP), and standard deviations of flow bytes (SDFB) and packets (SDFP).

The aim was to compare the performance level of individual classifiers in varying learning ratios under the measures of accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, and AUC. Its conclusions are supposed to define lightweight scalable solutions to the intelligent DDoS mitigation problem in SDN networks and lead to network security framework systems in the future (Musa et al., 2024).

Table 1: Related work

Study	Focus Area	Key Findings/Contributions
Hemanth Kumar et al. (2023)	ML for threat detection	ML approaches adopted for real-time threat detection in SDN-based networks
Wabi et al. (2024)	ML algorithms for DDoS	SVM, GNB, DT, and RF algorithms critical for DDoS detection in SDN
Ali et al. (2023)	Attack characterization	DDoS attacks characterized as volumetric or protocol-based floods that exhaust network resources
Wang et al. (2022)	Real-time classification	Real-time ML classifier forecasts network state based on past training sets
Alnatsheh et al. (2023)	ML classifier comparison	Comparative performance of SVM, GNB, DT, and RF algorithms for DDoS detection
Ferdiansyah et al. (2024)	Algorithm effectiveness	Focus on effective detection and mitigation using ML classifiers
Rizaldi et al. (2024)	Knowledge gaps	Knowledge gap regarding optimal algorithm selection in real-world SDN topologies
Roopesh et al. (2024)	Feature selection	Issues with feature selection, dataset variability, and computational efficiency
Singh (2021)	Algorithm trade-offs	RF achieves higher accuracy but at greater computational cost; GNB offers faster processing with lower accuracy
Isyaku et al. (2023)	Performance trade-offs	Controversies over best trade-off between accuracy, speed, and resource consumption

Hamarshe et al. (2023)	Detection consequences	Potential delays in attack detection risk network downtime and service degradation
Liu et al. (2023)	SDN conceptual framework	SDN defined as network architecture that decouples control and data planes
Ashwin et al. (2024)	Supervised learning foundations	Research guided by theoretical foundations in supervised learning
Al Essa & Bhaya (2023)	ML algorithm evaluation	Evaluation and comparison of SVM, GNB, DT, and RF efficacy
Pydala et al. (2024)	Systematic review	Synthesis of empirical findings on comparative algorithm performance
Almaiah et al. (2024)	Best practices	Consolidation of datasets, feature selection methods, and evaluation metrics
Sumukh & Sandhya (2024)	Security solutions	Best practices for deploying ML-based security solutions in SDN
Sumadi (2020)	Review methodology	Selection of peer-reviewed studies from 2020 to 2025
Haeruddin et al. (2025)	Recent evaluations	Evaluation of ML algorithms for DDoS detection in SDN
Mohsin & Hamad (2022)	Analytical frameworks	Comparative statistical analysis and thematic synthesis of feature engineering techniques
Musa et al. (2024)	Experimental approach	Two experiments on linear and tree topologies using Mininet with Ryu controller; identification of five key traffic characteristics

3. Methodology

In this study, a machine learning-based approach is implemented to detect the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) networks. The whole procedure includes modeling of an SDN network, creation of both benign and attack traffic, obtaining flow-level features, training of classification models, and evaluation of their performance in experimental environments.

Simulation of realistic SDN topologies required a choice of a lightweight Mininet emulator with native OpenFlow switch virtualization support. The network was controlled using the Ryu controller as the control plane software to handle flow rules and communications. The attack traffic was added via the hping3 tool to query non-attack traffic that corresponds to normal streaming and attacking traffic with SYN floods carried out by multiple hosts. The configuration enabled collecting traffic-recognizing traces in both good and DDoS circumstances (Setitra et al., 2023).

Based on the obtained traffic data collected from the network, they were used to derive five important features that are flow-based, and these features served to be the input of the machine learning classifiers (Yao & Guinko, 2025). The features chosen were Speed of Flow Entry (SFE) which reflects the rate at which new flows are initiated, Speed of Source IP (SSIP) which relates to the frequency of packets that are created by an individual IP (Babbar et al., 2024) and Ratio of Flow Pair (RFIP) which reflects the communication balance between the two end points, Standard Deviation of Flow Packets (SDFP) and Standard Deviation of Flow Bytes (SDFB) (Patel et al., 2024).

Reduce misclassification error in DDoS detection by selecting the most relevant features and performing parameter tuning of machine learning models. The features mentioned were arranged in the form of a structured CSV dataset and were used as input to machine learning classifiers to enhance detection accuracy and reduce misclassification errors in identifying DDoS attacks. This approach and methodology presented by (Estupiñán Cuesta et al., 2025).

Four supervised machine training were used to classify the work, including Support Vector Machine (SVM), Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB), Decision Tree (DT), and Random Forest (RF). These models were trained using five training/testing ratios of 90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 60:40, and 50:50 to evaluate their performance in different situations where data is not fully available. The entire execution was done in Python, using the Scikit-learning

library. The classifiers were created in order to predict the state of a particular instance of the traffic flow later referred to as normal or as a part of a DDoS attack using the extracted features only (Sahosh et al., 2024).




Figure 1. System design: DDoS Attack Detection Using Machine Learning

3.1 Simulation and Traffic Generation of the Network

The simulation was done in SDN environment using Mininet, which is an emulator that can support generation of virtual networks where OpenFlow-enabled switches can be applied. Path Programming: Flow rules were handled and forwarding decision was performed by adjusting the flow rules using the Ryu controller, which is an open-source SDN controller that operates in Python.

There were normal traffic flows and attack flows. It established normal traffic at the network host to host by using ping command to simulate normal traffic in the network. In the case of attack traffic, hping3 tool has been deployed where SYN flood attacks have taken place against a victim node. The resulting traffic was kept watch over and recorded, yielding a collection of move records fascinating both normal and adverse samples (Setitra et al., 2023)(Aliar et al., 2024).

3.2 Collecting Flow Statistics

Monitoring network traffic involves periodically recording specific flow statistics. The described parameters serve as crucial elements that help identify abnormal traffic patterns. The key parameters collected include:

- Speed of Flow Entry Speed (SFE) is a network monitoring tool that tracks to determine the rate of new flow entry additions. Where sudden spikes in entry speed may indicate a DDoS attack or unusual network activity.

$$SFE = \frac{N}{T} \quad (1)$$

- **N** (Number of New Flow Entries): The number of new flow entries that have been added to the flow table during the measurement period.
- **T** (Time Interval): The time period during which the number of new flow entries is measured, typically expressed in seconds.
- The Speed of Source IP (SSIP) is the rate at which an IP address transmits packets over a network, which is vital in the analysis of network performance and in network security as well as the frequency of new connections made by a given source IP address. SSIP is the frequency with which an individual source IP produces traffic. Once this is suddenly high, it can be a sign of scanning, botnet, or a DDoS attack by the IP.

$$SSIP = \frac{\sum IPsrc}{T} \quad (2)$$

- **$\sum IPsrc$** (Sum of Source IP Packet Counts): The summation of packets or new connections initiated by a particular source IP address throughout the measure time..
- **T** (Time Interval): The duration over which the packets or new connections from the source IP are measured, typically expressed in seconds.

- Ratio of Flow Pair (RFIP) is a measure that is employed to assess the amount of two-way communication existing in a network. It is the number of flows that create reciprocal pairs to the total number of flows that are observed. An increase in the value of RFIP shows stronger patterns of two way communication characteristic of normal legitimate traffic. A decrease in RFIP can be an indication of abnormal activity like DDoS attacks in which the traffic is predominantly unidirectional.

$$RFIP = 2 * \frac{PairSum}{N} \quad (3)$$

- **PairSum** (Sum of Flow Pairs): The number of bidirectional flow pairs that were happening in the network within the measurement time. A flow pair may be two flows between the same source and destination that proceed in opposite directions..
- **N** (Total Number of Flows): The total number of all flow entries recorded in the network during the measurement period, including both unidirectional and bidirectional flows.
- **Standard Deviation of Flow Bytes (SDFB)** identifies the variation of the packet sizes. Big variability indicated by a high SDFB may be an indicator of an unusual traffic pattern whereas small variability indicated by a low SDFB is an indicator of a stable size of packets that is typical of a stable network behavior.

$$SDFB = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (packet_i - MeanPackets)^2} \quad (4)$$

- **N** (Total Number of Packets or Flows): The total count of packets or flow-byte measurements included in the calculation.
- **packet_i** (Flow Byte Value of the i-th Packet): The size, in bytes, of the i-th packet or flow entry being analyzed.
- **MeanPackets** (Average Packet Size): Mean of all the sizes of packets in the measurement set.
- **Standard Deviation of Flow Packets (SDFP)** measure looks at the frequency changes in flow packets during the analysis process. It quantified the variation in the numbers of packets per flow. Big deviation is one of the indications of an irregular or suspicious traffic behavior whereas small deviation implies predictable and stable network behavior..

$$SDFP = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (bytes_i - MeanBytes)^2} \quad (5)$$

- **N** (Total Number of Packets or Flow Records): The total number of packet-count observations or flow entries included in the analysis.
- **bytes_i** (Packet Count of the i-th Flow): The number of bytes or packets recorded for the i-th flow during the measurement period.
- **MeanBytes** (Average Packet Count): The arithmetic mean of all packet or byte counts across the observed flows.

The parameters collected through the experiment are saved in a result.csv file with a structured CSV format for use as training data by machine learning algorithms.

3.3 Feature Extraction

Flow-level features were found by processing recorded traffic to provide the possibility to detect DDoS attacks with necessary accuracy. The features chosen were Speed of Flow Entry (SFE) which reflects the rate at which new flows are initiated, Speed of Source IP (SSIP) which relates to the frequency of packets that are created by an individual IP and Ratio of Flow Pair (RFIP) which reflects the communication balance between the two end points, Standard Deviation of Flow Packets (SDFP) and Standard Deviation of Flow Bytes (SDFB). All these five features were selected due to their sensitivity to shortcomings of abnormal behavior and effectiveness in prior DDoS detection practices. The extracted features were stored in a CSV file to be used to train and validate the model.

3.4 Training and Classification

Four supervised machine learning algorithms, including Support Vector Machine (SVM), Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB), Decision Tree (DT), and Random Forest (RF), were used to conduct the classification task. The amount of features was extracted with all of them trained on the same features with five different train-test split settings: 90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 60:40, and 50:50. This was to be able to analyze how each of the models performed under different conditions of availability of the data available and to make a balanced comparison. It has been

implemented on the Python programming language with the help of the Scikit-learn library, and the classifiers were trained to determine whether a traffic example was a regular or an attack flow (Sahosh et al., 2024).

4. Performance Evaluation

The results of every classification model were evaluated against several common evaluation measures. These were the accuracy that is what gauge the general correctness of the predictions; the precision that indicates the ratio between the number of properly predicted attacks to each predicted attack; the recall (or detection rate), which reflects the percentage of actual attacks compared to those that were identified appropriately; and the F1-score, a function that balances between the accuracy and the recall level. Also, the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) was employed in assessing the capability of the classifier to make a distinction between classes.

A 5-fold cross-validation technique as shown in in Figure 2. was used to rule out overfitting, to assess models against other settings in the dataset. Confusion matrices were created to visualize values of true positive and false positive as shown in Figure 3, false negative, and true negative values to learn more about reliability of the model. The composite analysis was also useful in finding the optimum trade-off algorithm in terms of its detection performance using least amount of computation.




Figure 2. Cross-Validation with K-Fold =5




Figure 3. Confusion Matrix

- **Accuracy:** It measures the overall correctness of the model. It is the ratio of correct predictions to the total number of predictions. This is the most fundamental metric used to evaluate the model. The formula is given by

$$Accuracy = \frac{(TP+TN)}{(TP+TN+FP+FN)} \quad (6)$$

- Precision: It shows the exact number of attacks detected among all predictions. Calculate the ratio of true positives to the sum of true and false positives. It basically analyses optimistic predictions.

$$Precision = \frac{TP}{(TP+FP)} \quad (7)$$

- Recall (sensitivity, true positive rate (TPR)): It measures a model's ability to identify real attacks. Recall is the ratio of true positives to the sum of true positives and false negatives. It basically analyses the number of correct positive samples.

$$Recall = \frac{TP}{(TP+FN)} \quad (8)$$

- F1 score: which calculates a weighted average between Precision and Recall providing a holistic model evaluation. The F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. It is observed that during the precision-recall trade-off, as Precision increases, Recall decreases, and vice versa. The goal of the F1 score is to combine precision and recall.

$$F1\ score = \frac{2Precision*Recall}{(Precision+Recall)} \quad (9)$$

- Cross-Validation: It is a machine learning method for valuating how well a model functions on unseen data. It reduces overfitting and provides a more accurate estimate of a model's performance.

5. Results and Discussion

In this section, a DDoS detection engine deployed inside a Software-Defined Networking (SDN) framework, based on machine learning, is introduced. The first one is to assess the capability of the system to differentiate genuine versus malignant traffic with strong precision. The performance of the system is measured by using key evaluation metrics like accuracy, precision, recall and F1-score. The influence of training data percentage and network topology also on detection performance are included in the analysis.

The network was simulated through Mininet, which enables one to create lightweight virtual network topologies based on virtual machines. Mininet is selected because of its flexibility and ease to contain realistic SDN scenarios. It allows an extensive variety of SDN controllers and OpenFlow-enabled devices. In the context of this paper, Ryu SDN controller is chosen because it is a modular architecture developed in Python, and it is also a popular research SDN controller in academia. Ryu provides extendibility, ability to see traffic in real time and compatibility with Mininet (Smida et al., 2020)

The hardware configuration comprised an HP laptop with Windows 11 installed, featuring an Intel Core i5-5200U processor and 16 GB of RAM. The exercise itself was implemented on a virtualized system with VirtualBox. Ryu version 4.30 was deployed as a management tool to handle SDN control logic. The simulation was a custom topology that was loaded through Python scripts in Mininet.

When working with the simulation, Mininet brings up the virtual network and links switches to the Ryu controller through the OpenFlow protocol. Discovery messages are sent by the controller to the switches, where the network topology is mapped and a graph representation is generated upon which decisions can be made. With traffic going between hosts, the controller fills flow tables on the switches by installing forwarding rules that are dependent on traffic patterns observed and logic predetermined. Flow tables begin as empty and packet-in messages are sent to the controller, where it takes a decision on what to do. The switches start forwarding packets automatically when flow rules are installed.

Data flows between hosts are generated by traffic simulation tools e.g. ping to simulate normal as well as attack conditions. Such an installed infrastructure can enable the proposed ML-based detection model to be tested in an SDN environment. This is aimed at enhancing more accurate detection and network reliability by means of sharing the decision making with adaptive traffic control, flow analysis and network reliability analysis.

DDoS Detection Using Machine Learning

The experiment that was conducted in this section marks the first of a series of experiments that would be run to assess the effectiveness of machine learning models in identifying the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks within Software-Defined Networking (SDN) configurations. In Experiment, A one-switch and twenty-hosts SDN topology is emulated in the simulation environment with Mininet, an SDN flexible and easy-to-use simulator. This layout enables us to test real-time communication with SDN features (controllers, switches and hosts) and intervene and track network-based attacks.

The main aim of the present experiment is to test how different machine learning algorithms would perform on detecting DDoS attacks using labeled network traffic datasets. RYU controller is used to inspect traffic and

provide mitigation measures by dynamically updating flow tables as per the traffic pattern. The hping3 tool is used to simulate the attack and the controller configuration blocks the malicious traffic by disabling the attacker's port disabled until a specified period.

A certain real-life dataset of SDN traffic is employed in the experiment and consists of 302,003 flow records, including normal (159,974) and attack traffic (142,029). The data contains five main engineered features, which are Source Flow Entry (SFE), Speed of Source IP (SSIP), Ratio of Flow Pair (RFIP), Standard Deviation of Flow Packets (SDFP) and Standard Deviation of Flow Bytes (SDFB). These characteristics are used as input to four models of supervised learning models, which include Support Vector Machine (SVM), Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB), Decision Tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF).

The models are all trained and tested on various learning rates (90%, 80%, 70%, 60% and 50%) in order to determine how they generalize, how precise they will prove to be and detection accuracy to various data availability conditions. Outcomes are then matched on a basis to include Detection Rate (DR), False Detection Rate (FDR), Accuracy, Precision, F1-score, Cross-Validation Score, and area under the ROC Curve (AUC). Such an arrangement enables us to study how the size of training affects model robustness and performance, and determine the best

learning rates and the best classifier DDoS in SDN topologies can be assured of being detected




Figure 2. Network Architecture for the Experiment

The following figures show The Experimental stages.

The RYU controller starts, and the topology is configured using Mininet, then checking connectivity by (pingall)

```
Terminal
user@user-VirtualBox:~/12-2024/1L-1S$ ryu-manager app.py
loading app app.py
loading app ryu.controller.ofp_handler
instantiating app app.py of DDoSML
Application Started with Data Collection Mode
instantiating app ryu.controller.ofp_handler of OFPHandler
Switch 1 registered with controller
```

Figure 3. Start RYU for the Experiment

```

Terminal
user@user-VirtualBox:~/12-2024/1L-1S$ ryu-manager app.py
loading app app.py
loading app ryu.controller.ofp_handler
instantiating app app.py of DDoSML
Application Started with Data Collection Mode
instantiating app ryu.controller.ofp_handler of OFPHandler
Switch 1 registered with controller

```

Figure 4. Start RYU for the Experiment

After trading the model, the controller's operation was tested by creating an attack from h1 to h20 using the hping3 tool.

```

mininet> pingall
*** Ping: testing ping reachability
h1 -> h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h2 -> h1 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h3 -> h1 h2 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h4 -> h1 h2 h3 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h5 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h6 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h7 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h8 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h9 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h10 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h11 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h12 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h13 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h14 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h15 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20
h16 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h17 h18 h19 h20
h17 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h18 h19 h20
h18 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h19 h20
h19 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h20
h20 -> h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19
*** Results: 0% dropped (380/380 received)
mininet> h1 hping3 --rand-source -i u10000 -S -d 64 -c 1000 10.0.3.20
HPING 10.0.3.20 (h1-eth0 10.0.3.20): S set, 40 headers + 64 data bytes
--- 10.0.3.20 hping statistic ---
1000 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
mininet>

```

Figure 5. Creating an attack for Experiment

The controller detected the attack and blocked the source port on the switch for 60 seconds, as programmed.

```

Switch 1 - Stats: sfe 0 ssip 0 rfip 1.0 sdfp 0 sdfb 0
Normal Traffic on switch 1
Switch 1 - Stats: sfe 0 ssip 0 rfip 1.0 sdfp 0 sdfb 0
Normal Traffic on switch 1
Switch 1 - Stats: sfe 0 ssip 0 rfip 1.0 sdfp 0 sdfb 0
Normal Traffic on switch 1
Switch 1 - Stats: sfe 0 ssip 0 rfip 1.0 sdfp 0 sdfb 0
Normal Traffic on switch 1
Switch 1 - Stats: sfe 0 ssip 0 rfip 1.0 sdfp 0 sdfb 0
Normal Traffic on switch 1
Switch 1 - Stats: sfe 164 ssip 164 rfip 0.0 sdfp 0.0 sdfb 0.0
Attack detected in Switch 1
Prevention started - blocking attack source ports
Suspicious activity from port 1 on switch 1: 164 flows
Blocked port 1 on switch 1 for 60 seconds
Switch 1 - Stats: sfe 2 ssip 1 rfip 0.0 sdfp 0.0 sdfb 0.0
Attack detected in Switch 1
Prevention started - blocking attack source ports
Suspicious activity from port 1 on switch 1: 166 flows
Switch 1 - Stats: sfe 0 ssip 0 rfip 0.0 sdfp 0.0 sdfb 0.0
Attack detected in Switch 1
Prevention started - blocking attack source ports
Suspicious activity from port 1 on switch 1: 166 flows

```

Figure 6 Block port for Experiment

After that, an attempt was made to connect to the victim host, and it could not be reached until the port was unblocked by the controller.

```

1000 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
mininet> h1 ping 10.0.3.20
PING 10.0.3.20 (10.0.3.20) 56(84) bytes of data:
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=1 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=2 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=3 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=4 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=5 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=6 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=7 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=8 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=9 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=10 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=11 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=12 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=13 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=14 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=15 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=16 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.0.3.1: icmp_seq=17 Destination Host Unreachable
64 bytes from 10.0.3.20: icmp_seq=18 ttl=64 time=1048 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.3.20: icmp_seq=19 ttl=64 time=6.47 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.3.20: icmp_seq=20 ttl=64 time=0.570 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.3.20: icmp_seq=21 ttl=64 time=0.094 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.3.20: icmp_seq=22 ttl=64 time=0.063 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.3.20: icmp_seq=23 ttl=64 time=0.086 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.3.20: icmp_seq=24 ttl=64 time=0.111 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.3.20: icmp_seq=25 ttl=64 time=0.067 ms

```

Figure 7. Test connection after attack in Experiment

In the last stage, the system is evaluated by calculating evaluation metrics.




Figure 9. Evaluates the system for the Experiment

Table 2. Sample Data Table for Network Traffic Features and Classification for the Experiment

DATASET INFORMATION						
Total: 302003 records						
TYPE 0: 159974 records						
TYPE 1: 142029 records						
	SFE	SSIP	RFIP	SDFP	SDFB	TYPE
0	-4	0	1.0	3.485775	341.605901	0
1	2	0	1.0	10.115013	991.271294	0
2	0	0	1.0	7.801506	764.547564	0

The network traffic dataset used for DDoS attack detection for the Experiment is shown in Table 2. The flow record contains five key features, including SFE (Source Flow Entry), SSIP (Speed of Source IP), RFIP (Ratio of Flow Pair), SDFP (Standard Deviation of Flow Packets), and SDFB (Standard Deviation of Flow Bytes). The database contains 302,003 network flow items, each in a single row, as the foundation for training and validating

DDoS attack detection algorithms using machine learning models. There were 159974 normal flows and 142029 attack flow

Table 3. Network Traffic Features Importance for the Experiment with SVM

Feature	Importance	Percentage
SDFB	0.9727	97.27%
SFE	0.0138	1.38%
SSIP	0.0135	1.35%
RFIP	0	0.00%
SDFP	0	0.00%

Table 3 showed the distribution of importance among the five features in the SVM model that continuously use the model relies almost exclusively on SDFB (Standard Deviation of Flow Bytes), which accounts for 97.27% of its predictive power. Other features, including RFIP and SDFP, show zero contribution, indicating that SVM is highly sensitive to fluctuations in data volume rather than flow relationships or packet frequency.

Table 4. Network Traffic Features Importance for the Experiment with GNB

Feature	Importance	Percentage
SDFB	0.4779	47.79%
SDFP	0.3409	34.09%
SSIP	0.1121	11.21%
RFIP	0.0637	6.37%
SFE	0.0053	0.53%

The table 4 would demonstrate how the five features in the GNB were distributed in terms of importance. The two models highlight SDFB and SDFP with more than 80 percent of the significance. This is in line with statistical nature of Gaussian, which is more inclined by features that can be measured in variance. The moderate influence is on SSIP and RFIP with an almost insignificant impact on SFE..

Table 5. Network Traffic Features Importance for the Experiment with DT

Feature	Importance	Percentage
SDFP	0.3859	38.59%
SSIP	0.3344	33.44%
RFIP	0.2349	23.49%
SDFB	0.0285	2.85%
SFE	0.0163	1.63%

Table 5 showed the mean of the importance of the five features included in the DT model. Having a definite inclination toward SDFP, SSIP and RFIP, it is possible to recommend including the fact that the frequency of

packets, the behavior of the source and the relationships between outbound and incoming flows are essential indicators. The role of SDFB and SFE is not much but also participates in the decision-making process.

Table 6. Network Traffic Features Importance for the Experiment with RF

Feature	Importance	Percentage
RFIP	0.9097	90.97%
SDFB	0.0444	4.44%
SSIP	0.0246	2.46%
SFE	0.019	1.90%
SDFP	0.0024	0.24%

Table 6 demonstrates the weight of significance of the five features. The model is highly biased towards RFIP that contributes 90.97 percent of its weight. This is an indication of the model to include structural flow relationships as major predictors. The other characteristics play a small role meaning that Random Forest prefers inter-flow dynamics as compared to statistical or time specific aspects.

Table 7 . Comparative Summary of Feature Importance

Feature	SVM	GNB	DT	RF	Conclusion
SDFB	Very High	High	Low	Moderate	Crucial in statistical models
SDFP	None	High	High	Very Low	Effective in DT and GNB
SSIP	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Behavioural indicator
RFIP	None	Low	Moderate	Very High	Essential in RF
SFE	Low	Negligible	Low	Low	Least impactful overall

Table 7 presents the outcomes of the feature importance analysis that displays the highlights of the various ways that the classifiers react to flow-level features. Gaussian NB and other statistical models are based on the vitality of the packets and bytes, whereas the tree-based models (Decision Tree and random Forest) are focused on the behavioral and relational resemblances. Such diversity supports the choice of keeping all the features within the study framework, which will provide the fair comparison of models when a similar input structure is provided.




Figure 8. Distribution and correlation of data features for the Experiment

Figure 10 shows the statistical natures, correlation profiles, and time change of the five picked traffic features-Speed of Flow Entry (SFE), Speed of Source IP (SSIP), Ratio of Flow Pair (RFIP), Standard Deviation of Flow Packets (SDFP), and Standard Deviation of Flow Bytes (SDFB), which are the basis of the DDoS detection framework.

The frequency distributions (top row) show the predominant ranges of each feature, their variability, and skewness. As the example of SFE and SSIP shows, they exhibit high peaks around a small range, implying that under regular network operation, flow entries and source IP request rates do not vary much. SDFP, however, and SDFB have more heavily tailed distributions that represent variability in packet and byte size distributions, which can be symptoms of abnormal/malicious network traffic. As shown in FIP, there is a bimodal distribution close to 0 and 1 which is consistent with the structural disparity between legitimate and attack flows.

The scatter plots (middle row) give us an idea about the extent of inter-feature correlation. A strong linear correlation is found between SDFP and SDFB as would be expected given that often packet-level variability is proportional to byte-level variability. In contrast, laxer or non-linear relationships are seen among other feature pairs, SSIP and RFIP, and they measure different aspects of network traffic behavior. This variability in terms of

correlation would imply that the features chosen are not only not redundant but complementary, pointing to an even stronger collective discriminative ability when used jointly to identify categories in classification problems.

The lower row depicts time-series plots of individual feature change throughout time of the experiment being conducted. The stillness of the background on the normal section is highly contrasted to the abrupt increases and uneven fluctuations brought about in the attack scenes. As it could have been anticipated, SFE and SSIP indeed contain faster spikes in the cases of DDoS conditions, which involves high-frequency flow requests of the controller. Similar bursts in SDFP and SDFB are a signal of the discontinuity of a packet and a byte traffic induced by malicious traffic. These time signatures also support the same sensitivity of the selected features in capturing the dynamics in the attacks.

The multi-perspective perspective emphasizes the validity and centrality of the chosen feature set in general. The distribution plots justify the nature of variable characteristics of these values; correlation plots indicate complementary interaction, and order analysis of time-successiveness confirms that they are susceptible to aberrant traffic flow. These findings justify why the five features are suitable in developing the lightweight and efficient machine learning-based models to identify the presence of DDoS attacks within SDNs.




Figure 9. Decision Region Boundaries for DDoS Detection for the Experiment

Figure 11 gives a clear illustration of the decision region boundaries of DDoS detection attacks in Experiment, whereby various machine learning models are applied to classify the data by using the Ratio of Flow Pair (RFIP) in the x-axis and the Standard Deviation of Flow Bytes (SDFB) in the y-axis. According to the analysis of the feature importance table, which is presented in Table 6, a good consideration to select (RFIP) and (SDFB) as the axes to learn the decision boundaries is a good choice. Such a combination makes it possible to represent extensively not only the behavioral peculiarities of the source but also the statistical distribution of the network traffic. The incorporation of the two dimensions helps in improving the accuracy of the classification and helps in having a better visual understanding of the model performance in relation to the various machine learning algorithms..

The background coloring indicates the classification areas, with the orange portion representing attack traffic. Different shape markers in the plot indicate the data points, where squares (■) show regular traffic (label 0) and triangles (▲) represent DDoS attack traffic (label 1). Each model demonstrates how well it discriminates between the two classes (0=normal traffic, 1=DDoS). With its linear approach, the Support Vector Machine (SVM) draws a linear boundary exhibits sharp, linear boundaries, reflecting its sensitivity to margin maximization and its reliance on support vectors. Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB) model is a probabilistic model which works under the assumption that the values of features in each category of data are normally distributed and, therefore, the decision boundary is smooth and curvy. As a result of this assumption, there is the error of classification in common areas. The Decision Tree also employs threshold-based partitioning in order to subdivide the data, that is, forming clear and distinct boundaries, which adapts to local structures and which offers clean separation. They however are vulnerable to overfitting and noise. Random Forest (RF), comprising of several trees that are connected to each other, is better at classification accuracy, less overfitting, and less rigid boundaries allowing flexible boundaries which make it work well in complex and overlapping areas giving a decent balance in generalization versus discrimination.

Performance evaluation for learning rate 90%

The next part involved the evaluation of four algorithms (SVM, GNB, DT, and RF) on a training set size (90 percent, 30200, 5) and a test set size (10 percent, 271803, 5), and the results obtained were attributed to their respective algorithms as illustrated in the next part.

Table 8. Different ML algorithms with performance metrics, with 90% training for the Experiment

Algorithm	Confusion Matrix	Evaluation
SVM		DR(Recall) 0.999930050363738 FDR 0.009053756680289217 Accuracy 0.9951988344756796 Precision 0.9900270101807604 F1 0.9949538889855577 cross-validation 0.9952207833092045 AUC 0.999801
GNB		DR (Recall) 0.9993005036373811 FDR 0.0001886199308393587 Accuracy 0.9995695506771299 Precision 0.9997900482888935 F1 0.9995452160223893 cross-validation 0.9993892610703424 AUC 0.999905





Figure 10. ROC and AUC with 90% Learning for the Experiment




Figure 11. MLA Evaluation comparison with 90% Learning for the Experiment

As shown in Figure 13, it presents a comparative analysis of the performance of four machine learning models (SVM, GNB, Decision Tree, and Random Forest) based on a 90% learning rate, evaluating performance using several metrics such as detection rate (DR), false detection rate (FDR), accuracy, precision, F1, cross-validation, and AUC. The Random Forest model achieved the highest values across DR, cross-validation, and AUC, outperforming the other models. The model's robustness in pattern recognition. However, the ideal results may indicate overfitting. The Decision Tree achieved the highest Precision and the lowest false detection rate (FDR). GNB has the lowest DR value. SVM suffers from an evident lack of accuracy and a high error rate. AUC > 0.9 for all models indicates high efficiency, but the superiority of the random forest (1.00) suggests an exceptional ability to differentiate classes even with unseen data


Performance evaluation for learning rate 80%

The SVM, Decision Tree, Random Forest, and GNB models demonstrated exceptional performance across all evaluation metrics, with a training dataset size of 80% (241,603) and a test dataset size of 20% (60,400)

Table 9. Different ML algorithms with performance metrics, with 80% training for the Experiment


Algorithm	Confusion Matrix	Evaluation
SVM		DR (Recall)
		F1
		cross-validation
		AUC
		0.00901182802428187
		0.9952318670220691
		0.9899759841286415
Decision Tree		DR (Recall)
		F1
		cross-validation
		AUC
		0.9949627453038095
		0.9951780167083513
		0.999804

GNB




DR (Recall) 0.9993671553633583
 FDR 0.00025032855623005195
 Accuracy 0.9995695435506035
 Precision 0.9997186367952731
 F1 0.9995428651803925
 cross-validation 0.9993625885205327
 AUC 0.999890

Decision Tree



DR (Recall) 0.999894525893893
 FDR 6.258213905751299e-05
 Accuracy 0.9999172199135776
 Precision 0.9999296814570002
 F1 0.9999121033664411
 cross-validation 0.9999254974596624
 AUC 0.999949

Random Forest



DR (Recall) 0.999964841964631
 FDR 9.387320858626947e-05
 Accuracy 0.9999337759308621
 Precision 0.9998945333098963
 F1 0.99992968640135
 cross-validation 0.9999213583868146
 AUC 1.0




Figure 12. ROC and AUC with 80% Learning for the Experiment




Figure 13. MLA Evaluation comparison with 80% Learning for the Experiment





Referring to the values in the results shown in the Table 9. and Figure 15, which were used for ease of comparison and deduction of the best models, it was found. SVM has the highest detection rate (DR =1.0), the highest false detection rate (FDR = 0.90), but the lowest accuracy and weak overall performance in distinguishing between categories and unstable across different samples.

GNB and DT provide nearly identical distinct performance, characterized by high accuracy and low error rates, and appear to be stable in other metrics. RF demonstrating its predictive power and adaptability with the highest F1 score, precision, and AUC (1.0). With an 80% learning rate, it is the most effective and balanced model in this experiment.

Performance evaluation for learning rate 70%

The performance evaluation, using a 70% dataset size (211403, 5) for training and a 30% dataset size (90600, 5) for testing, is shown in the next section.

Table 10. Different ML algorithms with performance metrics, with 70% training for the Experiment

Algorithm	Confusion Matrix	Evaluation	
SVM		DR (Recall)	1.0
		FDR	0.008528163740743822
		Accuracy	0.9954746636350592
		Precision	0.9904506812623733
		F1	0.9952024338871986
		cross-validation	0.9950615388770409
		AUC	0.999821
GNB		DR (Recall)	0.9992475014697237
		FDR	0.00033280638988268576
		Accuracy	0.9994702045231288
		Precision	0.9996236091180691
		F1	0.9994355199096832
		cross-validation	0.9993755970019658
		AUC	0.999864
Decision Tree		DR (Recall)	0.9999294532627866
		FDR	0.00012480239620600716
		Accuracy	0.9999006633480867
		Precision	0.9998589164785553
		F1	0.9998941836266798
		cross-validation	0.9999101238846277
		AUC	0.999946
Random Forest		DR (Recall)	0.9999529688418577
		FDR	8.320159747067144e-05
		Accuracy	0.9999337755653911
		Precision	0.999905942107367
		F1	0.9999294549216949
		cross-validation	0.9998959326658421
		AUC	1.0




Figure 14.. ROC and AUC with 70% Learning for the Experiment








Figure 15. MLA Evaluation comparison with 70% Learning for the Experiment

Figure 16 and Figure 17 show that all models showed elevated values across most performance metrics. The Support Vector Machine (SVM) has the highest Detection Rate, but it is limited by the significant false detection rate which indicates reduced accuracy and suboptimal F1 score. Such high error rate makes it unsuitable to be used in practice. On the other hand, the Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB) model gives good and realistic results, with a fine balance between retrieval and accuracy and thus making it a fairly dependable model. The Decision Tree is an excellent performer in all the measures; however, the model can easily overfit because the values of performance are so high. Random Forest model has been recognized as the best and most balanced among other alternatives because it is the highest accuracy, F1 score and lowest false discovery rate (FDR) with an optimal area under the curve (AUC). This model demonstrates high efficiency of attaining a balance of sensitivity, accuracy and generalizability.

Performance evaluation for learning rate 60%

In the next section, the low learning rate was used to test the generalization under the setting of the reduced training samples; 60 percent of the dataset (120801, 5) was adopted as the training samples, and 40 percent (181202, 5) as the testing samples.

Table 11. different ML algorithms with performance metrics, with 60% training, for the Experiment

ORITHM	CONFUSION MATRIX	EVALUATION	
SVM	 A confusion matrix for SVM with True Label on the y-axis and Predicted label on the x-axis. The matrix shows 63876 true positives, 309 false positives, 2 false negatives, and 34765 true negatives. A color bar on the right indicates counts from 0 to 60000.	DR (Recall)	0.9999647682632515
		FDR	0.008729600999453423
		Accuracy	0.9953560371517027
		Precision	0.9902484125322727
		F1	0.9950828724439263
		cross-validation	0.9950276180314358
		AUC	0.999832
GNB	 A confusion matrix for GNB with True Label on the y-axis and Predicted label on the x-axis. The matrix shows 64015 true positives, 22 false positives, 40 false negatives, and 34773 true negatives. A color bar on the right indicates counts from 0 to 60000.	DR (Recall)	0.9992953652650307
		FDR	0.00034356211446864995
		Accuracy	0.9994867634641811
		Precision	0.9996123279705369
		F1	0.9994538214877198
		cross-validation	0.9993377529127578
		AUC	0.999851
DECISION TREE	 A confusion matrix for Decision Tree with True Label on the y-axis and Predicted label on the x-axis. The matrix shows 64031 true positives, 4 false positives, 3 false negatives, and 34763 true negatives. A color bar on the right indicates counts from 0 to 60000.	DR (Recall)	0.9999119206581288
		FDR	6.24658389943e-05
		Accuracy	0.9999254979222199
		Precision	0.9999295352852059
		F1	0.9999207278940925
		cross-validation	0.9998896257900188
		AUC	0.999974
RANDOM FOREST	 A confusion matrix for Random Forest with True Label on the y-axis and Predicted label on the x-axis. The matrix shows 64030 true positives, 5 false positives, 4 false negatives, and 34763 true negatives. A color bar on the right indicates counts from 0 to 60000.	DR (Recall)	0.9999295365265031
		FDR	7.808229874287499e-05
		Accuracy	0.9999254979222199
		Precision	0.9999119222096956
		F1	0.9999207292905271
		cross-validation	0.9998730691940689
		AUC	1.0




Figure 16. ROC and AUC with 60% Learning for the Experiment








Figure 19. MLA Evaluation comparison with 60% Learning for the Experiment

Based on the results, which are shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19, the following is observed. SVM records the highest detection rate (DR = .096). but suffers from a high false discovery rate (FDR = 87.29%), resulting in low accuracy and a weak F1 score. Due to the high error rate, it becomes less reliable. GNB achieves excellent and realistic results, maintaining a precise balance between retrieval and precision, which makes it a relatively reliable model. Decision Tree offers excellent performance across all metrics; however, it may be prone to overfitting due to its exceptionally high-performance values. Random Forest performs best and is the most balanced in terms of sensitivity and precision, achieving the highest accuracy, F1 score, and low false discovery rate (FDR), along with a perfect area under the curve (AUC), making it the most effective.

Performance evaluation for learning rate 50%

Fifty percent of the data, specifically the value (151001, 5), and utilized to train the models for the utmost robustness evaluation.

Table 12. Different ML algorithms with performance metrics, with 50% training for the Experiment

ALGORITHM	CONFUSION MATRIX	EVALUATION
SVM		DR (Recall) 0.9999436881449467 FDR 0.008540809563705936 Accuracy 0.9954503913855446 Precision 0.9904757920571173 F1 0.9951872219692458 cross-validation 0.9948874496721853 AUC 0.999866
GNB		DR (Recall) 0.9991130882829108 FDR 0.00030011629506433745 Accuracy 0.9994238486907459 Precision 0.999661943262811 F1 0.9993874404162589 cross-validation 0.9993907317660418 AUC 0.999841
DECISION TREE		DR (Recall) 0.9997888305435502 FDR 0.00010003876502144582 Accuracy 0.9998476841366339 Precision 0.999887365190212 F1 0.9998380954392189 cross-validation 0.9998675505459996 AUC 0.999879
RANDOM FOREST		DR (Recall) 0.99991553221742 FDR 0.00011254361064912653 Accuracy 0.99990066356737 Precision 0.9998733036770089 F1 0.999894417501355 cross-validation 0.9998807953598309 AUC 0.999969




Figure 17. ROC and AUC with 50% Learning for the Experiment




Figure 18. MLA Evaluation comparison with 50% Learning for the Experiment

Figure 20 and Figure 21 show that the Random Forest model demonstrates outstanding accuracy, F1 score, and AUC, indicating a robust balance between precise detection and generalization capabilities. Consequently, it emerges as the most effective and balanced model, showcasing superior performance across all evaluative metrics. The Decision Tree exhibits commendable performance, as evidenced by the lowest False Detection Rate (FDR); however, it concurrently registers a comparatively low F1 score, which may indicate a tendency toward a specific class. The SVM achieves high recall; however, it encounters a significant decline in precision and a heightened False Detection Rate (FDR), thereby affecting its reliability. The GNB exhibits low classification precision alongside a high false detection rate; nevertheless, it performs admirably in cross-validation and relative accuracy. Thus, it is not regarded as the most suitable choice for this experiment.

Comparing the results of different training ratios in the Experiment.

The model examined the impact of the learning rate on the performance of SVM, GNB, DT, and RF in the Experiment by comparing the evaluation results metrics.




Figure 19. Evaluation of SVM with different Learning rates for the Experiment

Figure 22 presents an analysis of the Support Vector Machine (SVM) model's performance at various learning rates. The results indicate that reducing the learning rate of the SVM model improved the Area Under the Curve (AUC), while maintaining the high Detection Rate (DR), but a decrease in the cross-validation score and a high value of the False Detection Rate (FDR) suggest instability in the model's performance when trained on different subsets of data, which makes it unsuitable for DDoS detection in SDN networks.




Figure 20. Evaluation of GNB with different Learning rates for the Experiment

The analysis in Figure 23 shows that the performance of the Gaussian Naïve Bayes (GNB) model varies with different learning ratios. As the learning data decreases, the precision, F1 score, and accuracy become unstable, while the false discovery rate (FDR) increases. The model's performance remains less stable, with cross-validation values being significantly affected.



Figure 21. Evaluation of DT with different Learning rates for the Experiment

According to the performance analysis of the Decision Tree model depicted in Figure 24, a consistent observation is made concerning the area under the curve (AUC) and precision across a range of varying learning rates. It is observed that cross-validation, accuracy, and the F1 score exhibit a decline as the volume of training data diminishes from 90 to 80, then they increase with decreasing learning from 80 to 70, then they approximately stabilize as the learning ratio decreases. FDR increases in value when the learning ratio changes from 90 to 80 and reaches its highest value when the learning ratio is 80%, then decreases with decreasing learning ratios. Although the Decision Tree model demonstrates commendable performance in terms of accuracy (Accuracy = 0.9669) and metrics such as F1 and AUC at a learning rate of 90%, the consistency of these metrics across alternative rates, including cross-validation and FDR, suggests that the model may be susceptible to overfitting.




Figure 22. Evaluation of RF with different Learning rates for the Experiment

Figure 25 illustrates the analysis of the Random Forest model's performance across various ranges of learning data. It demonstrates stability in AUC, cross-validation, F1 score, and precision. A decrease in the detection rate (DR) and accuracy is observed when the training rate is diminished. The optimal learning rate for the Random Forest model is identified as 80%, achieving the most favorable balance among recall, precision, accuracy, and error rate. The model with this learning rate has a strong performance, as well as admirable generalizability, and does not experience any problem with overfitting.

According to the above discussion on the impact of learning ratios with regard to the effectiveness of machine learning models, the best-performing algorithm between the three learning ratios is the Random Forest algorithm, which achieves high accuracy, discovery rate, F1 score, and cross-validation scores. The reduced false detection rate ($FDR = 9.3e-05$) indicates the strong generalization abilities of the model. It shows the best performance under a learning ratio of about 80 as this ratio generates the best balance between accuracy and generalization to give a stable performance and high capacity to handle new information.

Conclusion The findings of this investigation provide substantial empirical substantiation elucidating the efficacy of machine learning methodologies in enhancing the security frameworks of software-defined networking ecosystems against distributed denial-of-service incursions. The Random Forest algorithm was identified as the most effective model for instantaneous detection, attaining remarkable performance metrics when subjected to an 80:20 data partitioning strategy, culminating in an accuracy of 99.99%. This elevated degree of precision signifies the model's adeptness at reliably differentiating between legitimate and malicious traffic patterns, even amidst intricate and fluctuating network conditions.

In addition, the paper explains how combination of well-designed feature engineering and effective machine learning models creates a dependable and scalable architecture to intrusion detection in SDN architectures. This combination enhances the defensive resilience of the network and leads to the development of adaptive detection systems that can maintain high performance in a variety of operational environments. Besides, the findings highlight the need to create models that demonstrate successful generalization in different traffic behavior and topological structures to provide uniform detection accuracy in a range of deployment conditions.

These findings add to the vast understanding of how machine learning is applied to the security issues, inherent in SDN, and emphasize the need to conduct further studies aimed at optimizing feature selection and evaluating

performance in realistic network environment settings, and examining hybrid mechanisms that can be used to combine machine learning with traditional security mechanisms.

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